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In the wake of Brexit and Trump, the debate surrounding post-truth fills the
newspapers and is at the centre of the public debate. Democratic institutions and
the rule of law have always been constructed and legitimized by discourses of
truth. And so the issue of “post-truth” or “fake truth” can be regarded as a con-
temporary degeneration of that legitimacy. But what, precisely, is post-truth from
a theoretical point of view? Can it actually change perceptions of law, of institu-
tions and political power? And can it affect our understanding of society and social
relations? What are its ideological premises? What are the technical conditions that
foster it? And most importantly, does it have anything to teach lovers of the truth?
Pursuing an interdisciplinary perspective, this book gathers both well-known and
newer scholars from a range of subject areas, to engage in a philosophical inter-
rogation of the relationship between truth and law.
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Post-truth: what is it about? Introduction
Tiziana Andina and Angela Condello
I.1 Fake images, fake narratives, fake facts (by A. Condello)1
With the present book, we aim to discuss the relationship between law, socio-
political relations and institutions, and truth. In particular, we will focus on the
consequences produced by various phenomena of truth-deformation and on their
impact on the political equilibrium and on democracy. The topic, indeed, requires
a timely theoretical analysis: legal and political legitimation are quite evidently
going through a crisis.
Starting from some concrete cases, the present introduction aims at drawing a
general framework for the theoretical cornerstones underlying the relationship
between law, post-truth and democracy. In particular, the concrete cases show the
impact of post-truth on the political and legal legitimation of authority and power
in contemporary societies.
Before proceeding, one clarification needs to be made. Throughout the chap-
ters collected here, authors often use the expression “fake news” in order to refer
to the most recurrent phenomenon associated to the more general linguistic and
epistemic practice known as “post-truth”. This practice consists of many different
actions: for instance, commenting on an image, reporting concrete facts and data,
or analyzing phenomena through a distorted perspective in order to evidentiate
some aspects and neglect others.
For instance, let us take the Italian public discourse on migration evidently, if a
whole category of subjects is depicted as being dangerous, sick, untrustworthy and
scary, the political agenda and the legal policies proposed and carried out will
reflect the type of consensus produced by the mainstream public opinion about
these subjects. Here we will consider in particular one fake image, two fake nar-
ratives and some fake data.
1 I wish to thank Valentina Calderone (Director of A Buon Diritto Onlus) and Valentina
Brinis (UNHCR Italy) for their advice on the information discussed in this paragraph
and (more importantly) for their work to make migration policies more humane and
just.
I.1.2 Fake image
Who is Josefa? Her full name is Josephine and she comes from Cameroon. The
image of her rescue in the Mediterranean in summer 2018 went immediately viral
on the web for two reasons: (i) she was the only one to survive the shipwreck of a
boat coming from Libya, a tragedy whose victims included a mother and her little
boy; (ii) Josefa, before the rescue, spent two days floating in the sea, holding on to
a piece of wood until the volunteers of the Spanish NgO Open Arms recovered her
in the waters off the cost of Libya.
Josefa’s eyes and tears then appeared all over the world. A detail was noticed:
there was another picture of Josefa circulating on the web, showing her after the
rescue, and at a closer look one could notice that she was wearing nail polish. This
picture also went viral, and a comment started turning Josefa’s tragic story into a
mystery. A woman commented on her Twitter page that the story of Josefa’s
rescue might have been a fake: how could Josefa’s hands look so clean after two
days in the sea? How could she be wearing red nail polish? Something was wrong,
something had to be false.
Annalisa Camilli, journalist at Internazionale, immediately replied to the com-
ment (she was on the boat with the Open Arms volunteers and had witnessed the
rescue): the picture circulating on the web, where Josefa wears nail polish, was not
taken right after the rescue, but four days later. The boat, after the rescue, navi-
gated to Spain, where some female volunteers helped Josefa recover, and thought
nail polish could help her feel a little better. She wore no nail polish whatsoever
when she was rescued.
I.1.3 Fake narratives
There are various narratives concerning migrants that, today, are quite popular in
Italy and Europe: some concern health, others public safety. It seems to be a
widespread (false) belief that migrants bring dangerous diseases: for instance,
malaria and tuberculosis. They allegedly come from Africa with their diseases and
spread them in healthy Europe. This is false, and a clear product of what a report
of the Council of Europe defined “information disorder”.2 As for malaria, the
National Institute for Health reports that the cases of malaria diseases in Italy were
not caused by infected migrants, but very likely by an insect that travelled with
European tourists and that was brought back through their luggage.
The false narrative concerning public safety, instead, is that migrants tend to be
criminals. Actually, this has become an equation often taken for granted in public
discourse. Data confirm the opposite: in relation to the percentage on the Italian
population, the number of migrants (which is an imprecise category, because not
all of them are refugees, nor are all of them illegal migrants) shows that they do
2 Information disorder: towards an interdisciplinary framework for research and
policy making: https://rm.coe.int/information-disorder-toward-an-interdisciplina
ry-framework-for-researc/168076277c.
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not tend to commit crimes. More likely, whenever a migrant commits a crime,
that individual event is immediately reported and goes viral more quickly.
I.1.4 Fake facts
In a video uploaded on her Facebook page, the leader of the right-wing party
“Fratelli d’Italia”, Giorgia Meloni, re-published a fake news piece that had been
circulating for months on right-wing webpages. The piece of news reports that
philanthropist millionaire George Soros (disliked by Trump and by right-wing
European leaders), in collaboration with MasterCard, would have distributed a
certain number of credit cards to migrants in order to help them flee from their
home countries and reach Europe. These credit cards allegedly bear the logo of
UNHCR, the UN agency working for refugee policies. How did the fake fact
emerge? It seems that the xenophobic Slovenian website Nova24, which had
spread other conspiracy theories and false facts, was the first to publish the news.
According to The New York Times, this website is controlled by other media
companies financed by politicians close to Viktor Orbán, the extreme right-wing
Hungarian leader. In October 2018, this website reported a Croatian policeman’s
declaration that many of “these migrants” entering the European border were well
dressed (as if it that was a crime, and as if one could not flee from war or famine
with a decent shirt), but most importantly they had MasterCard credit cards. A
policeman’s personal opinion thus became a (post-)true fact, which was naively
reported by a political leader in Italy. Without checking the source.
In short, what matters is the function performed by images, narratives, or facts.
I.2 Is post-truth only fake or is it something more? (by T. Andina)
The notion of “post-truth” seems to share some of the meanings that identify the
concept of “fake”. However, two points must be underlined: as emerges from the
examples we have just discussed, some fakes, for various reasons, take on a more
structured form than others; this form coincides with what we call “post-truth”.
The second point we must try to keep in mind is that this transition from truth to
post-truth seems to be subject to two conditions: first of all the idea that truth is
often placed, or perhaps hidden, in inaccessible or hardly accessible places. This
idea then generates a fundamental distrust, accompanied by the feeling that the
truth is often intermingled with deceit and that there is no way to separate the two
areas: truth and lies tend to overlap and it is seemingly impossible, from an epis-
temological point of view, to keep them separate.
This intuition has sceptical roots and was mainly introduced in philosophy by
Friedrich Nietzsche: to speak of truth and falsehood as two sides of the same coin
means to argue that there is no way to draw a line between truth and lies because
we do not have the epistemological tools to do so. This epistemological concern
created the conditions for the development of post-truth. In this sense, post-truth
is what emerges after we have discovered that the epistemological horizon of truth
must be replaced because, somewhat paradoxically, it is not true, or because it
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cannot be understood using the classical notions of truth and falsehood. In this
sense – this is the idea – the truth should be replaced with post-truth: that is, with
something that we know to be fluid, constructed and subject-dependent.
If Nietzsche laid down the premises for this sort of epistemological turn, post-
modern philosophy has completed and defined the horizon of post-truth, paving
the way for this conception of “fluid truth” to be applied outside the perimeter of
philosophy. To clarify this idea I think it is useful to take an example: namely the
narratives surrounding the issue of climate change. This is a typical case in which
the radical weakening of truth has allowed for the implementation of a precise
strategy, which has clear objectives in terms of economic repercussions. But let’s
take a step back and see how we’ve come to this situation.
I.2.1 On certainty: from fake news to post-truth
In principle, certainty would seem like a good guideline to follow; the problem,
however, lies in the idea of “absolute certainty”. What does it mean to have
absolute certainty when considering, for example, scientific problems? Absolute
certainty does not exist in science – which rather relies on a verifiable and share-
able method. In essence, science proceeds by trial and error, in order to get closer
and closer to a good degree of certainty. In other words, science has developed a
method that provides for the possibility of error and its correction: it therefore
provides for a margin of uncertainty without this jeopardizing the possibility of
producing objective knowledge.
However, it is precisely this margin of uncertainty that has given rise to the
radical and quite imaginative theses used by the many negationists of climate
change. In particular, their criticism is focused on two issues: firstly, on the
unreliability of scientific studies that deal with climate change; secondly, on the
idea that taking this uncertainty into account means accepting that any other
hypothesis has the same degree of legitimacy as those studies and, therefore, can
be supported as a plausible and founded alternative.
In reality, all evidence shows that this is not the case. Climate science has been
telling us for years now that climate change is taking place and that its origin is
anthropogenic. From the scientific point of view the trustworthiness of these
theses is very high. About 97% of the scientific production on these issues con-
verges to support three theses: (1) there is no doubt that the phenomenon of cli-
mate change is underway, (2) that it is anthropogenic, namely that a substantial
part of it can be traced back to human choice, and, finally, (3) that it is extremely
dangerous. On the basis of such a broad convergence of scientific literature, it is
more than founded to believe that scientific knowledge offers reasonably certain
conclusions in this regard. Yet the 3% of discordant scientific opinions has been
sufficient to produce a negationist rhetoric, aimed at precise economic and devel-
opment strategies.
Climate negationism began to take on an organized form in 1998, the year of
formation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The panel
was made up of hundreds of scientists from around the world who had been
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assigned the goal of studying climate change by providing empirical data. In all its
reports, the IPCC has always been consistent in supporting the anthropogenic
origin and the danger of climate change. The United States was the one to
strongly oppose the IPCC’s conclusions. In 1989 the Global Climate Coalition
was created, encompassing five oil companies as well as the Chamber of Com-
merce and the national association of US manufacturing industries. Beginning in
1995, when the second IPCC report was released, the association systematically
attacked the work of the panel undermining the credibility of the scientists who
were part of it. The communication strategy that they decided to adopt was
extremely simple and effective: the idea was to show that if there was no complete
consensus among scientists it was not possible to consider the results of those
studies completely certain. And since such total consensus was not present, it was
necessary to conclude that those researches had no sufficient scientific validity.
Now, as we have already pointed out, any researcher knows well that that kind
of consensus – that is, a consensus based on absolute certainty – is neither possible
nor necessary to produce certain knowledge. Nonetheless, the arguments of the
negationists have found significant consensus in the public opinion and this con-
sensus has been easily transformed into political action, that is, into social and
political pressure. Following this, the political decisions of the US government
have marked the choices that have affected and are still affecting climate change at
the global level, in decisive and fundamentally negative ways.
This story has all the ingredients for the transition from truth to post-truth: a
well-founded and reasonably certain scientific research is discredited using argu-
ments that have no meaning in the scientific community, but are rhetorically
effective and convincing for the general public; an economic and political objective
(producing wealth through a certain economic model) is lucidly pursued by some
economic-social actors; finally, extremely powerful and effective mass commu-
nication tools are used to create broad consensus. So, the strategy put in place for
the formation of the post-true narrative about climate change (as in the case of
narratives about migrants in Europe) was roughly the following: scientific knowl-
edge (or, in the case of migrants, social-historical knowledge) has been strategi-
cally weakened in the pursuit of a precise goal. On this basis, a certain narrative
was constructed and communicated, one that was functional to the purpose and to
the formation of social consensus. Finally, once the social context had been ade-
quately prepared, political action has been able to follow through – being able to
count on a wide consensus consolidated by continuous artificial “constructions” of
the truth (and falsehood).
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1 Truth, lies, and post-truth
Tiziana Andina
1.1 Post-truth
Post-truth is a mysterious object that has become part of our epistemologies for
some years now. As often happens, the term was coined to solve a problem,
namely the fact that the distinction between truth and lies, in some contexts and
situations, seems to have become particularly fluid and subtle, up to vanishing
altogether occasionally. True and false would be a whole in which everything is
confused together, depending on the perspective we adopt. Of course, no one
argues that lies should be preferred to the truth, but the concept of truth is
undoubtedly not doing too well given that it was thought useful to add to the
traditional pair of truth and lies a third concept, that of post-truth, which some-
what plays with the idea that there is “something” beyond the truth.
As is known, the function of theories in philosophy is to elaborate hypotheses to
offer arguments in support of an explanation. Now, the fact that theories have been
conceived that, in some way, refer to the concept of post-truth means two things: first,
that the concept of truth, in itself, has seemed to some insufficient to explain the type of
relationship that exists between human beings and the world. Second, that the tradi-
tional concept of truth, which – to be clear – certifies the correspondence between the
human representations of reality and reality itself, has seemed too rigid, too anthropo-
centric, to actually account for the complexity of the real. Therefore – at least ever since
Immanuel Kant – philosophers have begun to formulate the hypothesis that there is
something else, something that is placed beyond what the truth is able to capture.
Is there something beyond the truth? And if so, what is it exactly? It does not
seem easy to answer this question, but the concept of post-truth appears to result
from a certain dissatisfaction about the definitions of truth and lies: a dissatisfac-
tion similar to that which must have driven Kant to introduce the concept of
noumenon next to that of reality. At the other end of the reality of phenomena,
Kant placed something that goes beyond them, pointing at perfection: beyond the
imperfect and partially unknown world in which we find ourselves, beyond what
we construct and organize in that world, there we find the noumenon which is
perfect and complete and which perhaps we will never see or know. Yet, some-
how, we know that it exists and that it has (at least) those characteristics. I think
Kant introduced the noumenon into his theory because of his idea of perfection of
being: in some way, the world had to be better than we know it to be. The
hypothesis of the existence of a noumenal reality expresses this conviction.
The idea of post-truth, at least in its first approximation, on the one hand seems to
react to the Kantian conviction about the perfection of being, on the other hand
seems to radicalize Kant’s skepticism about the possibility of developing true judg-
ments about the knowledge of the external world, or relative to the knowledge of
phenomenal reality. The general thesis is rather simple: since we have reason to doubt
that it is accessible or even that it serves something, we consider the truth a bad telos,
something to which it is not necessary to aspire. Instead, post-truth seems to be, on
the one hand, a more modest and much more realistic objective, on the other hand, a
more useful perspective to organize the sense of reality. In short, if truth is a high and
unrealistic concept, that of post-truth seems to be a more circumscribed, consoling
domain, because it is more accessible and, in some way, ecumenical.
Post-truth is thus a type of truth that is for everyone, because – as we know all
too well – the truth understood in the traditional sense of the adaptation of the
proposition to the thing can be very hard both to achieve and to support. So, a
version of it at everyone’s reach, also suitable for the weaker, less radical, spirits,
can perhaps make us happier, make us feel less inadequate and – most impor-
tantly – open up a world characterized by a plurality of ideas and points of view.
Most of the latter, in the view of post-truth supporters, can aspire to a legitimacy
that is proportional to the rhetorical and polemical vehemence with which they are
expressed. In other words, the more one supports a post-true thesis, the more one
will be able to claim it should be considered true.
That is to say: if we admit that the truth as such does not exist, we must replace it
with individual versions of post-truth. In other words, post-truth becomes the mea-
sure of the fact that in our particular perspective we have placed a meaning in relation
to our life; a meaning that is true for us and only for us or, at most, for those with
whom we share the same perspective. In some ways, the commitment to claim post-
truth is stronger than that to support the truth which, in fact, in many circumstances
speaks for itself. The point, as I will try to show, is this: the post-true perspective has
the objective of debilitating or, if you will, weakening the truth, replacing it in the
name of tolerance, democracy, and respect. Now, these are all very shareable values,
when applied to the practical sphere of human life, but perhaps are less appropriate in
relation to truth. Yet, we often tend to confuse the epistemological and ethical levels.
Finally, according to some hermeneutical philosophies, that of post-truth seems to
be the only domain in which we ought to be interested, because it is a non-ideolo-
gical domain, which consciously rejects the rigor and harshness of any judgment that
claims to be true and therefore definitive and certain.1 The underlying intuition is that
humans should abandon the search for truth as a practice capable of giving them an
identity, simply because each individual corresponds to a particular identity, style, and
character; while, conversely, the truth seems unique, something that must be
achieved and shared and that, sometimes, was even imposed by force.
1 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, Princeton University
Press.
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1.2 Definition and genealogy
To approach the notion of post-truth and to capture the constellation of meanings
to which it refers, let’s examine the definition of the concept and then go back-
wards, reconstructing the genealogy of the term through the history of ideas.
“Post-truth. Argumentation characterized by a strong appeal to emotionality,
based on widespread beliefs and not on verified facts, which tends to be accepted
as truthful, influencing public opinion”. This is the definition of post-truth that we
find on the Treccani encyclopedia. The Oxford dictionary describes the concept in
much the same way: “Relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective
facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and
personal belief”.
The two definitions share more than one element, but mainly the idea that
post-truth involves a strong emotional reaction in relation to what the post-true
judgment is about. In other words, post-truth, more than truth, is emotionally
connoted: emotions help post-truth come into being; we could say that they favor
it. As is known, traditionally, a strong emotional connotation is considered an
element of disturbance to the formulation of true judgments, since emotion is able
to alter the objectivity of the formulation of the judgment. In the case of post-
truth, on the contrary, the emotional connotation would be the most useful ele-
ment to convince people to support post-true opinions.
The second assumption shared by both definitions regards the idea that, in the
domain of post-truth, objective facts have very little weight and, in any case, much
less importance than what we attribute to unfounded opinions. In other words,
the facts that we consider objective as verified are irrelevant. A third assumption
concerns the sphere of influence of post-true judgments and opinions. In fact, the
latter seems to be a very wide sphere indeed. The formulation of post-true judg-
ments, in general, does not concern experts in a certain domain; it rather concerns
non-experts, that is, practically all of us, formulating judgments whose objects are
not things we can claim to be competent in.
To summarize: the formulation of post-true judgments generally depends on
people who are not competent in the area in which they formulate judgments –
which means that, concretely, we are all exposed to the possibility of formulating
post-true judgments. Furthermore, the exposure to post-truth grows along with
the degree of emotionality that characterizes the issues we are dealing with. To be
clear, the more we are dealing with things that concern and involve us, but in
which we are not competent, the higher the risk of formulating post-true obser-
vations or opinions. In essence, therefore, nobody seems to be effectively pro-
tected from the risk of formulating post-true opinions and judgments and,
therefore, from contributing to muddying the waters of truth.
The last element that needs to be emphasized is the necessary link between
truth and post-truth. In both definitions it is possible to speak of post-truth
because, in the final analysis, we are still speaking of truth, or rather because the
concept of truth continues to offer the background of reference. There is a post-
true domain because there is a true domain – at least according to the definitions
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we have seen earlier. So, it seems to be indispensable to clarify what is meant by
truth in order to foster a better understanding of the concept of post-truth.
Truth is one of those concepts that has always run through the history of philoso-
phy. Plato, in the Cratylus, specified that “that speech which says things as they are is
true”2, while Aristotle, in Metaphysics, put forward the very famous definition by
which: “To say that what is is not, or that what is not is, is false; but to say that what is
is, and what is not is not, is true.”3 The Aristotelian definition would later be the
reference of Thomas Aquinas who, as we know, articulated the theory of truth as
adaequatio rei et intellectus, formulated for the first time by the philosopher Isaac Ben
Israeli.4 Post-true judgments are independent of the will to describe things as they
are; the goal of those who formulate them is instead that of constructing a narrative
that presents them to us as we wish, imagine, hope, or fear them to be.
As for the authors of post-true judgments, we must consider at least three cases.
The first is that in which the authors of post-true judgments believe that the for-
mulation of their judgments corresponds to the truth. So, in essence, they end up
mistaking post-truth (opinion, Plato would say) for the truth. Ultimately, they do not
question the truth, nor do they doubt that the truth exists: they simply confuse what
is true with what, at most, is only verisimilar. A second case is given by those who
formulate post-true judgments while being aware that they are post-true judgments
and using them as such. In essence, they lie knowing they are lying and do so for a
purpose. A third case, the most complex and philosophically interesting, is that of
those who believe that there is only post-truth, while truth is a kind of false myth that
philosophy should deconstruct and investigate genealogically. In this case, post-truth
completely replaces truth. Let’s consider the issue in more detail.
1.3 Truth pushed to the edge
One of the tasks traditionally assumed by philosophy is to subject everything to
critical scrutiny, even things that come with reasonable certainty. One of the most
striking examples of this deconstruction is René Descartes’ famous suspicion
towards the existence of the external world, which he developed with increasing
radicality, up to contemplating hypotheses that a person of common sense would
not even dream of formulating. Let us say, Descartes suggests, that what we call
reality is, in fact, a dream.5 After all, we could very well fail to notice the difference
2 Plato, Cratylus in Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 12 translated by Harold N. Fowler
(Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1921),
385b.
3 Aristotle, Metaphysics in Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vols.17, 18, translated by Hugh Tre-
dennick (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann
Ltd. 1933, 1989), IV,7 1011b.
4 Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate, q. 1. a. 1.
5 René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, in The Philosophical Works of Descartes
(Cambridge University Press, 1911). Friedrich Nietzsche’s insight is brilliant in this
respect: “Misconception of Dreams.—In the dream, mankind, in epochs of crude pri-
mitive civilization, thought they were introduced to a second, substantial world: here
we have the source of all metaphysic. Without the dream, men would never have been
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between reality and dream, since it sometimes happens that our dreams have ele-
ments of reality: it does happen that while we dream we mistake the dream for
reality. How can we rule out that this is not always the case and, indeed, that there
is no mysterious entity, perhaps evil, that deceives us systematically, causing us to
confuse dream and wakefulness? If this is the case – and no one, according to the
skeptical argument, can really exclude that it is – then it will be necessary to for-
mulate a theoretical and heuristic hypothesis that addresses the matter. This is one
of Descartes’ fundamental arguments in his Meditations.
It is not easy to deconstruct the skeptical argument because it asserts a possibi-
lity that, as such, cannot be excluded. If we accept, from an epistemological point
of view, the possibility of this paradox, it is not easy to get out of it, or rather it is
not easy to demonstrate that in reality this possibility is only possible (or even
impossible). Common sense has been widely used as a foothold to combat skep-
ticism which, however, cannot be silenced altogether. What common sense can
easily achieve is to show that it is not worthwhile to follow the skeptical path, since
it adds nothing to what we know with some degree of reasonable certainty. On
the other hand, the risks we run if we try to solve the skeptical doubts and take
them seriously are very high: in fact, to do so we should question the minimal core
of knowledge that allows us to dwell in the world and make value judgments.
George Edward Moore was of the idea that through common sense we know
certain things about the world with reasonable certainty, which philosophical
analysis could never find in a better and more convincing way. In essence, there is
no way that philosophy could bring our fundamental knowledge to a higher
degree of certainty. Epistemologists will not be satisfied – as is inevitable – but
ordinary people have no need to justify their knowledge of, say, the existence of
material objects in ways other than those they already know and practice. On the
basis of these intuitions, Moore committed to show the high degree of uncertainty
and implausibility implicit in skeptical arguments, compared to the certainty that
instead accompanies some statements of ordinary language.6 If Tom wants to
show Dick that there are three printing errors on page 11 in his book, what he
should do is go to page 11 and show him the errors, indicating them. In this way,
Dick would see the errors and easily convince himself that there are indeed three
printing errors in that book, on page 11. Moore believes that we must behave in
the same way with regard to the skeptical arguments about the existence of the
external world. Suppose we have to prove the existence of things in the world. It is
enough to show the existence of something in the world – it would not be
necessary to do anything else.
incited to an analysis of the world. Even the distinction between soul and body is
wholly due to the primitive conception of the dream, as also the hypothesis of the
embodied soul, whence the development of all superstition, and also, probably, the
belief in god.” F. Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human (Chicago, Charles H. Kerr &
Company 1908), § 5.
6 G. E. Moore, Philosophical Papers, Muirhead Library of Philosophy (London, New
York, Allen and Unwin; Macmillan, 1959), 32–59.
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Some have noted7 that Moore’s argument would leave the skeptic unsatisfied,
since it says nothing about the existence of external objects, but at most argues for
the existence of a certain external object – the book containing the errors on page
11. However, Moore’s purpose is clearly not to follow the skeptic into the folds of
his doubt, but to offer reasons not to get lost in it in the first place, i.e. to escape
that sterile deconstructive path. To put the question differently: is it really con-
venient, in terms of economy of thought, to accept the skeptical doubt? In other
words: given that the goal is knowledge rather than deconstruction, what advan-
tage would skepticism bring? I think this is a legitimate question, whose answer is
the only bulwark we can oppose to the skeptic’s deconstructive drive. There has
been a time in the history of philosophy in which not only the reality of the out-
side world was questioned, but the truth itself began to be viewed with suspicion
and distrust. It has been doubted whether people can access it, partially or com-
pletely, or, more radically, whether it even exists. In other words, some have
questioned whether the world in which we live is the true world, or whether it is
only the product of appearance or deception. Moreover, and more radically, it has
been asked if it made sense to speak of truth. The first question (about the real
world), actually seems paradoxical, at least from the point of view of common
sense. The second, on the very possibility of formulating true judgments, seems
radically absurd since the truth is intrinsic to our way of knowing the world.
Let’s start with the first one. One of the reasons that has led philosophers to
systematically ask the question of truth and to often put it in terms of the rela-
tionship between reality and appearance, translating it into the relationship
between truth and deception, is the suspicion about the limits and fallibility of
sensible knowledge. If we accept the fact that sensitive knowledge is somewhat
problematic and accidental – namely that it can be subject to deception due to
perceptual dysfunctionalities or cognitive errors in the brain’s processing of infor-
mation – then it seems necessary to find some grounds for knowledge that are safe
from the fallibility of the senses.
The senses, moreover, depend largely on one’s species: at a macro level the
information produced by perception is shared, but at a closer look human beings
perceive the world differently from (say) bats, cats, or fish. So, Kant investigated
the modalities of sensible and intellectual knowledge, relativizing them to the
human being. However, after circumscribing the perimeter of human knowledge,
bringing it back to its conditions of possibility, Kant also asserted that what there
is does not coincide with what humans can know. In other words, he hypothe-
sized that there are limits to what we can know and that what lies beyond these
limits – and of which we only have some negative intuition – is somehow more
real, more true, and more consistent than the reality to which we confer meaning
through reason and the senses.
In short, part of Kantian metaphysics is the idea that there is, or may be, a rea-
lity that is more true than the phenomenal reality that we also call true. Now, it is
7 P. A. Schilpp, The Philosophy of G. E. Moore (Open Court Publishing Company, 1999),
397–417.
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evident that this intuition does not make sense if transposed in the terms of
ordinary language, since for the common person it makes no sense to maintain
that there is a reality more real than that in which we live, or to make this reality a
transcendent reality separated from the human one. From the perspective of
common sense, we can hypothesize that there are things that escape our senses
because they are too big or too small or too complex, but in some sense, what is
there is all there is, and it is true.
Kant cautiously circumscribes the domain of what we can know, and limits it to
what can be encountered through our senses and explored through our intellect.
On the other hand, he is also certain that outside of this perimeter there is some-
thing more, which, however, we are destined to know only as a negative limit. We
know that there is something, but we do not know what it is, so we must consider
that limit as a regulatory principle. Kant thus overthrows the traditional framework
long upheld by philosophy, where the episteme prevailed on the doxa, so that the
former was seen as the only area in which it actually makes sense to speak of
knowledge. Rather, Kant circumscribes the scope of possibility to metaphysics,
somehow undermining the ultimate value of knowledge and keeping space for the
truth, while denying that it is a space that human knowledge can access. Essen-
tially, he introduces the idea of a truth circumscribed to the sense domain con-
structed by human beings – therefore, in the final analysis, a truth true to them,
but not absolutely true.
This idea is clearly guided by a principle of prudence, which involves certain
consequences, some desired by Kant himself – above all, the limitation of the
scope of investigation of metaphysics – others, in some way, unforeseen, such as
those produced by the introduction of a concept of truth that declares itself lim-
ited to a specific domain, that of human life. What is true is true, but it is true for
us who know things through senses and categories that work in our typical and
standardized ways. Humans know the world precisely within this domain which
they themselves create in the exact moment they organize it. Prudence, however,
concealed certain dangers that emerged promptly when the Kantian theory was
taken further.
This particular side of Kantianism was drawn on and developed by Friedrich
Nietzsche, who radicalized the subject taking it to extremes and trying to base it
on two distinct levels: physiology and the critique of culture. Once clarified that
only humans care about the truth, since only humans use languages and only
humans exist in the world reflecting on the meaning of their relationship with it,
we can deduce that the truth only exists for humans and relatively to their rela-
tionship with the world. Furthermore, we cannot exclude that, having a meaning
only for us, the truth is relative to our needs, or even depends on those needs.
Therefore, Nietzsche suggests that the truth is nothing other than the outcome of
a strategy aimed at survival. Let me quote here a somewhat long but particularly
meaningful passage, taken from Human, All Too Human:
Metaphysical World.—It is true, there may be a metaphysical world; the abso-
lute possibility of it can scarcely be disputed. We see all things through the
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medium of the human head and we cannot well cut off this head: although
there remains the question what part of the world would be left after it had
been cut off. But that is a purely abstract scientific problem and one not much
calculated to give men uneasiness: yet everything that has heretofore made
metaphysical assumptions valuable, fearful or delightful to men, all that gave
rise to them is passion, error and self deception: the worst systems of knowl-
edge, not the best, pin their tenets of belief thereto. When such methods are
once brought to view as the basis of all existing religions and metaphysics,
they are already discredited. There always remains, however, the possibility
already conceded: but nothing at all can be made out of that, to say not a
word about letting happiness, salvation and life hang upon the threads spun
from such a possibility. Accordingly, nothing could be predicated of the
metaphysical world beyond the fact that it is an elsewhere, another sphere,
inaccessible and incomprehensible to us: it would become a thing of negative
properties. Even were the existence of such a world absolutely established, it
would nevertheless remain incontrovertible that of all kinds of knowledge,
knowledge of such a world would be of least consequence—of even less con-
sequence than knowledge of the chemical analysis of water would be to a
storm tossed mariner.8
So, Nietzsche accepts the Kantian hypothesis: that is, he accepts the idea that there
could be a metaphysical world to which we usually associate a metaphysical truth,
which we know we cannot access. What we call truth is the fruit of the perspective
from which we formulate it, and more precisely, it is the fruit of the structure of
that perspective and of the idea of utility that it expresses. Hence a minimal and
prudent truth which – and this is the point – is the “owl” of post-truth.
1.4 Game over for the truth
Thus, Nietzsche pushes the truth from the edge of metaphysics, where it had
already been relegated by Kant’s decentralization, even further to outside the
realm of philosophy. The way he does so is rather simple. While granting the
possibility of the existence of being in itself, he decisively distances himself from
metaphysics on some specific questions concerning, roughly, the limits and char-
acteristics of human knowledge, the irrelevance of the metaphysical question for
common sense and, finally, for life. In other words, he does not simply claim that
it is true that being is when it is, but goes so far as to affirm that we call true that
which is useful – for us, that is. The revolution initiated by Kant thus becomes
Copernican with Nietzsche. Let’s see the fundamental questions around which it
revolves.
The relativity of perspective. Nietzsche believes that human beings, the only
creatures for which the word “truth” has any meaning, consider the world and the
truth from their own point of view. They can know their point of view and the
8 Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, § 9.
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ways in which it is determined, as well as the conditions that determine it, but they
cannot in any way come out of it, nor can they transcend it. This situation is
immutable: it cannot be changed or corrected. So, we have no way of knowing
what we would know if we were in different conditions. This situation – which is a
fact – makes the metaphysical question about the thing in itself irresolvable: it is
virtually possible that our knowledge is marked by imperfection, typicality, and
incompleteness and we may never notice. This is evidently the skeptical hypoth-
esis, transposed to the question of truth.
The limits of perspective. The knowledge that we usually produce when seeking
the truth is affected by the imperfect components of our humanity: typically, pas-
sions and emotions. All this exposes us to error. We are interested in metaphysics
precisely because of our passion for building worlds: we are passionate about this,
so we create imaginative and false explanations, i.e. fantastic worlds. It should be
noted that, rather curiously, Nietzsche continues to use the distinction between
truth / error / lie in this context, even after having completely dismissed the
truth. He dismisses it by rejecting the hypothesis that it is possible to reach the
truth with the hypothesis that truth is a theoretical construct subordinated to
utility.
We do not and cannot know what is absolutely true, but generally each of us
knows what is useful for them, which may or may not be in agreement with the
utility of the species. So, in the name of survival, reason tricked us into treating
utility as if it were the truth. Therefore, it passed off a circumscribed benefit as
absolute truth. In this context, the task of philosophy consists precisely in
describing this shift in all its significance, so as to take any residual grounds away
from metaphysics. The truth is no longer even a regulative principle: it has turned
into a lie which must be believed so as not to deprive human beings of their pur-
pose. In the long run, however, this “truth” will inevitably come out and reveal
itself as a lie.
The limits of the metaphysical question. For Nietzsche, the question of truth and
the real world, as it is posed by metaphysics, is only relevant to philosophy,
whereas for common sense these are largely secondary questions. The reason for
this lies in utility: the question about the conditions of possibility or knowledge of
the thing in itself does not affect daily life. It could affect the moral sphere, but as
Nietzsche shows, the latter is a typically man-made construct which, significantly,
derives from what humans consider useful for life.
The truth is now completely pushed aside: not only is it a secondary concept,
but it is also false,9 because it is the outcome of manipulation driven by bad con-
science, which transforms utility into reality. This manipulation has disruptive
effects, because the faith in the truth – as Nietzsche says – has given rise to the
most powerful energies. What happens is that we, human animals, only care about
things in their relationship with the human sphere, especially with regard to their
ability to bring pleasure or pain. If we ourselves are the criterion of truth, while
9 Friedrich Nietzsche, On Truth and Lying in An Extramoral Sense (Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1989).
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the yardstick of judgment is given by utility, it follows that what our species per-
ceives as useful is seen as true. If anyone ever revealed the truth to us, not only
would we not know what to do with it, but we would be deeply disappointed:
Whoever should disclose to us the essence of the world would be undeceiving
us most cruelly. Not the world as thing-in-itself but the world as idea (as
error) is rich in portent, deep, wonderful, carrying happiness and unhappiness
in its womb. This result leads to a philosophy of world negation: which, at any
rate, can be as well combined with a practical world affirmation as with its
opposite.10
As you can see, Nietzsche is deeply interested in the needs of the human being,
and therefore focuses on the question of happiness, creating an ambivalent ten-
sion: if someone revealed to us the essence of the world, if such a thing exists, it
would make us unhappy. Only the lie – which is also infinite freedom, because it
coincides with absolute creativity – gives us a colorful, interpretable world, with
which we can play and create endlessly. This childish creativity towards the truth
also seems to be the only guarantee of happiness. After all, this is the meaning of
the famous aphorism 125 of The Gay Science: “the madman.”11 In Nietzsche’s
view, the madman is such precisely because he has unmasked the most gigantic
deception of metaphysics, namely the existence of God and, as a result of this
unmasking, he tries to tell the world about this fact. The metaphysical world, of
which God’s existence would be a guarantee, provides shelter to human beings,
giving them some form of serenity. However, this comes at a dear price, a price
that we have all paid: human beings are content to live within protective lies, and
the madman pays with madness for his search for the truth.
However, even though Nietzsche dismisses the truth, calling it artisticity and
deception if not even a useless frill, the truth remains there: it is told by the
madman who strives to make it known to all. The madman knows that whoever
hears his story is destined to unhappiness; therefore, he also knows that, to defend
themselves from the truth of his story, his listeners will call him insane. This ten-
sion constitutes the backbone of the whole Nietzschean theory: on the one hand
there is the idea that the real world is a metaphysical construction that has been
developed by humans to defend themselves from the instability of a reality that
they fear and cannot control, and the idea that breaking free from that construc-
tion would allow those who have a strong enough spirit to live in a state of fuller
happiness because they would be more exposed to life, which is all there is.
On the other hand, there is a constant reference to the truth, because saying
that reality is neither captured nor described by the categories of true and false
means to argue against the theoreticians of truth with a specific truth – Nietzsche’s
own truth. There is no way out here, and Nietzsche knew this: any description of
being, however weakened or provisional, refers to a structure, albeit that of a
10 Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, § 29.
11 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science (Cambridge, CUP, 2001), § 125.
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world without structure. Moreover, Nietzsche himself could only draw his con-
clusions by taking the skeptical doubt seriously, in other words, by postulating
that reality may be radically different from how we experience it, because there
may be living beings who experience it and construct it in ways that are totally
different from ours. This could be the case, of course, but there is no evidence that
it is so.
1.5 The effects of the Nietzschean dynamite: the downfall of truth
and the rise of post-truth
“I am no man, I am dynamite”. In fact, the question of truth as Nietzsche inherits
it from Kant and then develops it in his own way is explosive to say the least in
terms of its consequences. Let’s try to recap the theoretical cores of the Nietz-
schean discourse:
1 The push of metaphysics to truth has no reason to exist for two reasons: first,
because even if it existed, the truth expressed in absolute terms would be a
negative concept: something about which, in the final analysis, we cannot
state anything. Second, because the only truth about which we can affirm
something is a truth circumscribed to the domain of the human being, the
only creature for which it makes sense to speak of truth and falsehood.
2 This type of investigation, so dear to philosophers, is absolutely indifferent to
common people, for whom the only perspective that counts is that of utility,
and secondly that of happiness. Therefore, it would be appropriate for philo-
sophers, too, to learn to deal with common sense rather than metaphysics.
3 Since truth in the absolute sense does not exist, it is entirely legitimate for
human beings to take care of their happiness by pursuing their own utility. As
for what kind of utility can convey happiness or at least serenity, Nietzsche
explains it extensively through his genealogical reflections aimed at discussing
the cornerstones of traditional metaphysics: the substantial subject, substance,
and God. Given this gigantic deconstruction of the foundations of reality and
the consequent reworking of the main concepts that make up traditional
ontologies, it is obvious, from the Nietzschean point of view, that happiness
should go through unhappiness – that which derives from the loss of any
object endowed with a comforting function. In these terms, the happiness
that Nietzsche has in mind is something that is only possible for the chosen
spirits – a happiness for the few.
These are the fundamental elements of Nietzsche’s theory. What is most inter-
esting with regard to the discourse about post-truth are the consequences of his
idea of the truth. First of all, it is important to note one point: although Nietzsche
undertakes to deconstruct the idea of truth understood in the traditional sense and
to limit its scope to a very circumscribed area – the human one – the truth remains
in the background as the horizon that makes the Nietzschean reasoning possible.
Nietzsche cannot eliminate the truth: he can weaken it, marginalize it, he can talk
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about its twilight, but he cannot overshadow its light completely. While dismissing
the truth, he tells us that utility and happiness (in the particular sense that
Nietzsche ascribes to the term) are more important than a truth whose power has
been tremendously reduced. If the truth is pushed to the edge of the scene, what
we should focus on is happiness.
Happiness is the core of the concept of post-truth as we understand it today.
Given that truth is not possible, since it may not be possible in absolute terms,
post-truth is there to make us, or allow us to be, happy, though not in Nietzsche’s
terms.12 Nietzsche’s conception of happiness was extremely burdensome: he dis-
missed the truth, but he made happiness something extremely demanding – prac-
tically elitist. His model of happiness required commitment to shape one’s
character, to control one’s instincts, to forge one’s will: a work that has an ascetic
aspect and that has a certain idea of human perfection as its natural telos. The idea
that it is legitimate to replace truth with utility and happiness is inherently pro-
blematic and full of implications, but Nietzsche somehow limited the con-
sequences of it – at least those implied by his theory – by proposing an ethics of
self-improvement that preserves the ideal of the human being, although it too is
full of consequences (many of which are questionable).
If, however, we redefine happiness in less demanding terms than those that
Nietzsche had in mind and bring it down to common sense – the same common
sense that is generally the focus of politics when it comes to creating consensus –
then the formulation of post-true judgments implies the adoption of absolutely
individualistic criteria that are tailored to the happiness of those who formulate the
post-true judgment. The domain of post-truth is not aimed at the truth: it is
content with a modest utility which, moreover, is functional to the achievement of
an equally modest happiness. Its core is equality – any judgment has equal legiti-
macy as long as it is useful to those who formulate it. Still Nietzsche, somewhat
paradoxically, captures well the mediocre nature of this typicalization:
Now, the great majority of mankind endure life without any great protest, and
believe, to this extent, in the value of existence, but that is because each
individual decides and determines alone, and never comes out of his own
personality like these exceptions: everything outside of the personal has no
existence for them or at the utmost is observed as but a faint shadow. Con-
sequently the value of life for the generality of mankind consists simply in the
fact that the individual attaches more importance to himself than he does to
the world.13
12 Here’s an example: “What I wish for those men who are of any concern to me at all is
that they experience suffering, desolation, sickness, ill-treatment and indignities—that
profound self-contempt, the torment of self-distrust and the misery of the vanquished
not remain unknown to them: I have no pity for them because I wish them the only
thing which can prove today whether one has any value or not—that he stands firm.”
Nietzsche, The Will to Power (London, Penguin, 2017), § 910.
13 Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, § 33.
12 Tiziana Andina
In this further stretch of his theory, Nietzsche recalls a doctor prescribing a cure
while knowing very well what side effects it will present.
In post-truth, any judgment should be heard and legitimized simply because it
has been formulated. Therefore, the best-formulated post-true judgments are
those that are rhetorically more effective and arouse emotions capable of making
them incisive. There are two objections, in my opinion decisive, to the two ver-
sions of the post-truth theory, namely the Nietzschean, broader variant and
today’s one, which is a less refined and less noble subspecies of the former. The
first is a sort of diffused mist that permeates a universe in which everything has the
same legitimacy. In the mist, the coordinates are lost and we lose direction even
more than in the dark. The second is that the post-true world will not produce a
better humanity: on the contrary it will produce a second-rate humanity, one for
which nothing matters except one’s own happiness. Nietzsche had a vague suspi-
cion, a presentiment, that this could happen: in a world where everything has the
same value – the value that each of us give it – we need Baron Münchhausen’s
initiative not to sink in the swamp.
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2 Certain trouble
Mockumentaries and truth
Sanja Bojanic´
2.1 Certain trouble: mockumentaries and truth
We are so eager for “truth”. But neither in life, nor theory, nor arts or politics is
truth given, and figuring out what appears to be true and what appears to be false
requires approaches that demand time and persuasive skills; not only rational and
argumentative proficiencies, but also artistic ones, which deal with a series of ele-
ments of aesthetic nature, and above all, of affective and emotional accuracy.
Indeed, producing or evidencing any material, information or fact, even artistic
fact, is somewhere in the midst of a framework that deals with both truth and
accuracy but also persuasiveness and acceptance.
Still, the truth and the accuracy I am dealing with in this chapter is not scientific
nor is it philosophical. The protocols of truth and accuracy don’t only imply par-
ticular argumentative correctness and exactness but also a certain structure of
affective acceptability built through a specific framework of timing and condition-
ing of the truth/falsehood relationship. By demonstrating functionality of a parti-
cular genre of cinema and its relation to truth, outlined throughout the twentieth
century, my intention is to highlight difficulties of unmet affective accuracies that
sometimes documentaries and specifically mock-documentaries, channel while
creating what has been seen, heard and experienced as true. More precisely, and
for the purpose of this chapter, the question is under which conditions we are
revealing the truth and what are the conditions under which the truth has been
accepted, on one hand in documentary, and on the other, in mockumentary.
Finally, my main objective remains to question the persuasiveness and affective
expressiveness of the message they deliver. Why does this message need to be true
and what are the consequences if it doesn’t meet spectators’ expectations?
But firstly, as the accuracy of what truth is should not be ambiguous, it is
impossible to say that something could be “more true”; even though it is possible
to say that it could be more accurate. It is well known in philosophy, and specifi-
cally in the theory of “truthmaking” (see Beebee and Dodd, 2005) at the inter-
section between ontology, metaphysics and semantics, that scholars deal with
acceptance and rejection of arguments about truth-makers’ maximalism where
every truth has a truth-maker. Generally, truth is made true in relation to a fact.
But this making or producing of the structure of facts becomes more complex
when dealing with the representation of facts that have certain accuracy and still a
problematic relationship with truth. Nevertheless, the goal here is not to go into a
long-standing and internal debate on truth and the accuracy of philosophers but
to point out the affective and emotional complexity of representing and accepting
truth in a particular genre of cinema (documentary and mockumentary).
In his 1995 book on some of television’s most controversial ways of addressing
the viewer as citizen and consumer, John Corner asked vital questions about the
nature of what appears on the screen and how it varyingly engages, informs and
entertains viewers. By retracing ways of reproducing informative facts, he pointed
out that:
the core mode of documentation from the 1930’s through to today is the
employment of the recorded images and sounds of actuality to provide the
viewer with a distinctive kind of ‘seeing’ and ‘hearing’ experience, a distinctive
means of knowledge.
(Corner, 1995: 78, author’s italics)
The particularity of such knowledge is thus produced through “a distinctive kind
of ‘seeing’ and ‘hearing’ experience” supported by “recorded images” and
screened evidences. Processes of supporting facts using the camera thus enable a
long list of specific cinematic “truth-makers” which differentiates at least two
major categories: what is seen and screened is evidential (i.e. real) and what is
constructed and screened is fictional (not-real or fake).
To illustrate this practice of “recorded images and sounds of actuality” belong-
ing to these cinematic “truth-makers”, I introduce a few remarks on one of the
pillars of the documentary in the history of cinema, Dziga Vertov and his Kino-
Pravda (1922–25) comparing it in a further step to one recent mockumentary (or
fake documentary) by Ziga Virc, entitled Houston, We Have a Problem! (2016,
98’). The aim of their brief presentations and comparison is to stress how affective
and emotional accuracy (which both examples remarkably carry each in their own
particular manner) influences “truth-making” and blurs the distinction between
factual and fictional in documentaries. Furthermore, it also introduces a certain
ineffectiveness of argumentative and factual persuasiveness when it comes to
recorded and screened footages and their overwhelmingly affective expressiveness.
If in the first case of Vertov our affective reactions meet the expectations of
spontaneity of life, sophisticated and technically successful mockumentary leaves us
emotionally unsatiated.
Kino-Pravda/Kino Istina (literally translated, “film-truth”) is the translation for
“cinema verité”, “direct cinema” and a synthagm describing a subject moving
through the world with a camera. Dziga and Ziga, likewise Vertov and Virc may
sound alike but these authors are on the opposite sides of a similar genre.
It was in 1922 that in the Soviet Union, Dziga Vertov started the Kino-Pravda
series. The series of 23 newsreels-documentaries took its title from the official
government newspaper Pravda and expressed Vertov’s agitprop preoccupations
serving the communist idea. On the one hand the Kino-Pravda was linked to the
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old newsreel, but on the other, it was a contemporary mouthpiece of the cine-
matic eye of the author who in a period of several years left an incredibly rich
heritage for the history of the world cinema. His experimental silent documentary
The Man with the Movie Camera (1929) shoot with the same zeal as Kino-Pravda
is famous for the range of cinematic techniques it invented. Vertov’s well-known
resistance to the Capitalist film industry in the early years of cinema opened a clear
path to depicting life as such with statements such as: “The body of cinema is
numbed by the terrible poison of habit. We demand an opportunity to experiment
with this dying organism, to find an antidote” (Barnouw, 1993: 54). His antidote
was “reality”. Together with his younger brother Mikhail Kaufman and his wife
Yelizaveta Svilova (who actually covered the opening of Auschwitz by the Red
Army in January 1945), they were to shoot what seemed important and to catch
life “unaware”. Kino-Pravda needed the camera eye, a kind of a truth-maker
considered as a miraculous tool and a “machine for seeing” which could help the
human eye perceive things it could not otherwise see. Vertov’s specific vision was
to capture “film truth” – i.e. fragments of actuality which, when organized toge-
ther, have an accuracy that cannot be seen with the naked eye. In his book pub-
lished in 1936, he affirmed “showing the truth is far from easy,” even though “the
truth itself is simple.”
Our eyes see very poorly and very little – and so men conceived of the
microscope in order to see invisible phenomena; and they discovered the
telescope in order to see and explore distant, unknown worlds. The movie
camera was invented in order to penetrate deeper into the visible world, to
explore and record visual phenomena, so that we do not forget what happens
and what the future must take into account.
(Vertov, 1984: 67)
With its dynamic, swift camera movements, double exposures, jump cuts, self-
reflexive visuals and rapid close-ups, Kino-Pravda was considered livelier than
most newsreels. Focusing on everyday experiences and shunning bourgeois con-
cerns, Vertov filmed marketplaces, bars and schools instead, sometimes with a
hidden camera, without asking permission first. The episodes of Kino-Pravda
usually did not include reenactments or any staging (with a few exceptions: the
people reading the journals in the trolley and the scenes of the selling of the
newspapers on the streets). The cinematography was simple, functional, unelabo-
rate, an obvious result of Vertov’s disinterest in both “beauty” and the “grandeur
of fiction.” It dealt with “the prose of life” (Vertov, 1984: 67–69) but processed
with certain elements that would convey symbolic values. So in issue No. 24
(1925), on the first anniversary of the death of Lenin, we see people streaming
past the dead leader in his coffin. Meanwhile the living Lenin appears by super-
imposure in the corner of the screen as though still speaking to them. Here the
“simplicity” of truth has been covered by sophisticated and tricky double expo-
sure, presence of the absent with intentions of symbolically comforting mourning
masses. The Kino-Pravda series considerably influenced the development of the
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documentary as a genre and likely contributed to Time’s decision to create The
March of Time. The inspiration to the cinema vérité movement of the 1960s was
not evident solely by its name but in the aspiration of capturing life “on the run”.
Content of life has been satiated by details and affective spontaneity. The stories
were typically descriptive, not narrative, and included vignettes and exposés,
showing for instance the renovation of a trolley system, the organization of farm-
ers into communes and the trial of Social Revolutionaries; one story even shows
starvation in the nascent Communist state.
This was to be a cinema of the seen, recorded and screened fact, of life
unscripted, and the cinematographer rejected any attempt to introduce fictional or
narrative elements as rearguard. For Vertov, cinema rose to its full potential as a
medium only when it “was built on the organization of documentary footage
recorded by the camera” (Vertov, 1984: 103). Affective and emotional persua-
siveness of the screened material fulfilled all expectations and the film was shown
with extreme directness and candor. On the contrary to his understanding of
capturing these life instances, the narrative cinema was “a phenomenon of a sec-
ondary, theatrical nature” as it was “founded upon the organization of acted foo-
tage recorded by the camera” (ibid.). This incredible energy and speed invested in
the creation of the cultural policies of the Soviet government actually followed the
interest in film expressed by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, resulting in subsidizing film
production and creating state film schools to train personnel for the new industry.
It was known that Lenin preferred the educational content found in newsreels and
documentaries, and argued for the establishment of a “fixed ratio between enter-
tainment pictures and scientific [documentary] ones” (Vertov, 1984: 88). This
protocol identified as a “Leninist ratio” followed the idea according to which if
you have good newsreels and serious educational films, then “it doesn’t matter if
some useless film is shown to attract an audience” (Vertov, 1984: 113).
Clearly, Vertov’s ideological faith didn’t only respect technological progress but
also certain pre-formalist elements which treated the cinematic eye as “the possi-
bility of making the invisible visible, the unclear clear, the hidden manifest, the
disguised overt, the acted non-acted” (Vertov, 1984: 82), finally constructing
reality from sometimes falsely spontaneous situations and directing raw screened
material into truth. Kino-Eye was to show truth on the screen and this truth was
given as the Kino-Pravda (film-truth). Avoiding any form of prearranged narra-
tive, emotional and affective persuasiveness make their way to the spectators in a
purely formalist, technological and repetitive manner. Obviously, these proceed-
ings matched Victor Shklovsky’s (1923) words from his manifesto: “Now (in
1923) words are dead, and language is like a graveyard, but an image was once
alive in the newly-born word”. A few lines later we read, “every word is basically
— a trope” and “we live as if coated with rubber.” The only imperative should be
to recover the world. The author continues:
The purpose of the image is to call an object by a new name. To do this, to
make the object, an artistic fact must be abstracted from among the facts of
life. We must first of all ‘shake up’ things… We must rip things from their
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ordinary sequence of associations. Things must be turned over like logs in a
fire.
(Shklovsky, 1923: 24–26)
Vertov’s words from A Report to the Cine-Eyes (Kahana, 2016: 171–173) are less
metaphoric even though they grasp the same radical necessity of epistemic change
and call for certainty that he finds in technology: “The technical quality, the social
and historical value of the material and, subsequently, the quality of the whole
thing depend on how and when we submit life to the lens and how we reinforce
the trace that it leaves” (Vertov, 1984: 113).
“Shaking up things” and quite intriguingly “submitting life to the lens”, face
the same goal of materially reinforcing the traces of life that subsequently didn’t
work later in the Stalinist and Zhdanov era of social realism. Truth then ceased to
be a product of hard work and investigation, and contrary to Vertov’s first inten-
tions, it only remained a highly constructed ideology packed into the hermetic
narrative. His position of cinematographer who produced and made naked truth
contrasted the opposing tendencies of substituting the cinematic eye with a well-
developed story. In the rest of the twentieth century the new documentary age
prevailed with various subgenres combining exactly the same tropes Shklovsky
fustigated as a waste of time and creative energy.
Documentary story-telling gradually contaminated screening of what has
been seen, heard and experienced as evident and true. In fact, it culminated in
different docufiction forms and the development of the mockumentary which
eventually found its ways as a genre combining facts and fiction, i.e. fiction and
facts in a form of chiasm. Comparing it to previously exposed Vertov’s inten-
tions, new documentaries started lacking the whole “reality” or “evidential”
part of the construction. This is the nuance between the construction of the
truth effects and the accuracy to the facts. Smoothly composed narration thus
feeds the spectator’s need for affective satiety. It urges the spectator’s satisfac-
tion but doesn’t meet his/her need for truth nor for the reality. Unlike most
docufictions which are by definition considered and treated as documented
story-telling, the trouble with mockumentary starts when it appropriates much
more closely the look and feel of a basic form of documentary. Mockumentary
uses all documentary devices such as voiceover narrations, on-camera interviews
and reenactments in order to provide appearance of documentary authenticity
to events that are actually staged and scripted (see Lipkin, Paget, and Roscoe,
2006: 11–27). It pretends going through the research and investigation by
citing the sources and providing disclaimers. Tricky enough, it remains reality
based and eventually, what it should mark it out from the “hoax” or “fake-
ness” is the unwritten contract set up between producer and audience (see
Schantz, 2018). Still, this lookalike attitude distances it from a position of the
truth-maker and obstructs its intentions. Consequently, even though mock-
umentary’s basic incentives are to deconstruct, criticize and mock certain rea-
lity, its relation to truth becomes distorted.
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But, let us first check what Houston, We Have a Problem! is about. The whole
film is extremely well packed and staged. All we read in its spoiler, we could watch
on screen. The story starts with:
the discovery of the newly declassified information proving that in the 1960s
the United States government paid $ 2.5 billion to buy the Yugoslav space
program, under the mistaken impression that it was far in advance of where it
was.
The plot is furthermore developed by introducing historical figures of John F.
Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson and even Richard Nixon, threatening president of
then Yugoslavia, Tito, “trying to get the tech to work or to get the money back.”
Along the way, Ziga Virc intercuts the story as being told by supposed historian
Roger McMillan, providing piles of “evidences” and archive footage. It chooses a
main character, a smart and obscure engineer “Ivan Pavic” who has been suppo-
sedly smuggled to the United States. More or less, the narrative is based on the
main character’s testimony during the visit to his abandoned birthplace in Yugo-
slavia and his first encounter with a daughter he never met. Americans patiently
kept the engineer alive, as he was supposedly helping them to crack the moon-race
code during the Cold War. By the end of the film, Slavoj Zizek (involved in the
process of production and certainly because of the notoriety mentioned as one of
the main protagonists), while commenting what has been screened proclaims:
“Even if it didn’t happen, it’s true.”
This ambiguously strange formula comes to an end and confirms the parody of the
whole script. Its ill tuned satirical tones leave most of the audience unfulfilled at
spending some time witnessing a film that mocked up, not only the conspiracy the-
ories and roles that certain figures had in a recent history of the Balkans region, but
also collective beliefs. The seemingly Lacanian statement with McLuhan’s nuances
not only pretends to propose a better understanding of the Real (as unattainable) but
puts truth on the opposite side of the Vertov’s “simplicity” and the understanding
that “showing truth is not easy” even though “truth is simple.” Regretfully, nowa-
days the post-truth ambiance encourages biases, which appear as truth. It allows
situations that pretend to be true and represent truth and results in the parodying of
truth to the point of inventing it. Distortion of truth and its highly constructed nar-
ratives reminds us of Shklovsky’s words: “we live as if coated with rubber.”
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3 After the ordeal
Law and the age of post-truth
Angela Condello
a uniformly valid and binding
designation is invented for things,
and this legislation of language likewise
establishes the first laws of truth
[Nietzsche 1873]
3.1 Preliminary remarks
Few things are probably more risky for a jurist than theorizing on the nature of
truth, (plus) starting from remarks on language; and, if it was not sufficient, within
a book composed by a relevant number of philosophical contributions. Yet, it is
precisely from language that I intend to begin and, in addition to this, it is with
some remarks on language that I shall conclude. In this book, we are called to
discuss the functions and values of post-truth today, and to question its meaning
from different disciplinary perspectives; the composed term ‘post-truth’ has been
used very frequently in the last couple of years, and it keeps being used quite fre-
quently nowadays. Why did this word emerge? What makes the use of the
expression “post-truth” relevant?
Emergence. New words emerge when new concepts or objects need to be
defined; when our vocabulary, in other words, is not enough. The emergence of
the expression “post-truth”, which in English is used as an attribute (like in the
phrase “post-truth politics”) while in Italian (and in French and in other romance
languages) is used as a noun, expresses the need to name a new form of knowl-
edge, of truth production, and of circulation of information–especially in the
public realm; more precisely, and more often, especially on the web. The Oxford
English Dictionary has decreed that “post-truth” was the word of the year for
2016 – the year of Brexit and of Trump’s elections. The word indicates a cir-
cumstance in which objective facts and the correspondence between reality and
what is said about reality is less influential in the shaping of public opinion than
emotions or personal beliefs.
Generally, the main remark made about post-truth is that such a linguistic-
rhetorical practice has a specific purpose, today: it is aimed, supposedly, at
constructing a new reality out of whole cloth. A new reality in which data are (or
might be) wrong, and yet are manipulated in order to reach specific goals (mainly,
and mostly, to achieve consensus for political purposes). In other terms, currently
post-truth is an instrument: it is no coincidence that in recent works about post-
truth (Ferraris 2017), philosophers have focused on the processes through which
truth is made, produced, created.
Post-truth requires a certain discipline and willingness to tell many lies that add
up to one bigger, and more inclusive, lie. This is why we do not speak about one
or two specific sentences which do not correspond to the truth and that are aimed
at achieving a precise political goal, but we refer instead to a broader and more
inclusive system of propositions that do not correspond to reality or that are not
coherent with reality. All these, together, build what has been defined as “post-
truth” politics.1 If legitimation through truth, lies, faith, and similar complex
structures of belief has always characterized the management of power through
politics, the contemporary era is particularly interesting since new media and social
networks – with the systems for filtering the news and for creating groups that
resemble Leibniz’s monads (speaking to themselves redundantly) – have increased
together with the increase of the communicative force of communication in truth
production and in political legitimation.
Connections. Post-truth is generally understood as a deviation from truth. But
its basic structure and system of production are the same as for truth (Ferraris
2017). Truth is, in fact, always based on the connection between a subject and a
predicate (Plato defined it with the term “symplokè”): truth defines the connection
between these two and such a connection can be, depending on the case, more or
less correspondent to reality. The reason why I introduce the function of connec-
tion in language is that such specific connection and correspondence explain the
emergence, today, of post-truth – since new media (in general) and the web (in
particular) multiply the number of possible connections between subjects and
predicates. Thus, judgments proliferate, together with the system of voices and
sources contributing to truth-making.
3.2 After truth
Post-truth indicates what comes after truth: a sort of “under-truth”, or minor form
of truth. The procedures aimed at making or producing truth (Ferraris 2017),
which are fundamental characters of the age called “post-truth”, lead to the crea-
tion of un-realities that exist parallel to “real” reality, one “riddled with falsity,
inconsistency, and confusion” (Fitzpatrick 2017). The majority of commentators
agree on the fact that the main aim of such a “passage” – from truth to post-
truth – is to confuse the perceptions of reality and to break down trust in order to
achieve the dependence of individuals on the dominating powers. Fitzpatrick reads
1 As an anonymous Bush official declared in an interview to The New York Times in 2004
(Ron Suskind, October 14): “We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our
own reality”.
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this transition through the Foucauldian intuition that liberal democracy would
have produced the singularization of individuals (Foucault 2007: 89, 106).
Similarly, Ferraris reads this moment of change through the metaphor of the
monads (Leibniz): each individual lives in a sort of “bubble” in which he or she can
produce truth autonomously. This is made possible by the fact that verification pro-
cesses through epistemic authorities are losing credibility. What is particularly striking
in Fitzpatrick’s and Ferraris’ reflections on the consequences of post-truth on socio-
legal studies, is that post-truth politics have an impact that goes much beyond the
mere sphere of “public discourse”, or of political debates. Post-truth constitutes an
alternative way for depicting reality, a way that creates room for different forms of
legitimation, and that thus has a relevant impact on the value attributed to the force
and power of institutions. The common characteristic of post-truistic communication
is that it works at a double level: on the one hand, it produces consensus and legit-
imizes actions, choices, and judgments based on consensus. A typical example is
Trump’s way of communicating via Twitter or other social networks. On the other
hand, the consensus is so powerful that it de-legitimizes other forms of power, such as
institutional or legal power. This allows for the creation of a different dimension in
which the correspondence between language and reality is not verifiable, but is
instead based on the authority and charisma of the individual that conveys the truth.
This produces a clash between different forms of truth, which could be described
with the categories of “truth” and “post-truth”, where the main difference between
the two categories lies in the source of the connection between language and reality.
In the case of truth, there are epistemic authorities that control the process of truth
production; in the case of post-truth, the validity of the connections between lan-
guage and reality is only guaranteed by the rhetorical force and charismatic attitude of
the individual-leader and by the consensus deriving from such force and charismatic
attitude.
A recent episode will hopefully help clarify this double movement and, at the
same time, will bring the former reflections more towards the specificity of law in
relation to post-truth today. It is mid-August 2018 and the vessel Diciotti, of the
Italian Coast Guard (Guardia Costiera), arrives close to the Italian coast, near
Catania in Sicily. A hundred and seventy-seven people are on the vessel: almost all
of them are in the conditions to be granted the humanitarian protection by
international law. The Diciotti remains docked for one day, and then for two days,
and up to more than five days. The migrants are not allowed to disembark
because – this is the argument used by the Minister of the Interior, Matteo Sal-
vini – they cannot disembark since they do not have guarantees from Brussels on
their distribution in other EU countries. The Minister of the Interior wants the
other European states to take responsibility for the care of the refugees and
migrants on the ship. During 2018, it is the third time already that the Diciotti is
prevented from landing migrants into an Italian port. This time, at the end of
August 2018, most of the people on board the Diciotti in Catania are from
Somalia and Eritrea. The spokesmen of various international NgOs, such as Save
the Chidren and Amnesty International, denounce the episode in terms of an
extremely serious violation of fundamental human rights.
After the ordeal 23
Matteo Salvini, Minister of the Interior, insists on his position despite the
intervention of intellectuals, politicians, civil society, activists, and NgOs. So, pro-
secutors start investigating on the legality of his behavior, travelling to Rome to
question Salvini and some members of his staff. The Guardian reports (August 25,
2018) his words: “I heard prosecutors asked for my details. Here you go. I was
born in Milan, March 9 1973. I’m ready and proud to be arrested because I’m
fighting to defend the Italian border” – this is what Salvini wrote on Facebook as
the news emerged about the investigation. In any case, after a couple days he let
the refugees disembark.2
3.2.1 After the ordeal
That is the prelude. Then the attack against the judiciary begins. The Minister
begins by writing posts on Twitter and Facebook against Luigi Patronaggio, the
Prosecutor of Agrigento who started the investigation. He writes that Patronaggio
had recently (actually, he writes “very recently”) declared that there could be, in
some specific situations, the risk of terrorism related to clandestine boats (out of
control of any authority). Actually, the interview he refers to had been released
almost one year before (first non-corresponding fact); and Patronaggio had been
discussing, in that interview, about a completely different situation: he had not
spoken about refugees fleeing the war, but about little clandestine boats carrying
completely different subjects in completely different conditions and for different
reasons (second non-corresponding fact). Salvini cuts parts and single propositions
in Patronaggio’s speeches about a different situation and context, and re-uses
them in order to demonstrate the alleged lack of coherence of the Prosecutor. He
uses the words that he needs to use, withdrawing titles and sentences from old
newspapers and building a collage that can support his current intentions: the
migrants must not disembark. His symbolic war against migration must be carried
on with all means and in particular with means not based on correct data, but
aimed at increasing support and unconditional consensus.
All this prelude leads at the core of an ancient contrast: that between opinion,
individual will and values, on the one hand; and convention, law, procedure, on
2 In January 2019, the story continues. Catania’s Court for Ministers requests author-
ization to proceed with the Diciotti case, for which Matteo Salvini is accused of kid-
napping for refusing to allow that large number of migrants to get off the Diciotti ship.
“They are trying again,” League leader Salvini said in a live Facebook broadcast. “Once
again I am under investigation for kidnapping people and minors, with a possible term
of between three and 15 years (…) I wouldn’t get that even if I were a drug dealer or a
rapist. (…) Now it’s up to the Senate and the Senators will have to say yes or no, free
or innocent, trial or not.”. He continues “But I say right away that my position is not
changing one centimetre - I ask the Italian people if they think I should keep being
minister, exercising rights and duties, or if should ask this court or another about
immigration policy. (…) I admit it, I confess it and I stand by it - I stopped the dis-
embarkment - And I declare myself guilty of the crimes of the coming months, because
I'm not changing”. [source www.ansa.it/english/news/2019/01/24/court-requests-
to-proceed-with-salvini-diciotti-case_3f6dbbc8-1463-4fb6-9770-da4a6ac7c048.html].
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the other hand – that between irrational choices and the rationality of procedure.
It is by now well known that the “art of the lie” (post-truth politics, in other
words) is built on mechanisms like “filter bubbles”, which are made possible by
the fact that netizens tend to form self-contained groups which circulate precise
information crafted precisely for those groups. Algorithms can detect preferences
and web surfing behaviors and this can keep people from finding countervailing
views and opinions (and data and facts corresponding to what is real). So, for
instance, during the referendum in the UK campaign, leavers mostly saw pro-
Brexit news. Obviously, these algorithms and the way they are used can construct
groups that “make” truth independently of any epistemic authority and procedure
of verification or legitimation. The function of truth is no longer the best interest
of the community, but it becomes the best interest of the individual.
I consider the conflict between Minister Salvini and Prosecutor Patronaggio a
good example of different attitudes towards truth: that of law and that of politics.
Social media, in fact, enable members of groups to strengthen each other’s beliefs,
by shutting out contradictory information: unlike legal procedures (I would say:
opposite to legal procedures) post-truth politics have been made possible by a loss
of trust in institutions and by a loss of grounding and legitimation of truth-making
procedures and systems. This has caused an extremely serious consequence: truth
has lost its raison d’être, which should have been the capacity of establishing con-
nections between language and reality. The contrast between the Prosecutor and
the Minister is interesting because it shows two different ways of approaching
truth: a proceduralized way, and an emotional and instinctive way. Such a contrast
proves that post-truth politics produce a deviation from the very nature of truth,
which lies also in the validation of truth-making processes. Such a validation and
control over the procedures that build the connection between language and rea-
lity got lost in post-truth politics. Perhaps, this has to do with a loss of the func-
tion of politics.
The function of law and of legal procedures, on the other hand, remains pretty
clear since there is no doubt about the consequences that a decision of a judge can
have on reality: law is not concerned with a final, universal truth (which, we will
see also following Nietzsche, is not something that can be discovered or possessed
by human beings), but with a sort of “everyday” truth. More importantly, legal
truth has clear consequences: it is because of the consequences that it could produce
that truth in law needs to be the product of clear procedures – of evidence, of
proceduralized investigations, of continuous verification. The consequences and
the concrete impact of truth, in law, are directly related to its proceduralization
and deliberately recognized artificiality. What is different in current post-truth
politics, instead, is that the procedures of truth-making and the constructed nature
of truth are often concealed because otherwise post-truth politics would lose their
rhetorical force. As a technique, instead, law permanently builds connections
between language and reality and leads to the attribution of values to propositions
and facts: the iuris prudentia is indeed a technè.
The prudentia of modern law is proceduralized for a reason. Such a knowledge
and capacity of judgment comes after the ordeal, which symbolically represents
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irrationality. Late Medieval ordeals used in the Langobardic legal system are an
interesting paradigm of a legal procedure based on completely irrational principles.
The correspondence between language and reality, in Medieval ordeals, was a
secondary value: what counted most was that a decision was reached – and as
quickly as possible. Individuals and individual interests and values, in those ordeals,
had a very active role in helping the judge to reach the truth: self-confirmation
counted more than truth in itself. Before the Gregorian reformation (XI century),
the official value of a trial was thought to be given by the Holy Spirit, which was
supposed to be diffusely present everywhere. The validity of judicial truth-making
procedures was certified by this kind of “mystical” force, invisible and yet extre-
mely powerful, in order to reach a conclusion as soon as possible. After the Gre-
gorian reformation, the Church established that the Holy Spirit is not present
diffusely and everywhere, and this entails that it must be embodied by someone,
by an authority that certifies its presence and truthfulness. Ordeals were officiated
before the Gregorian reformation and were based on a probatory system entirely
different from the Roman law procedure: where Roman procedural law was based
upon proofs, witnesses, and documents, the late Medieval (mainly Germanic)
ordeal – on the contrary – was based upon the outcome of duels, on oaths, and on
random natural facts. While ancient Roman procedure was aimed at finding
truth – or, better, at making truth – properly, that is to say according to the same
series of actions, the ordeal had the following characteristics (Loschiavo, in press):
(i) it was mainly oral; (ii) the activity of the parts was more relevant than the opi-
nion and the activity of the judge; (iii) the parts would communicate directly,
without much mediation of the judge; (iv) courage, faith, passions would count
more than truth-making procedures. Often guilt or innocence were determined by
subjecting the accused to painful or unpleasant and dangerous experiences. For
instance, a very common proof consisted in asking the accused to put his hand
into a cauldron with boiling water. Other times, it was the accuser being asked to
put his hand into boiling water. If the hand remained uninjured, he was con-
sidered innocent; otherwise, he was considered guilty. The trial by ordeal was a
judgment of God: a procedure based on the idea that God would help the inno-
cent by performing a miracle on his behalf.
After the ordeal came modernity. With it, law was returned to rationality –
which entailed procedure: a standardized way of making truth. From that moment
on, democracy and truth-making were no longer separated and this interconnec-
tion is now showing the risks of its misinterpretation and abuse.
3.3 Making truth. The legal perspective
When speaking about the relationship between law and truth, we must pre-
liminarily draw a distinction between the truth-value of a proposition of law, on
the one hand, and the procedure through which truth is made via procedure by
the judiciary – what has been named “judicial truth” (Viola 1995) – on the other
(Patterson 1996). What does it mean to say that a proposition of law is true?
Answering this question entails exploring the complex relationship between
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realism and truth in law, a relationship broadly explored in this book. Also, to
simplify what appears to be a conundrum of diverse perspectives on the relation-
ship between law and truth, we can recall H. L. A. Hart’s claim on legal positi-
vism, according to which truth in law is always (and must always be) a question of
form and of correspondence between form and content. It is widely known, at
least among legal scholars, that such a positivist and formalist perspective on law
was based on the idea that legal norms are part of a system within which the pri-
mary value is internal coherence: that is to say, a system in which each norm is
made valid (and, in this sense, also “true”) by norms of a higher level. The rule of
recognition is the paradigm of such a formal and systematized relationship
between law and truth: Hart’s rule of recognition is a kind of secondary rule which
validates a legal system and which is central, foundational, and essential to every
legal system. Law, from the perspective of legal positivism, is constituted by form
(Patterson 1996, 25):
form renders juridical relationships intelligible as such. Form is what makes
something intelligible, making it what it is and distinguishing it from all other
things. In other words, form makes the object or idea intelligible to a subject
capable of cognition. As an object of consciousness, form must be grasped as a
unity, that is, as a unity of content.
And yet, the specific nature of the interconnection between law and truth is not
only a matter of legal positivism, nor of legal formalism. Legal procedure has much
to do with the unique nature of legal truth too, as I shall argue in this paragraph.
What can we thus gain by looking at the relationship between law and truth, in
the age of post-truth? I am tempted to answer: “the very nature of truth”, but this
might sound as an exaggeration. Without idealizing law, which is itself a system
embedded with power and which of course is much more complex an object than
just a general and abstract Stufenbau – the “law”, as it is referred to in this syn-
thetic series of remarks – I am still inclined to answer that politics and public dis-
course would gain something by observing how law relates to truth. The general
remark is that law – both in its “static” version, the positive norm which gen-
eralizes an obligation and is valid because of norms of higher rank, and in its
“dynamic” version, the judgment that connects facts and norms – is intrinsically
artificial and deliberately considers truth as the product of a convention. Jurists
speak, in fact, of “judicial truth” (Viola 1995). The legal process (at least ideally),
as noted by many legal theorists including Luigi Ferrajoli, does not aim at per-
suading anyone, but at justifying the decision: judicial truth, thus, entails the arti-
ficiality of the connection between language and the world. The legal arguments
are not – and must not be – valued for their persuasive force. On the contrary,
they should be valued for their conformity to objective criteria and procedures, as
the example of the conflict between Salvini and Patronaggio discussed earlier
should prove.
The judicial decision concerns both facts and norms and thus truth-making
must be deconstructed into a quaestio facti (factual truth) and quaestio iuris (legal
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truth). The judicial decision is indeed a very interesting example of a mixed system
of truth production (Viola 1995), in which both the correspondence between
language and reality and the coherence of the final judgment with the more gen-
eral values and functions of the legal system (first and foremost, to guarantee jus-
tice) are relevant. From the point of view of the law, there are no true and false
facts or true and false norms, but only correct judgments (or non-correct judg-
ments). Italian legal philosopher Francesco Viola has perfectly recalled the cen-
trality of the competent authority in making legal truth, which was discussed by
Hans Kelsen. Viola writes:
In place of the empirical verification, through which the scientist knows and
constitutes the natural facts, there is the fact of the ascertainment by the
judge, who is the competent authority (Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre 244). A
legal fact is not a natural fact ascertained by a judge in a legal process, but it is
the ascertainment itself. Thus, the legal judgment has specific truth-criteria
that are parallel to those of natural science, but distinct from it. The most
relevant difference does not reside in particular methods, but in the normative
appointment of a subject authorized to produce legal facts. Therefore, Kelsen
restores total autonomy to the world of legal knowledge and of legal reality.
(Viola 1995: 252)
The legal paradigm is particularly interesting, when observed today, since it breaks
down the alleged division between philosophical theories of correspondence and
of coherence. Within the philosophical tradition, in fact, different theories on truth
have emerged and developed over time. The two main theories are known as
“correspondence theory” and “coherence theory”. On the one hand, the main
idea of correspondence theory, which is then diversified into various correspon-
dence theories (Glanzberg 2018), is that what we believe and say is either true or
false if it corresponds – or not – to the way things actually are, that is to say to
facts of reality. From the perspective of correspondence theory, facts are proposi-
tions that are always true, since they always have factual correspondence. On the
contrary, propositions are not always true since their correspondence with facts
must always be verified. It has to be noted that the correspondence theory of truth
is (at its core) an ontological thesis: a belief is true if there exists an appropriate
entity – a fact – to which it corresponds (Glanzberg 2018).
On the other hand, the coherence theory of truth implies that truth in its
essential nature concerns systematic coherence. Truth, in other words, must be
considered as one aspect of a larger frame. Thus, from the perspective of the
coherence theory, a belief is true if and only if it is part of a coherent system of
beliefs.
Law seems to stand between these two theories (Lynch 2008): both in the case
of the positive, abstract legal norm, and in the case of the judicial decision, the
relationship with truth is characterized by (i) the connection with reality and fac-
tuality; (ii) the coherence with a larger system of values and with the function and
raison d’être of law more generally, i.e. guaranteeing order and peaceful
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coexistence. Because of the functions that it is aimed at achieving, law indicates
the convergence between correspondence and coherence and thus indicates a dif-
ferent perspective on truth. Such connection with a task, and final objective, seems
to emerge in particular in legal texts that explicitly mention truth as a value for
future generations.
For instance, in section 26 of the Act on the German Federal Constitutional
Court (Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz – BverfGG, 1951) we read:
(1) The Federal Constitutional Court shall take the evidence necessary to
establish the truth. It may, outside of the oral hearing, instruct a member of
the Court to do so or may request another court to do so in respect of specific
facts and individuals.
Truth is, here, a value that must be protected and guaranteed and that, thus, must
be based on evidence, which in turn shall be selected according to specific con-
ventional criteria (Bellucci 2005). Around truth, in law, there is a system of pro-
tection: a labyrinth that, at each turning point, entails institutional responsibility
towards a community. Especially after the historical experience of totalitarian
regimes, truth is considered a fundamental apparatus of the rule of law: con-
temporary constitutions often mention truth as a sort of precious value that must
be preserved against the risk of tyranny.
Correspondence. Law rejects the existence of an absolute truth and builds ways
of dealing with what has been defined “pretention of truth” (Tuzet 2013). The
verification of such pretention is based on narratives (by the parts, by witnesses, by
the judge): this is due to the very structure of juridical norms, which are com-
posed – like every conditional proposition – by a protasis and by an apodosis (if X,
then P). Legal procedure aims at verifying the factual conditions and at connecting
them to the normative consequences.
Facts, in legal procedure, are necessarily reconstructed – this explains the
“ordinary” artificiality of judicial truth. Reconstruction is possible thanks to nar-
ratives which come from different sources. These sources, in turn, are selected:
thus, also the source of the narratives on which the correspondence between lan-
guage and reality is evaluated is conventional and established a priori. Mainly, four
types of subjects participate in the reconstruction of legal truth (Taruffo 2009;
Pastore 1996): the parts (especially attorneys); witnesses; experts and consultants;
judges.
Coherence. As far as the relationship with coherence is concerned, law relates to
truth in a way which is entirely different from, for instance, history or literature
(Viola and Zaccaria 1999). Unlike history or literature, which are also based on
narratives and on various sources, law performs a specific task and thus it shows
the need to be anchored to solid systems of value and to precise tasks. It is mainly
for this reason that judicial narratives, by all participants in the trial, are tied by the
need to reach a coherent conclusion which balances the interests of the parts –
which is, in other words, just. In order for this correspondence and coherence to
be assured, there is no transcendental value or institution involved in the
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procedure: it is sufficient that some basic conditions are respected – more specifi-
cally, that narratives come from qualified subjects (i) and that they have an
authoritative force once the decision is “constructed” (ii). The concrete and
practical nature of their consequences is, in other words, what makes them unique.
Truth is thus relevant for law, and for procedure in particular, because what
counts is not to reach whatever decision or truth. What counts is to reach a just
decision and a just truth, that is to say a very specific and qualified type of truth:
this is possible if correspondence to facts and reality and coherence with a more
structured system of values converge.
3.4 A “movable host of metaphors”
Often, post-truth has been associated with postmodernism and to the (misleading,
when exaggerated) perspective from which there are no facts, but only inter-
pretations of facts. Actually, if we take Nietzsche’s On Truth and Lies in a Non-
moral Sense (1873), the problem that emerges is that men tend to forget that
every linguistic connection is artificial, and thus that every truth – because it is
always a connection between a subject and a predicate – must be considered
starting from its artificial nature, and not as a transcendental value deriving from a
dimension other than the human one. It is not in the very origin of postmodern
claims, but perhaps in how they have been used purposefully, that we shall look
for when searching for the roots of contemporary post-truth politics.
As a matter of fact, Nietzsche underlines how in a comparison between human
mind and nature, lies are always the direct product of language and are thus
directly related to human life and activities. He wonders where the drive for truth
comes from. And he concludes that is comes from the need to coexist pacifically
with other individuals: insofar as the individual wants to maintain himself against
other individuals, he or she will employ the intellect mainly and essentially for
dissimulation, which is an intrinsically human act. Human beings invent truth,
which is nothing but a conventional way to establish connections between lan-
guage and reality, in order to banish the bellum omni contra omnes. After this
invention, for Nietzsche, that which shall count as truth is established.
Language, according to this picture, is nothing but a
movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms: in short, a
sum of human relations which have been poetically and rhetorically intensi-
fied, transferred, and embellished, and which, after long usage, seem to a
people to be fixed, canonical, and binding. Truths are illusions which we have
forgotten are illusions – they are metaphors that have become worn out and
have been drained of sensuous force, coins which have lost their embossing
and are now considered as metal and no longer as coins.
(Nietzsche, 1873)
Men should look back at how language functions in order to recover the meaning
of language, and most importantly its function, which is peaceful coexistence.
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What we possess are metaphors or colors, trees, flowers, and of facts; these meta-
phors, according to Nietzsche, correspond in no way to the original entities. And
so, conclusively, if language exists, it must be for a purpose. Law proves this con-
nection with its own purpose . . . everywhere.
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4 Can we trust post-truth?
A Trojan Horse in liberal counterspeech1
Jacopo Domenicucci
…il a été assez naturel de donner [aux démons] le plus d’emploi qu’on pouvait, et
de ne les épargner pour les oracles, et les autres miracles païens qui semblaient en
avoir besoin. Par-là, on se dispensait d’entrer dans la discussion des faits qui eût été
longue et difficile, et tout ce qu’ils avaient de surprenant et d’extraordinaire, on
l’attribuait à ces Démons que l’on avait en main. Il semblait qu’en leur rapportant
ces événements on confirmât leur existence et la religion même qui nous la révèle.2
“Post-truth” is a pervasive trope in media coverage, public speech, public exper-
tise, cultural initiatives and policy agendas these days. This term and its cognates
are increasingly setting the frame of our discussions in domains of private and
public interest. Its vocabulary is sprawling across all sorts of conversations—from
public health to elections, journalism, research, international relations, technology
and business. Terms like “post-truth” and “fake news” (and you could add
“alternative facts”, “post-facts” and “truthy”) are featured in political debates and
talk shows, in documentaries and pop songs. Journalists use them to describe the
impact of social networking on information. They are put to work as an insult
against certain media outlets (which outlets depending on the speaker). They are
taken up by the “Trust and Safety” departments of the tech sector (e.g. Face-
book’s Fake news is not our friend campaign). Policy projects are formulated in
these terms all around the world.3 This makes post-truth arguably one of the
1 I thank for comments Enrico Terrone, Jennifer Cobbe, Stephen John, Pierre Lauret,
Mathias Girel, Daisy Dixon, Victor Parchment and Pauline Boyer. I thank audiences at
the University of Turin, Maison Sciences de l’Homme, EHESS, and Peterhouse, as
well as Milad Doueihi, Maurizio Ferraris, Bridget Kendall, Sankalp Bhatnagar, Tobias
Cremer and Ephraim Levinson for helpful conversations. I am grateful to Tiziana
Andina and Angela Condello for generously prompting me to gather my thoughts
around these issues, first for a conference and then for this volume.
2 Fontenelle (1908/1687) Histoire des miracles (Dissertation I, Chapter II, Seconde
raison des Anciens Chrétiens pour croire les oracles surnaturels. Convenance de cette
opinion avec le système du Christianisme).
3 The word “post-truth” loudly entered in 2016 the English Oxford Dictionary as word
of the year. Its cognate notion of “fake news”, a noun, made its way through the
Collins Dictionary in 2017. “Alternative facts”, which seems an ironic and cynical turn
on a postmodern trope, was introduced by White House press secretary K. Conway to
leading narratives of our times:4 a narrative so pervasive that it seems transparent.
But what are you doing when you label a statement, or a speaker “post-truth” or
“fake news”? What is this narrative doing to our conversations? What are the
pragmatics of post-truth laments and post-truth accusations? What can be achieved
through them? Who can use these terms safely and effectively? These are under-
discussed questions I start spelling out here.
Most of the debate around the idea that we may live in a post-truth era has been
an attempt at getting more clear on the actual epistemological state of our socie-
ties. Here I don’t take a stand on the social epistemology of our times—on whe-
ther there is anything exceptional about our current relation to truth norms and
collective beliefs. Independently of the actual epistemic and doxastic state of our
societies, I want to assess the discursive tools this idea is supposed to provide. I
don’t take issue either with the current social science agendas devoted to post-
truth issues. In social scientific contexts, “post-truth” is mainly a term of the art
tagging a variety of research areas. It’s a theoretical tool to spotlight worries about
our societies—from the dangers of misinformation, to the rise of populism, the
state of free speech, the crisis of expertise and the challenge of tech-regulation. As
opposed to such high theorizing around post-truth, I am just interested in “post-
truth” as a (relatively new) term in our everyday language. I look at it as a meme
featured in ordinary conversations. I take it as a frame that shapes the lay under-
standing of our times and structures folk debates about politics, society and
information (here folk is broadly contrasted with social scientific uses of these
terms, and includes politicians, journalists and a variety of public experts). Certain
defend the President’s spokesperson’s inaccurate statement about the size of the crowd
at inauguration day. Searching “post truth”, Google gives more than 703 million
results (783 million for “truth”) and Amazon.uk gives 3000 (while 1000 for “popu-
lism”). Just to name a few wide audience books on the subject: Post-truth: the new war
on truth and how to fight back, by Matthew d’Ancona (London: Ebury Press, 2017),
Post-truth: how bullshit conquered the world, by James Ball (London: Biteback Publish-
ing, 2017), Post-truth: why we have reached peak bullshit and what we can do about it,
by Evan Davis (London: Little, Brown, 2017), The invention of Russia: the rise of Putin
and the age of fake news, by Arkady Ostrovsky (London: Penguin Books, 2017),
Weaponized lies: how to think critically in the post-truth era, by Daniel Levitin (Penguin,
2017). For business, see The post-truth business: how to rebuild brand authenticity in a
distrusting world, by Sean Pillot de Chenecey (Kogan Page, 2018). For a documentary,
see Adam Curtis’ 2016 HyperNormalisation (I thank Ella Mcpherson for that) and for
pop songs Francesco Gabbani’s Pachidermi e Pappagalli and La mia versione dei
ricordi. Legal frameworks to tackle post-truth and fake news have been or are being
discussed in Belgium, Brazil, Cambodia, Croatia, Denmark, Egypt, France, India,
Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Malaysia, Nigeria, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore,
South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, Tanzania, Uganda, the United Kingdom, the
United States… (See www.poynter.org/news/guide-anti-misinformation-actions-a
round-world).
4 According to the qualitative study conducted by IpsosMori in 27 countries, “60% think
other people don’t care about facts anymore, they just believe what they want” Ipsos-
Mori “Fake News, Post-truth and Filter Bubbles Report” (www.ipsos.com/sites/defa
ult/files/ct/news/documents/2018-09/fake-news-filter-bubbles-post-truth-and-trust.
pdf).
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uses of these tropes have already proved effective in ways that seem disruptive of
our public spheres and detrimental to the development of open societies. So-called
populists, supporters of illiberal policies, anti-vax, climate sceptics, conspiracists,
demagogues and rulers with authoritarian tendencies are making a strategic use of
post-truth accusations and laments. And it would be interesting to see why exactly
these tools are so effective in their hands.5 But here I don’t explore that. I want to
see whether these tools can be harnessed to defend and advance a liberal public
sphere. After all, liberal attempts at “reclaiming” this vocabulary are all around us,
from academics writing public open-letters6, to American satirists (e.g. Saturday
Night Live), high-profile media outlets (e.g. Le Monde, The Guardian, The New
York Times, La Repubblica, CNN, BBC…) and public experts. Is there any pro-
spect of success? Should speakers (and citizens) supportive of a liberal, political and
social debate welcome this new vocabulary? These are questions about the sort of
liberal counterspeech which can be produced to counter attacks to an open dis-
cursive sphere. Is it appropriate for this vocabulary to feed in forms of liberal
counterspeech? Can you advance the defence of an open society by forms of
counterspeech that label your opponents or their statements as “post-truth” and
“fake news”?
Liberal counterspeech can resort to post-truth tropes in at least two ways: as
hammers of critique (to borrow Nietzsche’s famous image) and as weapons of
polemic (ad hominem counterspeech).
As hammers, post-truth tropes are meant to serve the interest we can have in a
critical stance. This critical stance is embodied in a folk critical understanding of
our times—of the political landscape, of electoral results, of information ecosys-
tems, of public health campaigns… We use it to look at the society we live in and
to understand it, as when Brexit commentators blame it on fake news. If it is a
good hammer, it should help us spot what is to be criticized and who is to be
blamed for it. This is what we do when we criticize public officials for being post-
truth or for producing fake news.
As weapons, post-truth tropes are polemic, ad hominem, responses to one’s
(actual or potential) interlocutors. Are these weapons a “safe” form of counter-
speech when liberal speakers try to use them? What are their collateral damages?
Can speakers committed to a liberal public debate afford this move?
This chapter falls in two parts and follows the two functions—critique and
counterspeech—or, if you want, the two tools: (1) the critical hammer and (2) the
weapon of polemic. The first part argues that the post-truth hammer is an imprecise
critical tool and an ineffective vehicle of blame. The second submits that
5 See Faulkner (2018) for a study of Trump’s use of post-truth tropes, e.g. “Fake news
items and fake news media exist. However, this paper is not interested in this fact so
much as the fact that President Trump regularly calls real news items fake, and calls the
established news media the fake news media. These aspersions are intended to discredit
news items and media.”
6 See e.g. an open-letter to Science written by academics using the term “fake news” to
voice their worries (Lazer et al. 2018). See also Gewin (2017) reporting in terms of
“post-truth” the worries scientists have about their engagement with a broader public.
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counterspeech resorting to the post-truth weaponry structurally backfires against
certain speakers—the ones committed to a liberal debate.
4.1 A weak hammer: the critique is vague and the blame ineffective
4.1.1 A folk critical theory?
Taken as critical counterspeech, post-truth has the ambition to sketch the spirit of
our times. Three questions come to mind:
1 What does the property ascribed to our times amount to?
2 Why does this property apply to our times, why does our age fit the descrip-
tion of post-truth?
3 How did we acquire this property? (Where is the discontinuity with our pre-
decessors? Is this a new step in a longer-term process? Has there ever been
anything similar in the past?).
Post-truth does not just neutrally qualify the spirit of our times, though. It
clearly differs from, say, “postmodern”, which qualified the spirit of another time
and might have been used to convey a variety of expressive contents. No surprise if
getting rid of truth seems a bigger deal than getting past modernity. Truth is
something humans seem to care about, a precious good, perhaps a norm for cer-
tain actions (e.g. enquiry), attitudes (e.g. belief) and dealings (e.g. testimony,
communication). Saying that these actions, attitudes and dealings have abandoned
their reference to truth is to flag a serious predicament about them. O tempora, o
mores, we got post-truth! This triggers two more questions:
1 What’s wrong with and what’s distinctively bad about this property?
2 How do behaviours instantiating it differ from classic violations of truth-rela-
ted norms (e.g. lie, pretence and bullshit)?
No need to wait for social scientists, lay liberal counterspeech has ready-made
answers. In the order: (1) to be post-truth is not to care about the truth, or to
behave in a way that shows disrespect for the truth; (2) this applies to our times
insofar as some major public figures do not mind being caught lying and
contradicting their previous statements7, insofar as technical and scientific
experts are distrusted8, and insofar as irrational beliefs are widely held and
7 You can contrast this with G.W. Bush lying at the UN. Strictly speaking, this does not
qualify as post-truth. By bringing (alleged) evidence and citing (deceptive) investiga-
tions, Bush manifested a form of allegiance to the truth-norm (and misused it of
course). In contrast, as noted by Ferraris (2018), a better precursor of straight-out
post-truth may be Bush’s advisor, who was reported by the NYT Magazine saying
“We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality” (Suskind 2004).
8 A widespread contention, the idea of a crisis of expertise, deference and authority is a
delicate point. And not only because the very definition of expertise is too broad
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shared9; (3) the explanation of how we got there lies in the disruption of our
informational environment brought about by social media and the subsequent
spread of fake news 10; (4) this is pretty bad in many ways, the most salient
being that it threatens informed democratic participation; (5) being post-
truth is not just to eventually convey deceitful information on the back-
ground of a truth-norm, it is rather to act in a way that blurs this very norm.
Summing up, “post-truth” qualifies the (bad) state of the collective relation to
truth in our societies, it has techno-cultural roots in the widespread use of ICTs,
and it is of political significance. With variations, this seems a widely shared picture
of post-truth.
4.1.2 What is criticized?
For something to be a critical tool, it needs at least to make it clear what you cri-
ticize and who you blame for that (if anyone). What is being criticized is the target
of the critique.
The Oxford English Dictionary (2016) definition of post-truth—which has
been eagerly and extensively quoted by journalists and public intellectuals—
brushed. It is unclear whether it tracks any actual tendency of our societies to rely less
on experts or simply what people say about such reliance—which seems more likely,
since we’ve rarely relied as much on sophisticated networks of experts.
9 The idea that superstitious, unfounded, irrational beliefs are statistically more widely
held. I am not sure we can come with a nice way to measure that. There is further
disagreement about where to locate the source of irrationality in conspiracy theories
and about what is psychologically and cognitively salient about subjects holding them.
10 “Fake news: (noun) false, often sensational, information disseminated under the guise
of news reporting” (Collins Dictionary 2017). Fake news are not just false news, inac-
curate, incomplete news, e.g. with insufficient sources. Fake news are fake in the sense
that they are not, strictly speaking, news—not even imprecise news. They are rather
postiche, seeming information, phony news, rotten news. They circulate under the
guise of news reporting. Their character may be linked to a deliberate faking, and may
be part of a strategy of intentional misinformation, such as forms of propaganda by
political lies, for example. But we can also consider that there are fake news by acci-
dent, hoaxes that a non-ironic reception ranks as fake news. If the former are a form of
deception, the second comes from a misunderstanding. The aetiology behind fake news
is not necessarily that of a planned campaign of misinformation. It may result from a
prank. Nevertheless, it seems essential to the notion of fake news that the content be
presented as factual, or at least received and discussed as such. On the other hand, a
joke received as such—circulating as a form of entertainment rather than as a source of
information—does not constitute a piece of fake news. Similarly, a simple photo faking
is not a piece of fake news per se. A fake photo or a joke can become fake news once
they are presented, shared, discussed, commented, as if they represented facts. On the
other hand, an elaborate lie supported by a system of so-called evidence does not
necessarily belong to fake news. It is thus obvious that fake news is a generic term that
awaits a number of distinctions, namely on the basis of who is liable for the utterance (a
private individual, an institution, a bot), the domain (health, geopolitics, public
administration, finance, show), the circumstances (pre-electoral situation, protected
categories), the effects (on the circulation of knowledge, on the representation of
minorities, on democratic life…).
36 Jacopo Domenicucci
already gives a sense of the vagueness of the critique: “Post-truth: (adjective)
Relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential
in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief”. A post-
truth era is meant to be an era that no longer gives truth and rationality their
appropriate value. Can you circumscribe situations where emotion prevails over
reason, to label them “post-truth”? When would reason prevail over emotions? In
this sense, the age of post-truth reminds us of the Ancients’ Bronze Age, supposed
to follow a fantasized Golden Age we have never actually known. To say we live in
an era of post-truth seems a nostalgic complaint about the irrationality of our
times: has there ever been a Truth era, though?
The central claim of post-truth is also the most contentious: that truth-telling
would be a declining norm. This is unstable between two extremes. On the one
hand, the idea of a society where truthfulness is no longer the norm may just be
self-effacing: could we engage in any joint venture, in any shared action, or even
talk to each other, i.e. could there be a human society that doesn’t rely on truth-
fulness? (It is widely held that the notion of such society is self-defeating—as
defended on different grounds by philosophers as diverse as E. Kant, D. Lewis, B.
Williams and P. Winch). On the other hand, if you take this idea less seriously, it is
just as hard to point at empirical parameters to be fulfilled. Even the idea that fake
news are more widespread, and more widely believed than ever, is far from
obvious.11 This is not to say that the folk-theory of post-truth is empty, but that, if
we wanted to take it seriously, we would face an overly complex and contentious
picture.
It is hard to use the post-truth vocabulary to target a specific predicament, to
articulate a distinct criticism. “The dangers of a post-truth society” is unarticulated
and doesn’t help pinpoint what needs amended, reformed or improved.12 Rather
than providing a critical synthesis, this frame blurs what is at issue. Electoral lies,
pseudoscience, data theft, officials’ lies, social network filter bubbles, foreign pro-
paganda and scientific struggle for credibility are put in the same basket. … These
are all features attributed to a post-truth age. Unrefined post-truth descriptions
may further offer unhelpful explanatory short-circuits. They often provide too easy
an explanation for phenomena that should be more thoroughly investigated.
Blaming it on post-truth, we forget more specific, more causally stringent expla-
nations—as in the post-Brexit debate, in discussions around 2016 American elec-
tions or in various “Russia-gates”. Easy appeal to “post-truth” may distract from
11 For doubts about the actual volume, share (in the overall quantity of news) and impact
of fake news, see Fletcher and Nielsen (2018), Watts and Rothschild (2018) and
Benkler et al. (2017). Moreover, even if there was evidence of the importance of the
share of fake news in the overall number of news around, it would still be a question
whether the share of such news which is actually believed and taken at face value is
significant, or if, overall, fake news can be understood as another social practice closer
to entertainment.
12 Compare with report for the Council of Europe “Information Disorder: Towards an
Interdisciplinary Framework for Research and Policymaking” by MIT TechLab
researcher Hossein Derakhshan and fact-checker Claire Wardle.
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urgent political, institutional and technological issues. This is all the more worry-
ing when folk-theories of post-truth are cited to support or justify dubious reg-
ulatory initiatives from policymakers or the tech sector. By its grand appeal to
“truth”, the post-truth narrative easily trumps safeguards of transparency and
accountability in the area of content-moderation and free speech regulation. This
makes it ready for misuse in simplistic, façade or even oppressive campaigns.
4.1.3 Who is blamed?
A candidate critical tool that doesn’t spot the feature to-be-criticized is already on
the wrong track. But it could still help when it comes to blaming someone. For
that, it would need to be clear on who is targeted. But finely targeted blame does
not seem available to the post-truth hammer. Do you want to blame Trump,
Facebook, anti-vax activists, Cambridge Analytica, Kellyanne Conway, RussiaTo-
day or climate sceptics? For the term “fake news” this ambiguity has been studied
in a variety of contexts—lay, academic and policy.13 It is easy to attack a whole
sector and eventually try to erode its credibility—e.g. “mainstream” media, the
political system. It is easy to make noise with post-truth. It is way less straightfor-
ward to call out a specific official for, say, deception, and to put them in front of
their responsibilities. This means that the hammers of post-truth are hardly going
to improve any form of accountability (public, administrative or legal). Post-truth
carries an inherently temporal frame: it is ultimately our times that we are blaming
when we talk post-truth. And blaming it on our times, rather than on specific
contexts, institutions or individuals, may even foster a dilution of responsibility.
Everyone does it! (In this sense, a topographical notion would do a better job. It
would be more fruitful to denounce where we risk losing sight of the facts, or
which contexts are getting immune to rationality.) More fine-grained and con-
textualized tags, many of which are already available, would carry a better practical
purchase in terms of legal responsibility and of political awareness—take “mis-
information”, “disinformation”, “propaganda”, “officials’ lies”, “forgery”, “hate
speech”, “cognitive capitalism”…
4.2 A dangerous weapon: counterspeech that backfires
The discursive tool of post-truth is not only used to criticize, to blame, to propose
remedies, to advise and to discuss regulations. It is also used, and crucially so, to
13 See Zuckerman (2017) for fake news: “It’s a vague and ambitious term that spans
everything from false balance (actual news that doesn’t deserve our attention), propa-
ganda (weaponized speech designed to support one party over another), and disin-
formatzya (information designed to sow doubt and increase mistrust in institutions).”
For the term in academic contexts, see Tandoc, Lim and Ling (2018): they examined
34 academic articles using the term “fake news” between 2003 and 2017 and found it
used to describe satire, news parody, fabrication, manipulation, advertising and propa-
ganda. See Girel (2008) for a criticism of the use of “fake news” in policymaking in the
French context.
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silence, to forbid, to attack, to defend, to insult, to threaten and to shame.
While not a promising critical hammer, it may still be an effective polemic
weapon. As a weapon of polemic, it is trusted by a variety of speakers coming
from different social and political horizons. Trump vs journalists, journalists vs
Trump, conspiracists vs experts, experts vs conspiracists, anti-vax and climate
sceptics vs scientists, scientists vs climate sceptics and anti-vax—just to simplis-
tically name a few.
These means of ad hominem counterspeech proved effective at least for cer-
tain speakers. They have a strategic payoff, for instance, for supporters of
illiberal policies and so-called populist leaders who use them to shut down and
silence opponents. As the meme circulates the weapon is also increasingly used
by speakers from other horizons. Once you have identified a weapon of
polemic, and once you have realized how effective it seems in your opponents’
hands, it is tempting to add it to your own rhetorical repertoire. This is what
speakers committed to an open public sphere seem to be doing. They want to
use post-truth accusations in a way that is symmetric and adversarial to, say,
the way Trump is using them. Is this weaponry really available for them? Or
do they actually get hurt when they try to use it? Does post-truth polemic
backfire against liberal speakers who try to harness it in defence of an open
public debate? I suspect they may have not exercise enough care in handling
this weaponry.
For that, we need some grip on the speech-acts associated with this weaponry:
what are you doing when you label a claim “fake news” or “post-truth”? And, as
the conversation heats up, what are you doing when you call “fake news” or
“post-truth” to the speakers themselves? (This would be a complement to the
detailed pragmatics of post-truth sketched by Ferraris (2018): Ferraris analysed the
distinctive conversational properties of speech actually producing post-truth. He
focused on post-truth speakers—speakers producing bullshit, hoaxes, fake news
and lies. It would be misleading to say I focus on their respondents. I just look at
speakers who advertise themselves as responding to post-truth utterances and who
accuse their interlocutors of producing fake news. And among these speakers, I
focus on the ones who think of themselves as committed to living in a civil society
with an open public space.)
A full speech-act analysis of “fake news” accusations would be overambitious
here. Let me just point at a cluster of speech activities. I don’t unpack the
structure of this cluster, that is, I don’t take a stand on whether each layer is a
distinct speech act or whether there is a single act with a baggage of pre-
suppositions, implicatures and backdoor moves. Some of these effects are
plausibly core; others are just triggered under the right circumstances (a broad
sense of the priorities should be given by the order in which I present the
layers of the cluster). Beyond that, you shouldn’t need assumptions about
intentions of the speaker at hand to make sense of the conversational effects I
highlight. Finally, I leave aside questions about the complex felicity conditions
of this counterspeech, even if I raise the problem of the authority these moves
assume.
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4.2.1 An epistemological diagnosis
Imagine you are talking to your climate-sceptic neighbours. They come up with
some absurd figure to support their contention that humans have no responsibility
in climate change. You just reply “this is fake news”. Instead of addressing the
content of their claim to challenge it, you are shifting the focus from the content
to the status of their utterance. You are not even providing an assessment in terms
of true or false, such as when you flag inaccuracy in a belief or in a source. Rather
than just saying that the statement is factually wrong, you are saying that it is
wrong to believe it (endorse it, support it, circulate it, spread it…). The very
epistemological status of the statement is denounced: phony, rotten, forged,
postiche, manipulated… The utterance is not discussed for its content: it is ranked
as epistemologically indecent. Which suggests there is something pathologic about
the aetiology of the belief manifested, something that casts it out of the space of
reasons. When you say “it’s fake news”, you are assuming to have the authority of
a speech doctor and you are issuing an epistemological diagnosis. 14
4.2.2 Speaker’s subordination
This diagnosis is not easily bracketed. There is a natural spill over effect from the
utterance to the speaker. Disregard for the speaker is already conveyed by the shift
from the at-issue discussion to the evaluation of their speech as pathologic. A shift
from “It’s fake news” to “You’re fake news” shows a shift from the epistemological
diagnosis to a form of subordination—“you/they are [fake news]” fill in with
“post-truth”, “(a) populist(s)”, “(a) conspiracist(s)” etc. (To a certain extent, we
can think of this as just making explicit a move that was already there in “it’s fake
news”.) In this (attempted?) subordination the targeted speakers are disqualified
from their discursive status—of rational speakers on a par with you. Doubt is cast
on their entitlement to take part in the same conversational game as you. This
suggests that fake news accusations are not mere moves to score within a language
game. They also affect the very rules of membership in the game.15 The specific
forms of speaker subordination by “fake news” accusations are context-relative.
For instance, if you have enough authority you may silence the speakers you target.
If bystanders are there, targeted speakers may be shamed. And if the reference
group is sufficiently stable, this may count as a slur—e.g. “Brexiteers”, a group
that exhibits sufficient stability in its socio-economic demographics and whose
members are being consistently called “fake news”.16 (Accusations of “heresy” are
sometimes identified as an infamous precursor of “fake news” accusations (Coady
n.d.). While there are clear analogies here, I wouldn’t put too much weight on
them. And not only because flagging something or someone as heretic was
14 Compare with Basham (2017) who argues that post-truth accusations pathologize our
societies, in his reply to Le Monde social scientists.
15 For the notion of conversational score and the different ways to score in a language
game, see Langton (2009, Chapter 8) and Lewis (1979).
16 I thank Lucy McDonald for this.
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integral to a legal and social procedure of actual exclusion, but also because these
accusations somehow point at different directions. Heretics may have been
accused of abandoning doctrinal truth for a variety of reasons. An epistemic devil-
may-care attitude, however, doesn’t seem their central charge. They were arguably
accused of caring about it, just the wrong way.)
4.2.3 A doxastic imperative
This subordination comes to the fore when you realize that targeted speakers are
not just ranked (as in, say, “you’re a liar”); they also receive a directive. The
negative diagnosis and the subsequent subordination of the speaker pave the way
for a more active—action-oriented—dimension of this speech activity. What kind
of directive is that? You are neither advising your interlocutor to believe something
else, nor inviting them to consider appropriate evidence. Don’t believe that, don’t
say that, sounds exactly like an imperative. On top of refusing to argue with your
interlocutor, on top of disqualifying them, you also fire at them a doxastic
imperative. Note that is not simply ineffective to change the views of targeted
speakers; it is also problematic from the point of view of an audience you may
want to convince—whether this is a broadcasted debate, a café conversation or a
web forum. Giving doxastic orders is hard to reconcile with the form of rationality
liberal speakers would otherwise herald.17
4.2.4 Tribal self-assertion
When one is (dis)qualified as post-truth and given orders, one is posited as some-
one we can’t have a conversation with. This we takes me to another layer of speech
activity: a form of self-assertion based on group-identity. In-group belonging is
indirectly rejuvenated, and reasserted, through the moves I spelled out. When you
entrust your counterspeech to post-truth tropes, you risk ending up invoking the
bonds of in-group, communitarian trust. You would seem to buy in the idea that
these are the appropriate bonds of trust for political relations. This way you would
be giving up on forms of civic trust that are crucial to any debate within liberal
institutions. You would be reneging on civic trust mediated by institutions and
structured by a shared rationality. As a liberal speaker, you are undermining your
own aspirations when you have recourse to similar weapons which render the
confrontation tribal.18Tribal self-assertions back a division between communities of
17 Compare with Coady (n.d.) about “epistemic policing” and Habgood-Coote (2018,
22). The latter, while raising similar worries, concludes the paragraph “If you use
weaponized terms, you run the risk of hurting people.” This is not what I’m pointing
at. It is an open question whether liberal citizens can in general be required never to
(rhetorically) hurt their anti-democratic, anti-liberal opponents. The problem, as I see
it, is that the pragmatics of their speech may undermine their very political commit-
ments, and, perhaps, even fulfil those of their opponents.
18 There are asymmetries in the we between the liberal speakers I am focusing on and, say,
Trump. So, my picture is severe with liberals. After all, only one camp can be thought
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speakers—a division in their references, their modes of information, their patterns
of argument, their criteria of justification and their norms of legitimacy. This
results in the development of distinct, insulated, discursive ecosystems. This way,
calling people fake news doesn’t just carry a divisive narrative, it may enact it by
echoing tribal self-assertions. (Note that this self-assertive layer seems to have a
subtle role—too complex to be unpacked here—in creating the conditions of
assumed authority which allow you to play the speech doctor, to subordinate your
interlocutors and to give them orders. For example, we could think that the more
or less salient reference to a group you identify with is actually a vehicle boot-
strapping you into an authoritative position. And this fits the ambiguities of the
imperative, which seems ambivalent between an admonition supported by norms
of rationality and a proper command based on personal authority.19)
We’ve seen why each layer of speakers’ activity is problematic for liberal speakers
and how they add up. Liberal polemic meets in post-truth accusations its Trojan
Horse.20 Liberal speakers should be wary of post-truth tropes, since their prag-
matics structurally undermine the sort of public sphere these speakers/citizens
want to support. I am not saying that this weapon is unavailable to liberal speakers
because the latter should as a matter of principle never shut down a conversation.
I am not saying that they can’t afford this weapon because they can’t afford to
rhetorically hurt their interlocutor. I am not saying either that the move should be
abandoned just because it is tainted by association with prominent forms of
oppressive use. The danger for liberal speakers lies in each of the five levels of
speech activity—that can be more or less activated by an actual instance of fake
news accusation. And it builds up. Overall, the attempted discursive policing is not
only self-effacing but leaves the discussion worse off. It has divisive effects on the
community of speakers. It contributes to undermining the minimal conditions for
a civil society. On top of direct and indirect damages to the discursive landscape,
of as fully stressing the importance of such we. Also, one we is self-professed more
inclusive and less communitarian than the other. Could you leverage these asymmetries
to rescue a liberal reclamation? The other layers of speech activity I spelled out suggest
that you can’t.
19 For a discussion of the authority of subordinating speech, see Langton (2009, Chapter
4 “Pornography’s Authority? Response to Leslie Green”).
20 For other—distinct, but plausibly convergent—worries about the dangers in attempts
to reclaim post-truth vocabulary, see Habgood-Coote (2018, 18–26) drawing on Jason
Stanley’s notions of (bad) ideology and propaganda. The author frames the post-truth
vocabulary as “seemingly innocuous speech cue[ing] up” ideology (p.21). Note that
Habgood-Coote is explicitly interested in reclamation by “the establishment”. There is,
however, some slippage in the text between establishment defenders and democracy
defenders, as he goes on to consider post-truth terms as “honeypots for defenders of
democratic values.” I take it that these two sorts of speakers, and citizens, should not
be confused (and are often, purposively, identified by antidemocratic propaganda). I
further disagree with systematic attributions of bad faith to speakers resorting to post-
truth tropes: “what fake news is to the right-wing demagogue, post-truth is to the
centrist dad” (p.22). As a cultural meme, post-truth travels through our discursive
practices and does not need bad faith to prosper. This is why I would rather compare
this vocabulary to a Trojan Horse.
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fake news accusations affect liberal speakers themselves. First, in their own ethics
of communication, which, after reflection, is incompatible with this move. Second,
in their reputation since they lose credibility by this compromising shot.
4.3 Conclusion
I argued that if you are committed to a liberal public sphere you should distrust
post-truth/fake news laments and accusations; both as hammers of critique and as
weapons of polemic. What should liberal speakers/citizens do? They should
probably give up on the post-truth framework and try other strategies rather than
simply dismiss the claims of their interlocutors with “it’s fake news”, “you’re post-
truth”, “they’re fake news”. But one cannot always argue. For citizens committed
to an open and inclusive public sphere this ultimately opens up questions about
the challenge of liberal counterspeech.21
An important caveat is that this is not providing an argument for free speech and,
further, that this doesn’t carry any clear takeaway for the free speech debate. There is a
difference between, on the one hand, shutting down a conversation, and, on the other
hand, not letting certain conversations happen. Liberal speakers within a conversation
that is taking place would be wrong in shutting down their interlocutor by the dis-
tinctive speech activity I just fleshed out. But, as a society, we may think that certain
conversations should simply not take place. And the challenges of liberal counterspeech
remind us of the importance of upstream intervention on the discursive landscape by
various means—e.g. regulation by democratically accountable institutions of, say, the
use of botnets, tech-regulation by platform curation and eventually de-platforming,
promotion of media literacy and “fake news vaccination”.22
Now, this volume implicitly calls for philosophers and legal scholars to do some-
thing about post-truth. What could and should we do? I stressed the importance of
handling with caution the readymade notions of post-truth, of being suspicious of
this cultural meme. I obviously don’t think this is all philosophers can do about post-
truth. A brief assessment of our ordinary language is definitely not the only way to
engage with the social, epistemological and political worries that lurk in the back-
ground of such lay talk. And I don’t think that what I said has a bearing for scientific
uses of post-truth narratives in designing research programmes or constructing theo-
retical tools to analyse the epistemic and political shortcomings of our societies.23 A
reflection on the social distribution of epistemic credit and the new social infra-
structures of trust in digital societies is developing and post-truth theoretical worries
naturally have a place in it.
As citizens, we should bear in mind that this vocabulary is limited and danger-
ous. We could not be too cautious when tempted to shut down our interlocutors
21 For the philosophy and pragmatics of counterspeech, see Rae Langton’s current work on
counterspeech—e.g. Langton 2018, and forthcoming monograph.
22 For the possibility of “active inoculation” against fake news, see Roozenbeek and van
der Linden (2018).
23 For the opposite view, see Habgood-Coote (2018, 26).
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with a “that’s post-truth” rebuttal. Short-sighted deployment of this weaponry
may hide a Trojan Horse.
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5 Who cares about privacy?
The documedia surplus value
Maurizio Ferraris
5.1 Privacy, post-truth, and documedia surplus value
Ninety-two percent of young people do not read privacy terms and conditions,
but maintain that it is important to do so.1 I do not know how many old people
like me do not read the terms and conditions nor believe it’s important to do so,
but I wouldn’t be surprised if the percentage was even higher. Not only because
many people are willing to give up their privacy to share their thoughts, words,
and works for free on social networks, but also (and above all) because the cen-
trality of privacy is a thing of the past: it belongs to the world of bourgeois free-
doms and civil rights.
We have excellent reasons to regret the intrinsic values of that world, the values
of Max Weber and Thomas Mann, but that world is no longer ours, and hasn’t
been for a long time: totalitarianisms, world wars, and especially the mass media
have generated a different world, one where the relationship between people and
their public image, as well as the concept of “privacy”, has completely changed.
Privacy is obviously the least of problems for those (over half of the world) who
post content on social networks, and those (almost all of the world) who give their
consent to the use of cookies, eager to get on with it and access the given service.
It is not a question of bourgeois confidentiality, of decorum, of minding one’s
own business with due discretion; it is a question of labor.
In the same way, the relationship with the truth has also changed. The fact that
one is willing to accept the existence of “alternative facts” is the result of multiple
circumstances: ideological ones, like the postmodern critique of objectivity; socio-
logical ones, like the formation of the “society of the spectacle”; and above all
technological ones, which have determined what I call “documedia revolution”.
The latter is the boom of recording that has determined an unprecedented multi-
plication of documents – the so-called “big data” – and a horizontalization of the
media through social networks. Now, instead of focusing on the phenomenon
itself, I think it is important to look at its context and at what has made it possible.
The real problem, in the perspective I propose, is neither privacy nor truth, but
the disproportion (which I define “documedia surplus value”) between the data
1 M. Ainis, Il regno dell’Uroboro, Milano, La Nave di Teseo 2018.
available to the general users (the “mobilized”) and the companies that manage
the web platforms (the “mobilizers”). As we carelessly give up our privacy and
navigate in the waters of post-truth, we produce wealth. This, in my opinion, is
the essential core and the preliminary condition to focus on, in order to have a
correct understanding of epiphenomena such as the transformations of privacy and
post-truth. How much does an unemployed person care about their privacy?
Consider the many smartphone-owning beggars we see today: would they be
happier if their privacy were protected, or if their mobilization was recognized as
work, and paid, recognizing the documedia surplus value? Or think of those who
see the web as the space in which to vent their dissatisfactions, most often moti-
vated, but blamed on often imaginary causes: what do they care about post-truth?
Now, privacy is priceless, even in the sense that it does not necessarily matter to
many, and it is not clear how it can be protected; the same goes for truth, which is
certainly a great good, but only for the few (usually scientists) who care about it,
while for most of humanity post-truth (the current version of myth) works just
fine. But the value produced by our mobilization on the web, which involves the
renunciation of privacy as well as production and distribution of post-truth, does
have a price, which can be quantified and must be paid by the platforms without
weighing on national budgets. This would decrease social discontent, and perhaps
make politics easier, making it more honorable, feasible, and rewarding to serve a
less scared and angry people.
5.2 From the superstructure to the structure
With a move that Karl Marx would have defined typical of bourgeois economics,
the debate on the ongoing revolution is concentrating on its superstructures, but
its structure has remained in the shadows. Now, what does it consist of? In
Europe, in the United States, and progressively around the world (with a huge
competitive advantage of China, which has one billion and three hundred and
seventy million inhabitants, but one billion mobile phones) daily acts that until a
very recent past would have disappeared into thin air today are recorded and
therefore capitalized upon. Social objects (i.e. those objects that would not exist in
the absence of society: money, titles, status…) require recording, that is, they
follow the rule Object = Recorded Act. A social object is the result of a social act
(such as to involve at least two people, or a person and a delegated machine, or
two delegated machines) that has the characteristic of being recorded. The boom
of recording involves a proportional growth in social objects, thus generating the
most ubiquitous and informed capital in history. Every byte, for the few who
currently have the means to interpret it (i.e. web platform managers and web
analysts) is a bearer of knowledge and generates value.
Even assigning a very low value, for example a thousandth of a euro, to every
byte generated every day, we would still face the total value of €4 billion per day.
Because of this enormous data production, our world is not liquid and elusive, as
postmodernists claimed. It is perhaps the most solid world that history has ever
known, since everything is kept track of, therefore everything can be taken into
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account and everyone can be asked to account for it. And everything ultimately
goes to the account of Documedia Capital, the heir of financial capital and
industrial capital, which replaced goods and finance with a richer and more man-
ageable asset – documents.
Documedia capital does not provide the means of production, but the means of
interpretation, that is, the correlations and the meaning of the data, which it keeps
for itself and resells or reuses. Today’s workers are not subjected to monotonous
or tiring tasks, as was the case in the age of industry, but they must pay for the
means of production, i.e. the web terminals. Production is at the bottom, knowl-
edge at the top, although obviously the mobilized can access knowledge (for
example, books or encyclopaedias), except that in so doing they produce further
and much more precious knowledge about themselves, to which they do not have
access. This unprecedented and largely unforeseen way of producing wealth
through documents needs to be recognized and understood. This is necessary in
order to establish a new social contract, the lack of which is felt dramatically
especially in Europe and the United States, with the advancement of populism
triggered by a formal unemployment that is as extensive as real mobilization is
capillary.
This gap in the access to data is the fundamental point to understand the pre-
sent. In theory, in fact, the relationship between mobilizer and mobilized is fair:
the first offers services, the second pays with information. In fact, however, this is
not the case: between what the mobilizer gives and what the mobilized does there
is a crucial asymmetry, which can also be represented in terms of truth and post-
truth. The mobilized has much post-truth, the mobilizer much hyper-truth. By
“hyper-truth” I mean the quality of the knowledge that the mobilizer can acquire
about the mobilized. From this point of view, the difference between the data
available to the mobilizer (who owns the platforms) and the mobilized (who
simply has access to it) could not be more astounding.
From the point of view of the mobilized, documedia surplus value produces a
monadization of knowledge. Each of us is a monad in the sense that we see the
world, the World Wide Web, from our own very personal perspective, determined
by the coordinates that the web algorithms have attached to us. So, that World
Wide Web becomes the description of our home, and universal communication
becomes the interlocution with the unhappy few with whom we share prejudices
and preferences. We all live in different worlds – as sleepwalkers, it would seem, if
we follow Heraclitus, since “The awake share a common world, but the asleep
turn aside into private worlds”.2
The image of the world available to the mobilizers, the managers of the plat-
forms, is completely different. If we want to follow the Kantian categorization, in
terms of quantity the data on the platform are enormous, while those of the
mobilized are comparatively poor (although we may have the impression of being
inundated with information); in terms of quality the data of the platforms are rich,
because they are individual and consist of very detailed profilings, while those
2 Heraclitus, DK 22B 89.
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available to the mobilized are general-generic, referring not to individuals but to
general notions; in terms of relation the data of the mobilizers are secret, while
those of the mobilized are blatant and in the public domain; finally, in terms of
modality, the data of the mobilizers are real, in the sense that they record actual
behaviors on the net, while those accessible to the mobilized are a mixture of real
information and fake news.
So, let’s proceed to an analysis of this disproportion, in order to highlight the
documedia surplus value.
5.3 Quantity: big data
Let’s start from quantity. For every information of the mobilized there are several
recordings on part of the mobilizer. Google translate has capitalized on all the
existing texts on the web, and Tesla cars improve their software through the data
collection offered by Autopilot, Tesla’s semi-automatic driving system. While
providing a service, you acquire information (which does not happen in the simple
passive documentation of commodities: the label of a wine informs only us, while
an online purchase informs us as well as others, about us). The power of Google
or Amazon lies in an innovative scheme, based on the development of old things
(the register, in the case of Google; the postalmarket, in the case of Amazon), but
in a new context that has exponentially increased the possibility of recording, and
therefore of capitalization. It may not be immediately clear to what extent the
accumulation of data, regardless of the knowledge it provides (which I will discuss in
relation to quality), constitutes capitalization per se, but this will be perfectly evident
if we consider that money itself is data.
In fact, if money is a commodity like any other, as economists remind us about,
it is primarily because it is a document like any other: it is like a passport, for
example, of which it shares the complicated doodles and characteristic colors. With
a passport, a state authorizes a citizen to leave the country (as it originally used to
be) and with a banknote it authorizes him to buy things. Since the citizens who
want to buy are much more numerous than those who want to leave, banknotes
are more numerous than passports. Also, since money changes hands, banknotes
are not nominal, and – since the exchanges are done quickly and may involve
illiterate agents – to prevent misunderstandings about their value, in most States
(albeit with the significant exception of the United States) banknotes have differ-
ent sizes and colors, so that money could be defined as the documents of those
Table 5.1 A way of conceptualizing Documedia Capital
Kantian Categories Mobilizers Mobilized
Quantity Big data Small data
Quality Rich data Poor data
Relation Secret data Public data
Modality Real data Virtual data
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who cannot read. Moreover, both with passports and with banknotes, the state did
not come up with anything new, but simply gave a paper form to ways of fixing
acts and quantifying value that originate in our animal past, and whose evolution
coincides with the evolution of human cultures.
Many economists have noted that money is a recording system (although they
often speak of “information”)3– namely a low-cost means to keep track of previous
resource allocations4– and that money is superfluous when agents have access to all
their previous mutual interactions,5 because ultimately money is nothing but
memory. This thesis has been developed in particular by American economist Nar-
ayana Kocherlakota.6 The memory is an agent’s knowledge of the acts of all the
agents with whom he has had direct or indirect contacts in the past; money is an
object that, unlike commodities, you cannot manufacture yourself and is available in
fixed quantities; and yet, these amounts of money somehow make up for the limits of
human memory, representing an artificial informational deposit and ultimately
resulting in a form of primitive memory: instead of taking note of a given or rendered
service, a universally accepted document is created that sums up the annotation in an
anonymous form (this is particularly interesting for the narcos and the mafia).
In an environment where money is replaced by memory, every social actor has an
imaginary account. When an actor gives assets to another actor, his account increases,
along with his future ability to receive assets. When an actor receives assets from
another actor, her account decreases, and this decreases her ability to receive assets in
the future. In an environment endowed with memory, an agent’s account does not
only depend on her transfers. If Tom gives something to Dick, and Dick’s account is
empty, Tom’s account does not increase. So Tom’s account is not only based on his
actions, but also on those of the actors he is in contact with and on those of the
contacts of the latter. This environment is the web. The environment in which money
is replaced by memory also has the advantage of being able to account for finer
transactions: favors, reputation, physical pleasures (intellectual assets, on the other
hand, are an exception to this exchange system, in agreement with Franklyn’s prin-
ciple that sharing an idea does not mean losing it). At this point, big data are the
absolute memory and the absolute currency, and the exchanges that take place on the
web are exchanges in the strictest sense of the term (that is, they produce value by
being recorded in the great worldwide calculation of give and take).
In fact, between traditional currency and documedia money – documoney if you
will – there is no match. The credit guarantee and the facilitation of the exchange can
be implemented in a much more effective way through the collection of data, which
3 J. Ostroy, The Informational Efficiency of Monetary Exchange, in American Economic
Review, 63, 1973, pp. 597–610.
4 R. Lucas, Equilibrium in a Pure Currency Economy, Models of Monetary Economics, in
J. H. Kareken and N. Wallace (ed. by), MN, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis,
Minneapolis 1980.
5 S. R. Aiyagari, N. Wallace, Existence of Steady-states with Positive Consumption in the
Kiyotaki-Wright Model, in Review of Economic Studies, 58, 1991, pp. 901–916.
6 N. N. Kocherlakota, Money is Memory, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Research
Department Staff Report 218, 1996 October.
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inform about the state of the market (not only economic, but political, demo-
graphic…) incomparably better than currency may do. In fact, the latter only pro-
vides economic information through a rough summary of the price of products. As
for the value reserve, it is still left to currency, for now, though in the context of a
growing marginalization of banks (which are increasingly becoming value deposits
and must renounce their consulting functions). The progress of cryptocurrencies
suggests, however, that in the near future even the credit guarantee will cease to be a
privilege of the banks (that is, in the last instance, of the sovereign states). But here we
are already moving from the realm of quantity to that of quality.
5.4 Quality: rich data
So, let’s come to quality. Currency is a datum. But, more importantly, data are quali-
tatively much richer than money; or, more accurately, the data of the mobilizer are rich
data, since they hold information about the individual’s details, while the data available
to the mobilized are general information, the kind that can be obtained on the web, on
the labels of products, on price tags. The rise of data as knowledge of the individual is
an event that has far greater social and political repercussions than those related to the
mere protection of privacy – which, moreover, from a formal point of view, is preserved
by the fact that big data say everything about us, except our name. True transforma-
tions do not take place on the level of privacy, but on that of industry and capital.
In fact, under the profile of industry, rich data entail a decisive transformation.7 A
world that for centuries had resigned itself to the idea that the individual was
unknowable, and that only types, classes, and species could be known – just as
modern industrial production embraced the standard, renouncing the manufacture of
individualized products – has now discovered that the individual is not ineffable, and
that the production of the individual is not unfeasible. On the one hand, we now
know individuals up to their heartbeats and musical preferences (perhaps the only
thing that remains unknown is their name: but what does it matter at this point?). On
the other hand, the production of individualized commodities has returned to being
economically sustainable, as in pre-industrial times; this is true both in traditional
industries and for digital artisans (makers) that produce items with 3D printers using
individualized parameters. This encounter between producibility and knowability of
the individual, once again, makes documents much more powerful than money.
But above all, rich data entail a radical transformation of the economy. Tradition-
ally, documents had a commemorative value: they kept track of an agreement,
maintaining a social object in existence. But in the case of big data, the point of
interest shifts from the past to the future. The value of documents is now predictive,
with a potentiality that is multiplied now that machine learning methods use data not
only to transform them into predictions, but to verify previous predictions, precisely
by learning on their own. The data that documents contain can provide general
information on large sections of society and on the market, as in the case of big data,
7 M. Carpo, The Second Digital Turn, MIT Press, Cambridge (MA)-London 2017.
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or specific information on the behavior of the individual consumer (that, note well, is
also a producer), and this is the case with rich data.
In short, documents as commodities allow for unprecedented individual profiling,
knowledge and production – just think of the homepage of large online sites that
cater to the consumer by providing individualized suggestions, decreeing the end of
the standardized market. The phenomenon appears to be the opposite of the shadow
economy. The shadow economy is a commodity production that secures a hidden
profit to the producer and is not quantified in the nation’s gross domestic product.
Here instead we have a production of commodities that are even more profitable than
money itself, that is – as we have seen when talking about big data – highly informa-
tive and individualized documents generated through the mobilization of users on
the web. This mobilization, though, does not bring economic benefits to the pro-
ducer, whose activity is not even conceptualized as labor.
This process has a definite impact on the market as a whole. Classic industry has
a pyramidal structure, and this makes it unsuitable to compete with the new
internet giants, which not only have very few employees (since we are the ones
who do the work), but are much more suited to a situation where companies
seems to lose weight in favor of the market, that is, the wide sphere of inter-
mediation provided by the web. This has been realized by traditional but forward-
looking industries such as Daimler, in Germany, which will integrate the hier-
archical management pyramid with interdisciplinary and cross-functional groups –
that is, transversal groups endowed with humanistic skills – which will gradually
form the new core of the company.8 On the production side, which is more clo-
sely related to the passage from commodities to documents, there has been a
transition from company to market. The latter, in fact, constantly increases its self-
awareness (whereas before it was short of information compared to companies),
and therefore becomes increasingly efficient while companies have to run after it.
5.5 Relation: secret data
Once again, the violation of privacy appears as a secondary problem compared to a
more general framework, which has to do much more with the production of value
than with the protection of secrecy. This circumstance appears particularly evident
precisely when one examines the category of the relation, which is the one that has
more to do with privacy. From the point of view of relation, the mobilizer has secret or
at least exclusive data, in the sense that only he has them, while the mobilized accesses
data in the public domain, which from a strategic point of view are infinitely less rele-
vant. Indeed, one can distinguish two levels of recording that account for the asym-
metry of web exchanges in terms of secrecy9: the infrastructure recording, accessible to
8 V. Mayer-Schönberger and T. Ramge, Reinventing Capitalism in the Age of Big Data,
Basic Books, New York 2018.
9 J. Domenicucci, Trust, Extended Memories and Social Media, in Towards a Philosophy of
Digital Media, A. Romele and E. Terrone (ed. by), Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke
2018, pp. 119–142.
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a hacker or to the police but also, note well, to the companies that manage the web
platforms; and conversational recording, explicit and accessible to the mobilized.
The latter is therefore the only recording with respect to which the mobilized are
aware of dealing with privacy issues, as it is the extension of classical communication
contexts. But already at this level the mobilizers tend to underestimate the advantages
that come fromowning a continuous, centralized, and always active archive. Tomake an
example, an Austrian law student, resorting to a European law, has asked Facebook for
all the material collected on him and received a CDwith 1200 PDF pages, including the
comments he had deleted. And even in the case of IM services where the message dis-
appears once it has been read by the recipient, the content remains accessible to the
company that manages the platform; another obvious case of asymmetry between
mobilizers and mobilized. Even in the competition between companies, digital tech-
nologies create a huge cognitive asymmetry that allows capital to first destroy existing
forms of business and thenmanage entire sectors of the economy in amonopolistic way.
But it is infrastructural recording that provides the mobilizers with the greatest
benefits. Thanks to it, they accumulate data about the mobilized of which the latter
are not even aware, such as (just to give an example) the brightness of the place they
happen to be, not to mention all the bodily data that are recorded by devices like the
Apple Watch which, again, is bought by the mobilized and has the obvious effect of
giving a huge amount of free data to the mobilizers. Whether we are awake or asleep,
the gigantic archive that we familiarly call web is always growing and producing. If we
think that 90% of all data currently stored in the world has been generated only in the
last two years, it will be clear that the digital transformation has had an impact that
will soon be equivalent, if not superior, to the industrial revolution. In that case, the
driving force was given by steam and mechanical devices; here the revolution makes
no noise: it leaves traces and creates documents.
These documents are secret in many ways, but in a different form from those
involved in conversational recording. The latter, so to speak, were “plain” secrets,
expressed in natural language, whereas here we are dealing with secrets that are often
not even recognized as such, and which constitute knowledge only if we have the tools
to interpret them. Once again, more than the violation of privacy (can privacy really be
unknown to those directly involved? Of course this does not correspond to the tradi-
tional concept of privacy, and most likely to no concept of privacy in general). Rather
than a violation of the private sphere, therefore, we are dealing with a new form of
capitalization (and labor) whose dimensions have not yet been acknowledged.
5.6 Modality: real data
So, let’s come to the last category, that of modality, which is the most directly
concerned with post-truth. From the point of view of modality, in fact, the
mobilizer has real data, because they reflect the actual behaviors of the mobilized;
obviously you could create algorithms to confuse the results, and maybe you do,
but quantitatively speaking most of the documents would remain truthful. On the
other hand, the mobilized navigate in a sea of true, false, or purely verisimilar
information. This is the world of post-truth.
Who cares about privacy? 53
This circumstance suggests once again that the web space is a document rather
than an information context10: a docusphere rather than an infosphere. According to
the theoreticians of the infosphere,11 information is essentially made up of well-
formed, true, and meaningful data, so that false information is not really information.
However, on the web there is also post-truth, which is anything but true; recording
can explain it (it is a written act, although it refers to things that are not true),12
information cannot. So, even in this case we are dealing with a phenomenon that
finds its condition of possibility in the unprecedented formation of documedia capital,
and we must bear this in mind to understand the profound nature of post-truth.
Post-truth, in other words, is explained by the documedia revolution and is one
of the side effects of the formation of documedia capital, just like the mobilization
on the web. As for the way it works, I propose to outline it once again using the
Kantian categories, but this time, this being a communicative sphere, I will use
them in the version offered by the four “conversational maxims” enunciated 40
years ago by English philosopher Paul Grice.13
The principle of quality says: Be genuine, and provide truthful information to
the best of your knowledge. Trump says that Obama spied on him, but it is not
true. A simpleton would say that Trump is a liar; a man of the world would say
that what Trump expresses is an alternative truth. The term “alternative truth” is
the tribute that vice pays to virtue, but it is also a formally radical chic construct,
which raises the suspicion that the truth is fascist and dogmatic, and claims to
emancipate while deceiving. The man of the world might very well have learned
this trick in some good university in which liberal and naive professors like the
professor of The Blue Angel preached the farewell to the truth in the name of
justice: solidarity is more important than objectivity, democracy is more important
than truth. There are at least two weaknesses to this idealistic defense of lies in
democracy, or, if you will, two precious lessons that can be drawn from post-truth.
The first is that the audience addressed by the philosophers is already trained to
worship the truth, but must be sensitized to respecting solidarity and otherness.
The second is that, after having offered an involuntary ideological assist to popu-
lists and having deprived the intellectuals of their only weapon (the pride, if not
the courage, of the truth), postmodernists did not consider that a democracy
without truth is not a democracy, and that if solidarity prevails over objectivity,
this produces an uncontrollable drift (after all, the mafia or amoral familism are
notable examples of the prevalence of solidarity over objectivity).
Grice’s maxim of quantity recites: Do not be reticent or redundant. Aware of the fact
that the best reticence is redundancy, post-truth engages in the industrial production of
bullshit. In terms of quantity, post-truth is favored by technology: there is a ceaseless
10 M. Ferraris, Documentality. Why It Is Necessary to Leave Traces, Fordham UP, New
York 2013.
11 L. Floridi, The Fourth Revolution. How the Infosphere is Reshaping Human Reality,
Oxford UP, Oxford 2014.
12 M. Ferraris, Postverità e altrienigmi, il Mulino, Bologna 2017.
13 H. P. Grice, Logic and Conversation in P. Cole e J. Morgan (ed. by), Syntax and
Semantics, vol. 3: Speech acts, New York, Academic Press 1975.
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production of documents on the web, and each receiver can in turn become their
transmitter and the re-transmitter (the bullshit reaches its critical mass thanks to the re-
tweet, the forwarding that inaugurates virality). Is this production systematic and
intentional, as claimed by the Marxist doctrine of ideology, according to which those
who control the means of production control the ideas? No: behind bullshit there is no
great puppeteer, no intelligent and strategic capital. What we inadequately call “capital”
is precisely a documedia system, that is, I repeat, the union between the constitutive
power of documents (“documentality”) and the mobilizing power of the media, gen-
erating behaviors that are difficult to explain with age-old categories belonging to a
different world. Hence a second teaching of post-truth: let’s try to explain what hap-
pens with different criteria, in particular by seeing the convergence (very accidental and
not very intelligent) between a technological organization and a natural human weak-
ness: we might understand something more about the world we live in.
The maxim of relation is: Be pertinent. But pertinence is a rare, burdensome, and
obnoxious quality, whereas the hoax is mediagenic and viral. It is gossip, heir of the
fairy-tale, the fantastic, and the futurist words in freedom. But once again, post-
modernism contributed too, by claiming that the world depends on our language and
our conceptual schemes. Which, if said in a seminar, can make you smile or think (do
dinosaurs really depend on the word “dinosaur”?), but outside the classroom can justify
the idea that things are the docile subordinates of words: if you say that there are
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, then there are weapons of mass destruction in
Iraq, and if you say, on May 1, 2003, that the war in Iraq is over, then it’s over. These
hoaxes are much more demanding than the claim that a restaurant in Padua serves
human flesh, but at the same time they manifest the human lordship over language that
philosophers and non-philosophers were so passionate about in the twentieth century,
and of which now (the third teaching of post-truth) we recognize the vanity.
Finally, the maxim of modality is: “Avoid ambiguity” and fashionable nonsense.
However, people like nonsense – this is an unquestionable truth. It is neither true nor
post-true that humans naturally seek knowledge, as Aristotle claimed: rather, they hate
the potential consequences of their lack of knowledge, which is a very different thing.
In short, although the truth sooner or later comes out, the search for truth can hardly
be carried out with bare hands and with no cultural training. Augustine says so in his
Confessions: I want to do the truth, not only in my heart, but also in writing and in
front of many witnesses. What does he mean? Can you do the truth like you do a sport?
No. I would propose we interpret this sentence as follows: truth is not granted, and
requires technical training as well as a good dose of goodwill and sometimes even per-
sonal courage. In short, while post-truth can be constructed by means of nonsense and
illogicality, the truth asks for more but also has much more to offer. And if we really
cannot give up post-truth, and maybe are very attached, say, to the concept of “bad
hombre”, it is better to submit it, rather than to a minimal fact checking, to the chal-
lenging test proposed by William James: “True ideas are those that we can assimilate,
validate, corroborate, and verify. False ideas are those that we cannot”.14
14 W. James, Pragmatism, 1907, New York, Dover 1995, Lecture VI.
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5.7 The unfair exchange
Let’s return to our general goal: to understand the determination of the doc-
umedia surplus value. As pre-Marxian economists did not see that workers
were only paid for part of their work, so today we tend not to consider that
the mobilization is paid only in part by the free services offered by the web. It
is difficult not to grasp the asymmetry between give and take here. The docu-
ments that the archives provide to the mobilized are general and accessible to
everyone, by definition: therefore, they do not offer competitive advantages.
The information that the mobilized offer to the archives are individual and
accessible only to the archives: therefore, they offer enormous competitive
advantages. Of this advantage I only get the negative part, the one that pushes
me to spend due to the probabilistic prediction of my habits. Add to this that,
as I recalled, the mobilized also pay for the means of production: devices and
internet provider subscriptions (not unlike what happens for the house in
Airbnb or the car in Uber). Trying to draw a general law from the various
categorizations proposed so far, I have obtained a law on the formation of
documedia surplus value that can be formulated as follows:
Let’s call the documedia value v, the amount of generic data received from the
mobilized Q and the amount of specific data provided by the mobilized X.
(1) The way things appear to the mobilized: receiving a free amount of Q
seems to coincide with the documedia value
v* = Q
(2) What actually happens: the mobilized receives Q in exchange for X
(whether they know it or not), therefore the true documedia profit is:
v = Q - X
(3) We can quantify X as quantitatively and qualitatively superior to Q,
therefore expressed by the formula
X = (1 + k)Q (with k>0)
Therefore the true documedia profit is
v = Q - X = Q - (1 + k)Q = -kQ
And consequently the surplus value obtained by the system (social network
or else):
p = X - Q = - v = kQ
In particular, if we say that the mobilized receives 50 from the platform in generic
data and gives 100, this is equivalent to saying k = 1, which means that X = 2Q
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Therefore the documedia profit is
v = -Q
And consequently the surplus value is
p = - v = Q
In short, we have v = -Q = -v *, i.e. the mobilized person believes they have
a documedia profit v*, instead they face a documedia loss of the same value.
On the contrary, the surplus value of the system is equal to the data that it
has apparently given to the mobilized user.
Until this law is clear, I fear that we will continue to operate with inadequate
categories and to nurture social hatred – which is the most serious problem of an
age that, in many ways, is the richest and most evolved in human history.
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6 Believing fake news
Anna Elisabetta Galeotti
6.1 Introductory remarks
The proliferation of misinformation, inaccuracy in data processing, twisted scientific
findings through the web and social media, in a word the proliferation of “fake
news”, has raised worries concerning their alleged impact on democratic processes.
For example, events such as Brexit and Trump’s election are ascribed to the effects
of “fake news” on citizens’ choices, as well as the xenophobic attitudes against
refugees and the mistrust of scientific research. Deception, self-deception, misread-
ing of evidence, biased interpretations of facts, mixed with propaganda and spin
have always been present in democratic politics and society. At first sight, what is
new is the multiplying effect of web dissemination as well as a diffuse sense of
danger and threat induced by the denunciation of the unstoppable spreading of
false information among citizens and governments of Western democracy. Despite
these worries, which have monopolized media’s attention in the past couple of
years, research on this subject, though growing, is still in an early stage and mainly
focused on web communications. Yet, the nature of fake news and the reasons why
it is so massively and virally believed require much more digging and theorizing.
In this chapter, I want to tackle this phenomenon by raising two questions. The
first concerns what fake news is, or, to put it differently, whether it is a specific
form compared to traditional public disinformation and deception. More precisely,
I shall ask whether the novelty of fake news lies just in the multiplying effect of the
web and in the speed of dissemination, or if there is something more specific to it,
linked to the information selection allowed by the web platform and to the cog-
nitive traps triggered by this means of communication. Incidentally, even if the
fake news phenomenon were only quantitative, the mass of misinformation dis-
seminated by the new media is such to engender a different scale of risk for
democratic and open society. Therefore, even the mere quantitative dimension of
the phenomenon creates a specific new issue for our society.
The second question addresses the issue of fake news from the viewpoint of the
recipient or consumer, and asks on the basis of which cognitive traps and
mechanisms cognizers end up believing fake news at a higher and faster rate than
true news (Vosoughi et al. 2018). Is fake news believed in the same ways as lies or
are there more complex cognitive and motivational elements factoring into
coming to believe in fake news? A first immediately visible difference between
someone duped by a lie and someone duped by fake news is that the latter usually
becomes an active propagator of the false information to large audiences through
social media, contributing to the deception of many other users.
In the first section of this chapter I shall thus take up the discussion on what fake
news is and see whether a specific account can be provided that marks it specifically
off compared to traditional forms of public deception. The relevant deception here
is public for fake news typically affects large audiences and constitutes a public
concern for a healthy democracy. In the second section of this chapter, I shall try to
map the cognitive and motivational traps making people victims of this form of
disinformation and deception. Finally, in the third section, I shall take up the dis-
cussion about possible remedies, focusing on the ones directed at improving indi-
vidual epistemic responses to fake news exposure. There is a lot of discussion about
institutional remedies, whether through the web providers or through political
institutions, as well as a significant resistance to forms of political control and cen-
sure of the web. The issue of institutional control, however, must preliminarily
consider what political values are at stake and whether political intervention can
defend them effectively without endangering others. But this work goes beyond the
scope of this chapter. Meanwhile, on the issue of cognitive countermeasures, as we
shall see, the research is still to be developed. While there are a number of studies
focused on new media communications, and while there is an important literature
on cognitive and motivational distortions and bias and on the epistemology of tes-
timony, there is little work connecting the two and seeing how the findings in
cognitive psychology and in epistemology bear on the fake news belief formation,
persistence and dissemination. I shall try to connect the two literatures and see
whether some hints for counteracting the effect of fake news can be found.
6.2 What is fake news?
The expression “fake news” was introduced more than a decade ago to connote a
special genre of popular television entertainment, such as the Daily Show, where
political satire is embedded in the humorous reviews of daily news (Holbert
2005). It is a form of reality-based television, since the content of the satire is
taken from current political news. The satirized reporting, though, often create
ambiguity concerning what is factual and what is fictional, so that the audience
must play an active role in determining the true meaning of the satire. The original
sense of the expression, then, relates to a style of news presentation, uncorrelated
to truth, highlighting inconsistencies in political rhetoric, which might make it
difficult for viewers to separate satire from facts, truth from fiction. Fake is more
precisely the form in which satire is presented as (inverted) news, while it is up to
the audience to decipher the satirical and fictional nature of the show. Some
researchers still use “fake news” in reference to either political satire (Balmas
2014) or, by extension, to the “tabloidization” of news as means of attention
grabbing and sharable reporting, epitomized by clickbait headlines (Chen et al.
2015). In this latter sense, the sensationalist form is responsible for blurring the
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line between fact and fiction. More specifically, in the case of clickbait headlines,
the indifference towards the truth leads to information whose only purpose is to
induce people to click on a link to a webpage to increase the page views. The
content of the message is not necessarily fiction, but often misleading, unverified
and seldom corrected. Fake here is referred to the fact that clickbait headlines are
exaggerated, suggestive, easily misleading, hence represent one important source
of fake news and of its spread.
In sum, originally, fake news meant something quite different from lies, namely
messages whose fictional nature was wrapped up in a form mimicking reality, leaving
the job of drawing the boundaries and decoding it in an appropriate way to the
individual recipient. The very categorization of this genre of satirical news as “fake”
exploits a line of reflection in experimental psychology on the effect of (explicit) fic-
tion in inducing beliefs in subjects (Gerrig, Prentice 1991; Gilbert et al. 1990; Marsh,
Fazio 2006). Even if authors of fiction do not aim at producing an accurate account
of the world, there is a lot of information that readers acquire from fiction. Some of
this information is accurate, and some is instead made up in the fictional story.
Experiments have shown that some of the fictional inaccuracies about the real world
go undetected by readers and come to be encoded in subsequent beliefs, as if the
compartmentalization of fiction vs. real world information were blurred. The inte-
gration of fiction and real world sources into self-ascribed beliefs is apparently less
significant when fiction deals with fantastic world remote from daily and familiar
experience. By contrast, when fiction deals with familiar events in a realistic world
similar to ours, the integration is eased, resulting in inaccurate reports of state of facts
by the readers (Rapp, Hinze 2014). Hence, a satirical content presented in a form
similar to news reportage may well induce confusion between fiction and reality.
If the original meaning of fake news thus referred to forms of communication
blurring the boundaries between fiction and real world, and did not mean the
spread of false information, the prevalent meaning of fake news is now rather dif-
ferent. Especially after the 2016 American election, the term has come to mean
false stories describing events in the real world by mimicking the forms of tradi-
tional media reportages, fabricated and promoted on social media either for ideo-
logical reasons or for financial gain (Rubin et al. 2015; Silverman 2016;
Mustafaraj, Taxis Metaxas 2017; Allcott, Gentzkow 2017; Rini 2017; Jang, Kim
2018). In this new definition, the following features characterize fake news:
(1) News occurrences are false, being explicitly fabricated by their producers, and
are not simply the result of mistakes.
(2) They are propagated through social media, implying that they are targeted on
large audiences.
(3) They are usually motivated either by the wish to manipulate people’s beliefs in
a polarized political context or by the wish to grab attention in order to increase
the clicks on certain links and pages for financial gain.
In the latter case, there is no interest in the doxastic states of the social media
consumers, only in inducing a certain behavior advantageous for the producers.
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This definition covers both intentionally fabricated news articles, large scale hoaxes
and humorous fakes, i.e. articles originated in satirical websites that can be mis-
understood as factual, especially if viewed out of context on Twitter or Facebook.
Moreover, it is agnostic concerning the intentional deception component in fake
news. Some authors in fact hold that intentional deception is one of its character-
izing features (Rini 2017; Jang, Kim 2018; Mustafaraj, Taxis Metaxas 2017),
while others do not take a side on the matter (Allcott, Gentzkow 2017; Vosoughi
et al. 2018). I think that the intentional deception component is neither a neces-
sary nor a sufficient condition for fake news. We have seen that some fake news is
motivated by financial gain, while some others depend on the consumer’s inability
to understand humorous jokes as such. Hence, not all instances of fake news are
prompted by the intention to deceive the social media users into believing some-
thing that is false but in the interest of the liar to have them believe. Moreover, I
suspect that those scholars who underline the intention to deceive conflate the fact
that the information passed on is false and the producer is aware of this fact with
the explicit intention of deceiving others. The two things must be set apart for in
the first case the deception usually occurs but simply as a by-product of passing on
false information for other reasons, while in the second case the deception of
others is the outcome of a deliberate strategy of lying. True, some fake news
information, notably the ones with political content, are deliberately created and
disseminated aiming at the manipulation of beliefs and behavior of citizens. In this
respect, political manipulation by fake news seems to be no different from tradi-
tional political manipulation via politicians’ statements, apart from the social media
effect of multiplying and speeding up dissemination. But this similarity concerns
only a section of fake news and, even in this section, evidence coming from cur-
rent research shows that there are specific features setting political fake news apart
from old propaganda and manipulation. On the one hand, as many scholars hold,
internet and social media seem to affect the selection process of the information
one is exposed to (Sunstein 2007; Pariser 2011; Mustafaraj, Taxis Metaxas 2017),
and, on the other hand, cognitive traps, heuristics and motivational interference
are more easily triggered in social media contexts (Levy 2017). Moreover, there
are consequences of the spreading of fake news, such as their agenda setting power
on traditional media and public discourse (Vargo 2018).
In other words, current research has successfully shown that there are some
specific features of the platform’s algorithms allowing producers of fake news to
find the people likely to disseminate the false news, and, at the same time, that the
dissemination is parasitic on cognitive features of users. Fake news producers
exploit technological possibility of the platforms to reach potentially sensitive users
(Mustafaraj, Taxis Metaxas 2017), while clickbait headlines exploit the proneness
to attention-grabbing cues of human minds (Chen et al. 2015). Moreover, once a
fake news story has become viral, it is discussed in the public forum (Vargo 2018).
So far, we have seen that “fake news” can be characterized as something specific
compared to traditional political deception and propaganda, with reference to: (1)
how the false news is fabricated, posted and disseminated through social media
and research engines; (2) how the dimension of misinformation, due to the size of
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the affected audiences and to the speed of the dissemination, is incomparable with
traditional forms; (3) how it comes to be believed by the social media users; and
(4) how it powerfully affects the agenda setting in the public discourse of a society.
Despite the possibility of a specific characterization of fake news, some
researchers doubt that the expression represents a useful notion for analytical
purpose. The ideological use of the concept, now habitually used polemically to
criticize and reject unfavorable political information, seems to discourage its
adoption in a more analytical context. Whatever negative information comes about
in the public forum about any politician or party is now commonly rejected as fake
news, as intentionally planted falsehood to discredit him or her, apparently with-
out need to provide evidence for the allegation. This partisan and symmetrical use
of fake news to reject critical information about oneself or one’s party has the
effect of enwrapping political discourse in a fog where truths and fabrications are
mixed together, leading some commentators to speak about the present as a
regime of post-truth (Manjoo 2008). For this reason, some researchers have
grown suspicious of using the expression in scholarly analysis, and now they prefer
to substitute the expression with false news and information vs. true news and
information (Vosoughi et al. 2018). While I understand their qualms, I think that
fake news better conveys the specificity of this novel form of misinformation
compared to traditional false information. Hence, I shall stick to the expression
fake news, aware of the misuse in partisan politics, but also confident that con-
ceptual analysis can dispel the fog.
6.3 Why do we believe fake news?
The question of why we believe in fake news may appear otiose, for we believe
fake news in the same ways as we believe true information. Experimental psy-
chology has actually validated an intuition by Baruch Spinoza concerning belief
formation while understanding a message: as Spinoza claimed, evidence supports
that while understanding a piece of information we accept it as true, and maybe
later we come to disbelieve it (Gilbert et al. 1990). This experiment gives primacy
to believing information as true rather than suspending judgment. One usual way
of getting information is through testimony and, as a rule, we believe information
by testimony, if there are no reasons either to mistrust the testifier or to doubt the
content of the information that is either incoherent or at odds with our system of
beliefs.1 A recent paper has actually argued that from the point of view of the
epistemology of testimony, believing in fake news is often individually reasonable
(Rini 2017). Despite the fact that the relationship between testifier and testimony
in the case of social media is more ambiguous, nevertheless people mainly treat
1 The evaluation of the truth of a statement can count on five criteria: (1) general
acceptance by other people; (2) gauging of the available evidence; (3) compatibility of
the other beliefs; (4) general coherence of the statement; (5) credibility of the source
(Schwarz et al. 2016). In case of belief by testimony, criterion (2) does not apply, but
the other four are actually available.
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social media transmission as if it were a normal form of testimony. Even though,
according to Rini, social media transmission is a form of bent testimony that
should make us more cautious before accepting the information as true; never-
theless, certain conditions in the use of social media make the acceptance of testi-
mony through them subjectively reasonable. That is because social media news
often concerns political matters and, to be precise, highly polarized political mes-
sages. If, as Rini claims, partisanship in not epistemically unreasonable, then it
follows that accepting partisan testimony transmission is compatible with epistemic
virtues. For this reason, she concludes that believing fake news with a political
partisan content, all in all, is not subjectively unreasonable. I shall not discuss this
claim now. I only refer to this argument in order to show that the question of why
we believe in fake news may appear otiose prima facie, given that not only do we
believe in testimony as a default, but also that there are good subjective reasons to
believe in the form of bent testimony represented by social media.
Yet, despite the fact that accepting fake news may be judged in line with the
epistemology of testimony, the question of why we believe in fake news is not
otiose, given that recent research has established that fake news is spread on social
media more broadly, rapidly and deeply than true news (Vosoughi et al. 2018).
This work, based on the analysis of Twitter from its beginning to 2017, confirms
the finding of another research, which instead examined Facebook news during
the final three months of the US presidential campaign in 2016: “The analysis
shows how viral fake election news stories outperformed real ones on Facebook”
(Silverman 2016). Both researches actually measure the spread of fake news, and
not the beliefs resulting from it, but, as we shall see more properly later, beliefs are
a function of their diffusion and, even if not all re-tweeters are in fact believers in
the news content, a good number of them supposedly are. If we are to infer, then,
that the social media induce false beliefs at a higher rate than true beliefs, why we
believe in fake news is far from being an otiose question.
Going back to the findings of the Vosoughi research, the authors looked for an
explanation of the superior capacity of penetration of falsehoods; hence, they
firstly tested the conventional wisdom according to which the spreading of fake
news is explained by the structure of communication and by individual variances.
In other words, the conventional wisdom attributes these results on the differ-
ent—longer or shorter—presence of people on Twitter, on their being more or
less active, having more or less contacts and so on. But Vosoughi and his collea-
gues found that this explanation has no grounds. For alternative answers, they
subsequently looked at information theory and Bayesian decision theory, and
hypothesized that novelty might be an important key factor for news spreading.
Novelty has not only an attention-grabbing power, but it is more valuable for it
provides new information and grounds for decision making, as well as for social
factors. The provider of new information acquires a higher social status as the one
who is “in the know”. Since fake news usually contain new and striking informa-
tion, given their attention-grabbing nature, novelty could represent the relevant
cue. The novelty hypothesis was in fact confirmed by a check on subjects’ previous
exposure to fake vs. true information, as well as by a check on the emotion
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displayed in the retweeting. For fake news, the prevalent emotions were surprise
and then disgust, which corroborate the hypothesis that fake news typically
transmits new and surprising information. Thus, the cue priming retweeting has
nothing to do with the truth credentials of the news. As said earlier, this very
important research concerns the diffusion of news on social media, and more
specifically on Twitter, by checking the rumor cascades from any original tweet,
whether true or false. It does not advance any claim about beliefs. Retweeting is
not equivalent to endorsing and believing the information one is transmitting.
The difference between the two has to do with the uncertainty of the norms of
communication governing social media, even if, despite ambiguity in testimonial
intentions, it seems that above a certain threshold of sharing, any ambiguity
seems to be washed away and people take the sharing as a form of endorsing
the transmitted claim (Rini 2017).
The relationship between news spreading and correspondent beliefs formation
deserves to be analyzed more closely for it may help to respond to our question.
In general, a precondition for a piece of news to be believed is to reach out to
people, and, in that sense, the broader and faster spreading of fake news increases
the probability of its being believed. Yet, given that retweeting does not imply
believing the news, we can speculate here that the reasons or causes for retweeting
can be different from the reasons or causes of coming to believe the news. The
novelty of the message, as suggested in the research earlier, grabs the attention
and surprises the user, which, in turn, motivates him/her to retweet the message.
The correspondent belief can at this point more easily be formed, even if at the
beginning the subject was unsure about the truth of the message, on the basis of
two different mechanisms described by cognitive psychology. One is predicted by
perception theory, that is the tendency to infer belief from behavior, or, to put it
differently, to use behavior as a sign of the correspondent belief, justifying the
behavior ex post (Bem 1967; Bem, McConnell 1970). In this sense, retweeting
may be taken as revealing the correspondent belief justifying the action of
spreading the message. The second consists of the effect on fluency processing of
information, so that a more easily retrievable stimulus affects what people come to
believe (Alter et al. 2007; Rapp et al. 2014). Suppose that the retweeting user is
originally agnostic about the claim of the message. Yet retweeting exposes the user
twice to the same message, and if the dissemination proceeds, there is a good
chance that the same claim may reach the user by a different cascade, and fur-
thermore by the claim being reported on traditional media. Repeated exposure
facilitates familiarity and the fluency processing, which, in turn, induces the cor-
respondent belief, just because the retrieval of the information is easier and more
readily available (fluent). The fluency effect strikes automatically, even if, origin-
ally, one had doubts about that piece of information, and it may be activated by
the salience and simplicity of the message, as well as by repetition and familiarity.
It may seem that novelty and familiarity are going in opposite directions concern-
ing their effect on belief, and that the one should limit the effect of the other. In
fact, in the dissemination of fake news, the two, apparently opposite, cues for flu-
ency processing are likely to work together. The novelty arouses attention and
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emotion of surprise, which make the message salient and the subjects prone to
suggestibility (Eslik et al. 2011). Then, retweeting is a repetition, which is likely to
be only the first, for the message can reach the user through other cascades and
from traditional media commenting on it. This increases familiarity as well as the
perception that the information is shared and held by others, reinforcing the belief
in it being true.
Both self-perception and fluency processing work below the radar of awareness
and analytical reasoning, and strike anyone, in the appropriate context. I like to
stress the difference between the two mechanisms. Self-perception is a distorted
form of self-attribution of beliefs ex post based on actual behavior, which has been
interpreted as a form of reduction of cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957); by
contrast, fluency processing is a heuristics, a process speeding our cognitive pro-
cess bypassing epistemic rules, which, under the appropriate circumstances, pro-
duces reliable judgments open to epistemic justification (Reber, Unkelbach
2014).2 Yet, heuristics can as well lead to wrong conclusion in the unfavorable
circumstances. The consideration of fluency processing shows that, even if the
media user is relatively sophisticated epistemically, and not immediately duped by
the fake news, the latter may automatically affect his doxastic state, at a later time,
just because of the repeated exposition and to the action of retweeting (Levy
2017). In sum, even though the researches by Silverman and by Vosoughi and
colleagues concern the spreading of fake news, the broader and faster rate of
spreading is likely to induce an increase of correspondent false beliefs, given cer-
tain cognitive mechanisms.
The reason why fake news stories are believed is thus firstly correlated to certain
cognitive features, amply analyzed by cognitive psychology, which are displayed in
all sorts of acquisition and retrieval of knowledge, but which are especially trig-
gered by the working of social media. That is because not only the news on social
media is presented in a simplified, but attention-grabbing form, but also because it
tends to spread rapidly and to come back from multiple paths to social media users
so as to induce familiarity, hence enhancing fluency processing. Beside these two
features of news circulation online and on social media, another factor affecting
the credibility of information is its general acceptance by others. The larger the
number of people believing that P affects the tendency to acquire and share the
belief that P. Now it is unclear whether the influence of a popular view on our
2 I shall refer to heuristic and implicit modes of belief acquisition without taking sides in
the controversy over the dual process of reasoning or the unified process of reasoning.
The supporters of the dual process envisage two different strategies of learning, one
based on intuition, making use of heuristics, fast and often unreliable; the second,
based on analytical thinking, much slower, but under control, and epistemically ade-
quate (Alter et al. 2007; Schwarz et al. 2016). The supporters of a unified process of
learning think of a continuum of different strategies in knowledge acquisition and
retrieval, some of which are implicit and quick, some are slower and explicit, and some
are automated after many repetitions (Osman 2004). For the purpose of this chapter,
the relevant fact is that the supports of either theory acknowledge that acquisition and
retrieval of knowledge can proceed by implicit or automated processes, below the radar
of awareness, and by explicit analytical thinking modules.
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doxastic system belongs to the same kind of automated mechanisms described
earlier or not, for the fact that a belief is shared among other people is often a
reasonable corroboration of its truth (Schwarz et al. 2016). If, however, other
grounds justifying the belief are lacking, accepting a belief as true because it is
largely popular may be a display of conformity bias. Clearly, the multiplying effect
of social media largely amplifies this tendency, contributing in making falsehoods
believable as true facts. Evidence shows that especially when a view is held by
people with whom we identify, the influence on our doxastic system is especially
powerful (Del Vicario et al. 2015; Levy 2017).
This phenomenon leads me to consider the motivational interference in the
acquisition of information, as a relevant cause of misinformation, and the effect of
partisanship and ideology, as sources of specific forms of motivated false beliefs. I
define partisan viewpoints as “ideological”, if they work as screens for selecting
information, blocking out the adverse news and prompting the acceptance of
favorable ones. Much research done on political misinformation either through
politicians and old media or through new media confirms the effect of partisanship
in accepting or rejecting certain news, according to whether its source is one’s
party or more generally one’s side or not (Cohen 2003; Uhlmann et al. 2009;
Silverman 2016; Piacenza 2018). However, relatively little reflection is available
on the different components contributing to the effect of ideological views on
beliefs. I argue that relying on ideology as selector of information embodies: (1) a
reasonable component; (2) a fluency processing component and (3) a motivational
component influencing the belief formation. The reasonable component has been
argued for by Rini (2017) in the article previously discussed. If someone holds a
comprehensive view of politics and society, and is genuinely convinced it is true,
he/she shares a special bond and trust with the people sharing the same world-
view. As much as one trusts the testimony of a trustworthy friend, similarly, one
tends to trust information coming from the party or the group sharing the same
comprehensive view, for that makes them trustworthy. In that respect, believing
information coming from the party or group that one trusts is in general reason-
able, at least if the content of the news fits with what one knows about the world
and is consistent with one’s other beliefs. However, and that is precisely one of the
fake news features, the content of the information passed on via social media is
often outrageous and striking, has sometimes the character of a hoax, or of satire.
Think of the infamous news spread during the last US presidential campaign
against Hillary Clinton, concerning the use of the basement of a pizza parlor in
Washington, for pedophile activities (Cush 2016). This is typically the kind of
information that should make anyone who has previous information about Hillary
Clinton be dubious of its veracity, no matter whether one liked her politically or
not and whether the news source is from one’s party. Nevertheless, the news was
widely believed by Trump’s supporters who willingly contributed to its spread on
social media. In such a case, which is far from being isolated in the dissemination
of political falsehoods on social media, there is no reasonable justification to
believe the information, even from the subjective viewpoint of a partisan. Lacking
reasonable justification, external cues may perhaps explain the belief formation.
66 Anna Elisabetta Galeotti
Such information is new, surprising and attention grabbing: such features con-
tribute to make it salient, and, in turn, salience triggers fluency processing. This
kind of news arouses attention and emotional responses of both surprise and dis-
gust, as reported by Vosoughi’s research, and sticks to one’s memory much more
than mundane pieces of facts. Partisan misinformation through social media are
especially fit to elicit such cognitive responses. However, if the reason of believing
such an incredible story was just fluency processing, that is, a “cold” cognitive
mechanism, how come the believers were all Trump’s supporters? Fluency should
strike indiscriminately either conservatives or liberals. This consideration leads me
to consider the motivational component as crucial, which, may in case trigger the
fluency processing component. Evidence of the motivational component is abun-
dant in all studies on political polarization. Motivated irrationality is a well-known
area of study in epistemology and philosophy of mind. It has mostly concentrated
on two specimens, namely self-deception and wishful thinking. The analysis of
motivated irrationality has also been applied to ideology, under the strictly Marx-
ian notion of false consciousness (Elster 1983). Now I propose to extend the
motivated irrationality analysis to ideological convictions in a broader sense, as
comprehensive worldviews, which people not only believe as true, but with which
they also identify themselves. In general, if we firmly hold a worldview, we are
inclined to believe any news consistent and fitting into that view. The “consistency
push” is neither irrational nor necessarily motivational: actually, among the criteria
for evaluating whether a belief can be accepted as true, one is precisely its con-
sistency with the other beliefs one holds, and another is the coherence of the
content of the information (Schwarz et al. 2016). Yet, we have seen that in the
case of fake news, such checks are usually suspended when the misinformation
comes from the group or party sharing our worldview, despite the fact that its
content is unfitting the world as we know it. In front of a preposterous news, such
as the pizzagate and Hillary Clinton, what makes people believe it cannot be the
consistency push. We must rather presuppose a wish to believe information favor-
able to one’s party as the push for partisans to believe something without warrant
and despite good sense. Obviously, ideology has always worked in this way much
before fake news was circulating online, and contributed to people’s holding fal-
sehoods. What is new now is the quantity of partisan information spread through
social media and coming back to research engines on the web and on traditional
media and the preposterous nature of fake news claims. In turn, the false beliefs
seem to be immune from correction and new evidence.
This observation leads me to a final issue, which represents a major concern for
the effect of fake news, that is, the resistance to corrections: even in case of sub-
sequent exposure to new and compelling evidence against the fake news, subjects
tend to retain their false belief in line with their ideological views, despite
debunking. When a subject believes that P according to her wish but against
available evidence, this is precisely a case of self-deception. The fact that once-
formed beliefs seem immunized to new evidence and new arguments is widely
reported in many researches in experimental psychology and political psychology
(Gilbert et al. 1990; Marsh, Fazio 2006; Nyhan, Reifler 2010; Eslik et al. 2011;
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Lewandowsky et al. 2012; Peter, Koch 2016). Furthermore, some experiments
have proved that the attempt of debunking fake news with evidence and argu-
ments often have the backfire effect of reinforcing the false belief. Strangely
enough, this kind of research has never considered the work done in the area of
self-deception by epistemologists, philosophers of mind and experimental psy-
chologists, for I think that it might have helped to make a clearer sense not only of
the resistance to corrections but also of the backfire effect.
The backfire effect has been especially investigated by Nyhan and Reifler
(2010). They precisely tested participants by exposing them to information con-
tradicting their political beliefs and opinions, for example exposing them to nega-
tive information relative to their preferred candidate. This is a case where, in order
to preserve one’s political conviction, it is not sufficient a careful selective search of
information, to the effect of filtering out all data contradicting one’s convictions.
The biased search strategy is actually one of the typical mental activity displayed by
self-deceivers to defend their favorite belief that P against threatening evidence. In
this case, though, the negative evidence has been put in front of the participants’
eyes, and in order to defend that P is not sufficient to look away and filter out the
evidence for ~P. The account of persisting in a false belief cannot simply refer to
the fact that people believe what they want to believe, as the authors of this
research pointed out. On the one hand, we cannot believe by fiat, and, on the
other, if that were possible, humans would live in a delusional world and that
would be extremely dangerous for their own survival. In fact, most of the time we
hold beliefs appropriately, whether formed by heuristics or by expressed reasoning.
This is what makes so puzzling the phenomenon of self-deceptive beliefs, that is,
false motivated beliefs held in the teeth of evidence. Thus, how come the partici-
pants of the experiment were directly exposed to information contrary to their
belief, and nevertheless, not only retained their belief, but also became firmer in
their conviction? In this case, in order to defend the belief that P, the subjects
must either explain away the contrary evidence or block the inference from the
contrary evidence to ~P. Either way, the subjects must engage in sophisticated
counterarguments to avoid concluding that ~P, either questioning the credibility
of the information, or its relevance for the judgment on their preferred candidate.
Since the negative evidence does not directly compel one to believe ~P, there is
always a little latitude for engaging in arguments, twisted and yet sophisticated,
leading to the self-deceptive belief that P. This finding actually confirms researches
and studies on self-deception (Wentura, Greve 2003; Wentura, Greve 2005;
Michel, Newen 2010) where it is apparent that the persistence of a counter-evi-
dential belief according to one’s wish is brought about by a whole host of argu-
ments displaying a quasi-rationality. As a result of such argumentative activity,
subjects end up even firmer in their convictions.
In sum, not only ideological convictions contribute to make fake news believed
in accordance with one’s ideological outlook, but they motivate partisan people to
hold on to their preferred beliefs even when contrary evidence becomes available,
and may even induce backfire effect. Making use of the work on motivated irra-
tionality, we can say that ideological motivations lower accuracy, manipulating the
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acceptance threshold in processing information concerning one’s ideological out-
look (Mele 2001). The positive information is therefore immediately and fluently
processed to form the favorable belief that P. In case of welcoming stimuli, the
ideological motivation triggers subintentional mechanisms directly producing the
belief that P thanks to a lowered acceptance threshold. This is usually how wishful
thinking, that is believing beyond evidence and in accordance with one’s wishes,
comes about. The negative information, by contrast, primes a self-deceptive pro-
cess, for self-deception is precisely believing something according to one’s wish
and against the evidence. But, while wishful thinking is brought about directly by
the working of subintentional cognitive mechanisms triggered by the wish, self-
deception is set in motion by the threatening negative evidence and the emotion-
ally loaded wish to believe that P, in case of costs of accuracy sinking or dis-
counting (Galeotti 2018). The last condition is important to sort out the
selectivity issue of self-deception, namely the fact that self-deception does not
strike all the times reality frustrates our desires (Talbot 1995; Bermudez 2000).
Incidentally, Nyhan and Reifler indirectly referred to selectivity when they pointed
out that the backfire effect cannot be explained by the fact that people believe
what they want. Self-deception cannot be the default response whenever infor-
mation runs counter to our preferences. In front of the negative evidence, the
rational response would be to act so as to counteract the threat and bring about
the desired state of the world. However, sometimes action is precisely foreclosed
by the circumstances, or it is too costly, or, in any case, the consequences do not
befall on the agent. This circumstance leads to sinking or discounting the costs of
inaccuracy, lowering the threshold of evidence for believing something true and
heightening the threshold for disbelieving it. Let us apply this model to the ideo-
logical backfire effect in front of debunking. The person holding certain ideologi-
cal convictions is actually powerless to counteract the negative information she is
exposed to; the discomfort induced by the bad news cannot be undone with an
accurate processing of data. In a word, for her there is nothing to gain by epis-
temic accuracy, only to increase her discomfort and uneasiness. Thus, the circum-
stances favorable for a self-deception process are all in place. The subject at this
point starts thinking about how to reject the negative evidence and to go on
holding one’s cherished conviction. The motivated reasoning is affected by biases
in data treatment, so that when the subject has found an explanation washing
away the negative evidence, she can stop and go on holding what accords with her
favored view. Since the subject must produce arguments to dismiss the negative
data, the process embodies explicit reasoning that, though twisted, biased and
below standards, does not proceed randomly.
One of the reasons why the reference to the motivated irrationality literature is
important concerns the understanding of the motivation underlying the stickiness
of ideological convictions. To be sure, lots of research has been done on the per-
sistence of errors in experimental and political psychology, mostly testing inter-
ference of inaccurate information with memory retrieval. However, these
experiments are designed to highlight the effect of external cues, fluency proces-
sing and other subintentional mechanisms in the difficulty of correction of
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mistakes, clearly not considering the very possibility of motivational interference. I
argue, however, that the motivational influence is crucial to make sense of cogni-
tive phenomena which otherwise would look contradictory, for example the phe-
nomenon of “Blind choice” which seems to go opposite to the stickiness of
erroneous beliefs. The blind choice phenomenon emerges in experimental con-
texts where the participants are asked to express their agreement with certain
statements, and then, through a subtle manipulation of the experiment sheets, are
asked to justify their own answers, some of which have been reversed by the
experimenters (Hall et al. 2012) Many participants do not realize the manipula-
tion, and take the answers written down as their own, hence proceed in justifying
them. The blind choice experiments are deliberately designed to test self-percep-
tion theory, namely the tendency to infer beliefs from behavior ex post, and the
interpretation of the irrational shift in beliefs is provided by the reduction of cog-
nitive dissonance, in the direction of internal consistency. This experiment, how-
ever, must be considered in a larger context to be realigned with the findings on
the persistence of mistaken belief and the difficulty of correction. It is doubtful
that the drive to consistency is purely cognitive and has nothing to do with the
sense of self and the desire to save face. The strange behavior of people who argue
in favor of viewpoints that earlier on they have explicitly rejected, more than
proving that they self-attribute certain beliefs from their written responses, to my
mind, proves that they want to avoid embarrassment. My interpretation finds
confirmation in another experiment on the phenomenon of blind choice reported
by Neil Levy (2017): the experiment asks participants to write an essay supporting
a view running counter to their preferences, namely that university fees should be
raised. The participants were divided into three groups: one was given financial
incentives, one was asked to volunteer to do the task and the third was the control
group left free to support either views on the issue. As expected, the control group
wrote against the raise of university fees; the others instead followed the instruc-
tion. Yet, when asked to expand on their essay, the group who received financial
incentives had no difficulty in saying that they wrote the essay for money without
believing what they argued. The group of volunteers instead defended their essay
and endorsed the argument they wrote following the instruction but against their
preference. The explanation in terms of self-ascription theory does not seem
completely convincing. To my mind, it was not that they inferred their preferences
from what they wrote, driven by the need of internal consistency, but rather, they
felt uneasy and ashamed about having volunteered to switch their positions, and in
order to defend their integrity they ended up endorsing the disliked thesis. This
irrational shift of positions concerned more their moral consistency, the integrity
of their own self, rather than merely their logical or epistemic consistency. Such a
problem did not affect the group paid to write the essay, for they had an external
reason to sustain a thesis contrary to their conviction and their moral integrity was
not stained by their response to the task. The defense of one’s image and identity
is the same motivation underlying the motivated irrationality induced by ideolo-
gical convictions: the endorsement of an ideology defines people’s identity and
self-image. The negative information threatening the robustness of ideology is at
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the same time a threat on one’s self-image as sharing that view and on the group
with which one identifies himself: no one likes to be associated with political cor-
ruption and illicit behavior. Hence, the resistance to corrections, though it may
well be eased by the presence of implicit or automated cognitive mechanisms, is
triggered by the desire to defend one’s image and the image of the group with
which one identifies. In this respect, the motivational and the cognitive compo-
nent are integrated: desires are triggers of cognitive implicit and subintentional
mechanisms leading to believing or persisting to believing that P. When the sub-
ject is confronted with negative evidence, the subintentional mechanisms are sup-
plemented by explicit, though biased, reasoning arguing against the negative
evidence.
Such cognitive distortions, motivated and non-motivated alike, are actually
spread in all forms of communication, interpersonal, public, through old or new
social media. As already mentioned, the specificity of fake news spread on social
media concerns: (1) the quantity of messages and information one is exposed to;
(2) the way news on social media is fabricated to convey simple, striking, even
outrageous messages leading people to disseminate; (3) the enhancement of flu-
ency, given the form of the message and its repetition. Concerning specifically
political news, then, many scholars have advanced the worry on the increase of
polarization. As effect of social media, citizens not only come to hold more false
beliefs in line with their ideology, not only resist correction, but tend to be more
ideologically segregated and more polarized, making bleaker the chances for a
healthy democracy (Abramowitz, Saunders 2008). The effect of new media on
polarization had first been denounced by Cass Sunstein at the beginning of the
millennium (Sunstein 2001; Sunstein 2007).Hewas especially worried by the unlimited
filtering of information allowed by the web, which would virtually produce the echo-
chambers effect where consumers only listen to themselves. The segregation effect is
further increased by the working of web-platforms, which propose users’ contents of
their liking, based on previous choices (Del Vicario et al. 2015; Flaxman et al. 2016). A
healthy democracy would instead require that citizens were exposed to a large range of
opinions in order to form political views through a balanced and informed inquiry of
issues and candidates.Much subsequent research, however, have shown that the worries
about political segregation via the web and especially social media are largely exag-
gerated (Gentzkow, Shapiro 2011; Bakshy et al. 2015). These researches pointed out
that internet and social media are far less segregated than networks of trusted friends. To
my knowledge, there is, however, no research on polarization specifically, hence so far,
the hypothesis that news passed on social media and the internet induce a greater
polarization is reasonable, given the nature of the messages. Moreover, the repeated
effect at debunking certain fakes by general media may induce in partisans the backfire
effect analyzed earlier, contributing to strengthen increasingly polarized positions.
6.4 What is to be done?
Neil Levy, in his article “The Bad News about Fake News” (Levy 2017), projects
a very bleak view on the possibility of changing the communicative landscape so as
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to free our society and polity from fake news. We usually tend to think that fake
news dupes unsophisticated people, typically “others” with respect to the groups
we identify with. This third-person effect of fake news has actually been detected
and analyzed: people perceive the effect of fake news as being greater on outer
political groups than on themselves or on their own group (Jang, Kim 2018).
Clearly, such perception is deceptive, yet it is reasonable to think that fake news
does not affect everyone in the same way. Levy’s argument is instead meant to
counter the common idea that sophisticated social agents may be immunized
against fake news. He claims that the danger implicit in fake news stories is not
just caused by the difficulty to detect and debunk them, but also by the mere fact
of being exposed to them. Experimental psychological work on fiction (Gerrig,
Prentice 1991; Marsh, Fazio 2006; Rapp, Hinze 2014), as we have mentioned,
shows that even when people know that they are reading or viewing fictional
works, the latter leave representations in their mind, subsequently retrievable by
memory and often giving rise to beliefs, in case related beliefs are not stable and
clear. In sum, there is no way to escape from fake news and the related dangers,
according to Levy. If one is easily taken in by them, then, as we have seen, she is
likely to resist corrections and to become more convinced as a result of the back-
fire effect. If one is sophisticated and epistemically cautious so that she is not easily
duped by misinformation, she is in any case exposed and repeatedly, given the fake
news agenda power in traditional media and the public forum. Such repeated
exposures increase the chances to end up believing what she knew from the start
as being false. In a word, Levy precisely projects a world of post-truth where our
reasoning capability and epistemic virtues are at a loss in the fight against mis-
information. Similar conclusion is reached by a different argument by Rini (2017):
if believing fake news is subjectively reasonable in many circumstances, then, she
argues that we cannot rely on epistemic virtues to fight falsehood. That is why she
advocates institutional measures, which seem the only possible conclusion from
Levy’s view. However, as said, I do not intend to open the Pandora box of the
institutional measures, whether concerning web-platform or politics, because, to
start, we should preliminarily clarify what are the values and rights worth protec-
tion here. Assuming we have epistemic rights (Watson 2018), how can such rights
be enforced, and does not the enforcement risk infringing on other rights? These
complex questions deserve to be dealt with at length. For this reason, I shall now
confine myself to consider measures at the level of the individual epistemic subject.
In this respect, I would start by saying that the danger of mere exposition to
fake news has been greatly exaggerated by Levy: exposition may facilitate the for-
mation of a correspondent belief, but only in a second time and only in case the
subject is not certain about his beliefs on that matter. Otherwise, all of us would
believe anything that comes in our way and, as a result, we would all share the
same beliefs, instead of being polarized on controversial information. Moreover,
despite the emphasis on automated and implicit processes in bringing about false
beliefs, on the base of suggestibility, repetition, familiarity and fluency memory
retrieval, cognitive psychology also provides some guidelines to counter the mis-
information effect on beliefs. A first interesting suggestion comes from a research
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aimed at blocking the fluency effect in belief formation (Alter et al. 2007). The
authors have found that when subjects experience metacognitive difficulty in activat-
ing fluency processing, they instead activate analytic forms of reasoning that assess, and
in some cases correct, the output of more intuitive forms of processing information. In
other words, facilitating disfluency helps set in motion explicit forms of reasoning
leading to a more critical validation of the received information. The finding is
undoubtedly interesting, yet the problem is how such disfluency can be induced out-
side the lab, and especially in users of social media. A different kind of suggestion
derives from a research specifically on validation of information (Richter et al. 2009).
This research tested the hypothesis of a fast-track validation system interacting with
comprehension, and activated in early stages of information processing, based on
background knowledge. Contrary to the thesis according to which the acceptance of
information is primary and implicit in comprehension while the epistemic validation, if
at all, comes later (Gilbert et al. 1990), and is slow and costly, the researchers provide
evidence that the validation takes place at the same time as comprehension, and is a
fast, routinized process relying on the cognizer’s background knowledge. This vali-
dation modality, called epistemic monitor, actually checks the inconsistencies in the
incoming information vis-à-vis what we know of the world, and represents an efficient
filter to detect falsehoods and deception. Thus, we are in principle endowed with a
system allowing us to believe only what is in line with epistemic validation: how come
then are we so easily duped by fake news? The experiment shows that the epistemic
monitor works efficiently only if the cognizer has the relevant background knowledge:
in the opposite case, as it happens with medical information, the subject is not able to
detect falsity and is actually prone to believe the information. Here we have an
important hint, namely that the more people are educated and knowledgeable, the less
they can be victim of misinformation. This consideration actually correlates with
findings in political psychology (Rapp 2008; Rapp et al. 2014): the more background
knowledge the people have, the less prone they are to believe in fake news (paceLevy).
The finding is not unexpected, however some less general suggestions may be inferred
concerning the areas where misinformation is especially widespread and publicly dan-
gerous, namely politics and science. Some researches on political polarization have
actually found that more worrisome than polarization is the widespread ignorance
among citizens about political facts (Bullock et al. 2015).
In conclusion, we seem to know quite a lot about how we are duped by fake
news, but relatively little about how to fortify our epistemic capacities, though
knowing that we are endowed with an epistemic monitor is reassuring. A different
path to avoid cognitive traps is to adopt strategies of pre-commitment, that is,
strategies providing external constraints compelling us to be more accurate cog-
nizers.3 In a way, such strategies implement the idea to create disfluency in order
3 Pre-commitment has been analyzed by Jon Elster (1979), as the strategy to counter
weakness of the will by binding oneself at a time t2, in condition of cognitive lucidity,
to avoid at time t1, under emotional pressure, to fall prey of a behavior against one’s
better judgment. Pre-commitment is symbolized in the story of Ulysses who made
himself bound to the ship mast before being exposed to the siren’s fatal singing, hence
avoiding to jump off the board.
Believing fake news 73
to provide a warning flag activating explicit and analytical reasoning. For example,
the symbols used by Facebook to alert of the possible inaccurate claim of a certain
news can be seen as a form of pre-commitment. It is clear though that in order to
work such kind of strategy presupposes the acknowledgement of the problem and
the willingness to overcome it. And, in that respect, cultivating epistemic virtues
and being convinced of one’s epistemic rights may be the first crucial step.
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7 From transparency to “Trumparency”
Sara Guindani
The current political and social discourse seems to be all about “more transpar-
ency” in the natural relationship that transparency is supposed to have with truth.
The latest French political elections have gone against all expectations due to
the discreditation of the initially favored candidate and his lack of transparency.
Transparency is also the focus of a social revolution that is going on all over the
world in the wake of the Weinstein case under the name “metoo”: that is, the
revelation of the violence and abuse undergone by many women in the workplace.
The unspeakable suddenly comes to light often thanks to the “transparency”
offered by technology. The problem is not that this “praise” of transparency has
meant that we now have Emmanuel Macron rather than François Fillon, or that
because of it some people have been condemned.
What seems to me interesting and symptomatic to consider is the paradoxical
relationship between the continuous calls for transparency – in a society that seems
to be increasingly able to realize this desire thanks to new technologies and our
being hyperconnected – and the emergence of a phenomenon on the contrary so
muddy and opaque as that of post-truth. What is the relationship between this
imperative of transparency and the phenomenon of the so called “post-truth”?
In order to do this, I will first of all analyze some philosophical aspects of the
concept of transparency in its relationship to truth, secondly see how they apply in
contemporary political philosophy, and finally use these tools to analyze a concrete
case study related to the Trump administration and to his speech about transpar-
ency and truth.
Transparency is a Leitmotif that runs through the whole of Western philosophy.
Before becoming a metaphor, transparency was a concept related to the optical
field. As noted by Emmanuel Alloa1, transparentia is the Latin translation of the
Greek diaphanes, and refers to the aesthetic quality of a material that transmits
light without deviating it. Then the notion of transparency gradually filtered into
the domain of epistemology where – in analogy with light – it may sometimes
indicate the intuition of the mental gaze, or the self-evident nature of certain
truths.
1 E. Alloa, Das durchscheinende Bild (Zürich: Diaphanes, 2011), pp. 123–178.
One could say transparency is the engine of philosophy itself, considering the
latter’s yearning for an idea that transcends sensible contingency. The sensible
medium should dissolve – becoming transparent – and leave room for an idea.
The more the medium is dematerialized and matter is spiritualized the closer we
get to the truth. In short, the truth is reached when the sensible loses its opacity
and resistance and acquires transparency. This is Jacques Derrida’s diagnosis of
metaphysics and its tendency towards logocentrism. Writing has been devalued as
opposed to orality, just like the body and matter have been devalued as opposed
to an immaterial principle (be it the soul or the idea).
Transparency brings other associated terms with it: spirit, truth … The semantic
network of this term shows that it does not simply indicate the quality of visibility,
but also has significant moral connotations. In the European tradition, transpar-
ency alludes to the phantom of a pure presence, which can only appear by dissol-
ving its material medium. The Greek notion of aletheia, meaning truth as
unveiling, is strongly linked to that of transparency. The notion of transparency,
though, is also related to two other terms that define its moral and temporal
implications: innocence and immediacy. Jean Starobinski, in La transparence et
l’obstacle, speaks about the dream of transparency made real by the technique of
vitrification: “The technique of vitrification is inseparable from a dream of inno-
cence and substantial immortality. Transforming a corpse into translucent glass is a
victory over death and over the decomposition of bodies. It is already a step
towards eternal life.”2
Another important term to understand the notion of transparency is “pure-vis-
ibility”, namely the idea that what is transparent “places no filters, no barriers to
the gaze: the inside is never visually separated from the outside, and the two
spaces are entirely visually permeable.”3
In this sense, transparency has significant political weight as it plays a role in
defining the “inside” and the “outside”, the “public” and the “private” of social
life. Plato already expressed worry about the fact that citizens should hide aspects
of their lives. In Laws, when discussing what makes a good administration, Plato
makes the Athenian say:
ATH: (…) As to the walls, Megillus, I agree with Sparta in thinking that they
should be allowed to sleep in the earth, and that we should not attempt to
disinter them; there is a poetical saying, which is finely expressed, that “walls
ought to be of steel and iron, and not of earth”; besides, how ridiculous of us
to be sending out our young men annually into the country to dig and to
trench, and to keep off the enemy by fortifications, under the idea that they
are not to be allowed to set foot in our territory, and then, that we should
surround ourselves with a wall, which, in the first place, is by no means con-
ducive to the health of cities, and is also apt to produce a certain effeminacy in
2 J. Starobinski, Jean-Jacques Rousseau. La transparence et l’obstacle (Paris: Gallimard,
2003 [1971]), p. 203.
3 R. Donati, Critica della Trasparenza (Turin: Rosenberg & Sellier, 2016), p. 11.
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the minds of the inhabitants, inviting men to run thither instead of repelling
their enemies, and leading them to imagine that their safety is due not to their
keeping guard day and night, but that when they are protected by walls and
gates, then they may sleep in safety; as if they were not meant to labour, and
did not know that true repose comes from labour, and that disgraceful indo-
lence and a careless temper of mind is only the renewal of trouble.4
Transparency in the social space is good if not necessary for the morality of the
citizens. Walls weaken their spirit, make them lose their fighting spirit and
resourcefulness. Transparency is therefore crucial to the constitution of the polis
and is therefore central to the virtue of a good citizen.
If the spectre of dematerialization is ancient, the possibility of its realization is a
specific attribute of modernity. The dematerialization process of our cities and our
daily lives is to be read in parallel with the advent of electricity and
telecommunications:
Electricity marks the end of the idea of reality as a continuum of solid and
compact bodies, while at the same time generating the aesthetic and political
dream of the penetrability of matter, if not of its complete dissolution into
pure energy.5
The modern world has always broken into bodies and minds, using technology to
go as deep as possible into the cosmos and into matter, into the human body and
its psyche.
The prophetic list McLuhan made in 1964 seems to make it clear that tech-
nology aims precisely at this dematerialization and openness:
The telephone: speech without walls.
The phonograph: music hall without walls.
The photograph: museum without walls.
The electric light: space without walls.
The movie, radio and TV: classroom without walls.6
At a socio-political level, this dematerialization translates into the crisis of enclosure
institutions (“milieux d’enfermement” according to the Michel Foucault expression).
Gilles Deleuze talks about this in his Post-scriptum sur les sociétés de contrôle (1990):
We are in a generalized crisis in relation to all the environments of enclo-
sure—prison, hospital, factory, school, family. The family is an “interior,” in
crisis like all other interiors—scholarly, professional, etc. (…) everyone knows
4 Plato, Laws, VI, 778 a - 779 b. I am grateful to Ernesto Sferrazza-Papa for pointing
this passage out to me.
5 R. Donati, Critica della Trasparenza (cit), p. 12.
6 M. McLuhan, Understanding Media (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964).
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that these institutions are finished, whatever the length of their expiration
periods. It’s only a matter of administering their last rites and of keeping
people employed until the installation of the new forces knocking at the door.
These are the societies of control, which are in the process of replacing the
disciplinary societies.7
But what is a society of control? Deleuze defines it as a very fast mode of control
that no longer takes place by means of enclosure but through constant control and
instant communication. In 1990, at the dawn of the digital age, when people still
did not imagine how ubiquitous the Web would become, Deleuze managed to
grasp how it would transform individuals and institutions. He makes the example
of hospitals, with the increasing cases of day-hospital interventions and home
health care, which he sees as the sign of a potential ambivalence of freedom and
control.
In addition to remarking the metamorphosis of space, Deleuze notes that the
society of control also changes time: “In the disciplinary societies one was always
starting again (from school to the barracks, from the barracks to the factory),
while in the societies of control one is never finished with anything” – and our
everyday experience of email seems to support this thesis. The temporality of this
new regime is that of urgency and immediacy, in both senses of the term: the lack
of a medium implies an acceleration. This phenomenon was first mentioned by
Virilio; recently the German sociologist Hartmut Rosa has analyzed the relation-
ship between acceleration and alienation8, and the French philosopher Bernard
Stiegler has investigated the “madness” of this “disruption.”9
In 1990, Deleuze wrote:
The conception of a control mechanism, giving the position of any element
within an open environment at any given instant (whether animal in a reserve
or human in a corporation, as with an electronic collar), is not necessarily one
of science fiction.
With a tremendous imagination (also in the ethical sense of the term, noted by
Hannah Arendt), Gilles Deleuze has succeeded in interpreting the symptoms of
his society so as to envision the possible evils of a society to come:
In the prison system: the attempt to find penalties of “substitution,” at least
for petty crimes, and the use of electronic collars that force the convicted
person to stay at home during certain hours. For the school system:
7 G. Deleuze, « Post-scriptum sur les sociétés de contrôle », in Pourparlers 1972–1990
(Paris: Les éditions de Minuit, 1990). English translation available at:
https://cidadeinseguranca.files.wordpress.com/2012/02/deleuze_control.pdf
8 H. Rosa, Alienation and Acceleration: Towards a Critical Theory of Late-modern Tem-
porality (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2010).
9 B. Stiegler, Dans la disruption, comment ne pas devenir fous? (Paris: Les liens qui lib-
èrent, 2016).
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continuous forms of control, and the effect on the school of perpetual train-
ing, the corresponding abandonment of all university research, the introduc-
tion of the “corporation” at all levels of schooling. For the hospital system:
the new medicine “without doctor or patient” that singles out potential sick
people and subjects at risk, which in no way attests to individuation—as they
say—but substitutes for the individual or numerical body the code of a “divi-
dual” material to be controlled. In the corporate system: new ways of hand-
ling money, profits, and humans that no longer pass through the old factory
form. These are very small examples, but ones that will allow for better
understanding of what is meant by the crisis of the institutions, which is to
say, the progressive and dispersed installation of a new system of
domination.10
Indeed, for Deleuze, power is mainly a “form of visibility” – a view shared by
Foucault who, in Surveiller et punir, argues that the stability and legitimacy of
political power rely on a model of vision. This model, for Foucault, is the panop-
ticon: a transparent and circular prison imagined by philosopher Jeremy Bentham
in the late 18th century. In it, the institution’s representative, the guardian,
housed in a central tower, has an absolute scopic power that allows him to observe
all the prisoners without them knowing if they are being watched. “Seeing with-
out being seen” is the abstract formula of the panopticon. “Being seen without
seeing,” instead, is the formula from the point of view of the dominated.
The panopticon is the model that reflects, but also overcomes, the disciplinary
society. In fact, it replaces a much more “concrete” surveillance system based on
quarantines and enclosures, supervisors and controls. With the panopticon, one
supervisor is enough, as all information is available to him through the visual
device. Foucault writes: “Full lighting and the eye of a supervisor capture better
than darkness, which ultimately protected. Visibility is a trap.”11 Hence the most
important function of the panopticon: “to induce in the inmate a state of con-
scious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power.”12
The panopticon is a “machine for dissociating the see/being seen dyad: in the
peripheric ring, one is totally seen, without ever seeing; in the central tower, one
sees everything without ever being seen”.13 It is a device aimed at improving the
exercise of power by making it faster, lighter, more effective. If, then, the society
of enclosure has a vision model that anticipates the society of control, the latter
has “surviving elements” of the former. But Deleuze was already very lucid on this
point: “It may be that older methods, borrowed from the former societies of
sovereignty, will return to the fore, but with the necessary modifications.”14
10 G. Deleuze, « Post-scriptum sur les sociétés de contrôle » (cit).
11 M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), p. 200.
12 Ibid., p. 201.
13 Ibid., p. 202.
14 G. Deleuze, « Post-scriptum sur les sociétés de contrôle », (cit).
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7.1 From transparency to “Trumparency”
And this is what, after this long conceptual premise, brings me to Trump and to
his relationship to truth in its link with transparency. How to explain Donald
Trump’s obsession with the wall between the United States and Mexico? How to
interpret this will to “close” space when the “open”, transparent and fluid society
of global control has come to its peak?
In an interview with The New York Times on July 13, 2017, Donald Trump
made remarkable and significant statements about the construction of this wall,
which I am here taking as a symbolic or symptomatic figure of his exercise of
power. When the journalist asked him whether he was joking about building a
solar wall, the President of the United States said:
No, not joking, no. There is a chance that we can do a solar wall. We have
major companies looking at that. Look, there’s no better place for solar than
the Mexico border — the southern border. And there is a very good chance
we can do a solar wall, which would actually look good. But there is a very
good chance we could do a solar wall.
But the most interesting thing is that this wall should have particular visual quali-
ties. Trump in fact continued as follows:
One of the things with the wall is you need transparency. You have to be able
to see through it. In other words, if you can’t see through that wall — so it
could be a steel wall with openings, but you have to have openings because
you have to see what’s on the other side of the wall.
To explain the reasons for this transparency, Trump has used moral and legal
reasons:
And I’ll give you an example. As horrible as it sounds, when they throw the
large sacks of drugs over, and if you have people on the other side of the wall,
you don’t see them — they hit you on the head with 60 pounds of stuff? It’s
over. As crazy as that sounds, you need transparency through that wall. But
we have some incredible designs.15
Why should transparency deter “those” who throw sacks of drugs over the wall?
The transparency invoked here seems to imply the self-regulatory functioning
Foucault said would operate through the panopticon, that is, the ability “to
induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the
automatic functioning of power.”
This is a paradigmatic example of the paradoxical nature of Trump’s power. The
manifest discourse is that of a reactionary, closed, nationalist and xenophobic
15 Interview in The New York Times, July 13, 2017.
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society, implying enclosures and the multiplication of barriers. However, these
proclamations clash against the reality of the society of control. The wall separates
and hides, whereas the new barriers are dematerialized and light. They look more
like the electronic gates at airports or stations (but now also museums and schools,
after the recent terrorist revival). The new barriers are light, penetrable, transpar-
ent, mobile and are everywhere16; and they also have the ability to extract infor-
mation about us, to intrude into us up to making us transparent. This is Foucault’s
intuition come true: full light shows more than the shade, visibility is a trap.
Trump’s call to make the wall between the United States and Mexico trans-
parent seems to me as a sort of symptom or latent meaning in his own political
discourse. This image claims to fall under the interests of the global system,
despite its protectionist and nationalist façade. Transparency is used here as the
main instrument of control of the globalized world, where what is transparent is
only such from a certain position of power.
Indeed, transparency has never been simply given, it is manufactured, and what
is interesting is that these manufacturing techniques are then denied and made
invisible. This is the kind of power that, in Mémoires d’aveugle, Jacques Derrida
attributes to lenses: they allow us to see only insofar as they are themselves unseen.
In this sense, truth as perfect transparency (aletheia) becomes problematic.
Truth is always manufactured, in the sense that it always emerges in connection
with a certain technicality of appearance.
On this point, and in a more direct relation with the question of post-truth, we
agree with what Maurizio Ferraris, in his book on post-truth, defines as “meso-
verità” (“mesotruth”). “Mesoverità”, far from being a “middle truth”, is rather a
truth indissociable from “media” (technical), “a technological result of the rela-
tionship between ontology and epistemology”.17 It is opposed by Ferraris at the
same time to the “ipoverità” (hypotruth) of hermeneutic philosophy and to the
“iperverità” (hypertruth) of analytic philosophy, guilty respectively of having
overestimated ontology or epistemology without having considered the question
of the technique.
However, this position seems incompatible with the hypothesis of a direct gen-
ealogy between post-modern and post-truth that Ferraris supports. In fact, for the
post-truist, the truth is always whole and absolute, no doubt comes to crack it, no
point of view of the other can be contemplated, no mediality is considered. It is
the phenomenon produced by the so called “filter bubbles”, a system of persona-
lized filtering of information used by the algoritimic functioning of the Internet,
that remains unseen by the user but that is capable of creating an intellectual and
cultural isolation letting him find only information that meets his potential agree-
ment and then suppress, on the duration, any critical capacity.
16 This aspect of the society of control has been discussed at a seminar of the Collège
d’études mondiales/Fondation Maison des Sciences de l’Homme in Paris with Olivier
Bouin, Françoise Vergès, Bernard Stiegler, Maurizio Ferraris, Ernesto Sferrazza Papa
and many other colleagues, to whom I am grateful.
17 M. Ferraris, Post-verità e altri enigmi (Bologne: Il Mulino, 2017), p. 129.
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For the hermeneutic philosopher it was quite the opposite: the thing is not
denied but multiple points of view can be given on it. Furthermore the etymology
of the word itself, “hermeneutics”, seems to be very close to the meaning of that
“mesoverità” indicated by Ferraris: the hermeneutic wants to be the heir of
Hermes, god of communication and mediality.
Any uncritical call for transparency means to forget (or make us forget) the role
of medias, of technology and therefore of power in conveying information.
Now, in his wish to build a transparent wall, Trump is precisely enacting the dream
of paranoid transparency of the panopticon. However, one should note that this
transparency is only possible if there is a punctum caecum lying outside this transpar-
ency: the formula of the panopticon is “seeing without being seen”, after all.
The position of the Trump administration should be read in the light of this
paranoid visibility: even in the campaign, the transparency invoked for others
implied significant opacity when it came to the means to obtain it.18
In this context, rather than transparency, we should talk about Trumparency –
like we talk about a politics of “Trump-l’oeil”, as Joan Wallach Scott pointed out
in her article about the concept of “Trump”19.
I am thinking of course about the emails stolen from the Democratic party
during Hillary Clinton’s campaign and published by Wikileaks in the name of
“transparency”; whereas the means to obtain such emails have not been subject to
the same requirements. Not to mention the links with Putin’s criminal politics, the
paradox of an alliance with Julian Assange – who is officially under an international
arrest warrant – and an organization like Wikileaks, which American institutions
officially regard as a criminal association. In short, the mechanism of transparency
seems to work only if all the conditions that determine it are invisible – meaning
out of any transparency.
I wish to conclude with a passage in which Jacques Derrida, talking about his
own philosophical writing, warns us about an acritical call for transparency:
My own experience of writing leads me to think that one does not always
write with a desire to be understood – that there is a paradoxical desire not to
be understood. It’s not simple, but there is a certain “I hope that not every-
one understands everything about this text”, because if such a transparency of
intelligibility were ensured it would destroy the text, it would show that the
text has no future [avenir], that it does not overflow the present, that it is
consumed immediately.20
This desire for non-transparency, as Derrida clearly says responding to Searle’s
criticism, is not a lack of clarity, but a “need of excess”, a desire “to leave a kind of
18 For an interesting analysis of the relationships between transparency, conspiracy and
post-truth in Trump’s era see the article by C. Birchall “Interrupting Transparency”, in
E. Alloa & D. Thomä (eds) Transparency, Society and Subjectivity. Critical Perspectives
(London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), pp. 365–394.
19 www.politicalconcepts.org/trump-joan-wallach-scott/
20 J. Derrida, M. Ferraris, A Taste for the Secret (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), p. 30.
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openness … which leaves room for the future”. For Derrida, going against trans-
parency means leaving space in the text for what has not yet happened, for those
who have not yet come, for those who will arrive, for the other as someone that
cannot be expected.
Derrida’s thought and work, his reflections on transparency and secret, warn us
against considering accessible documents as straightforward and transparent. The
presupposition of such transparency, as Derrida suggests, would mean the very
destruction of the given text or document, the annihilation of its potential to have
a future outside of immediate consumption. Every document must be respected in
its ability to be read and interpreted differently, in its ability to give space to the
other witness, to the witness of the other order, in its unpredictability, and in its
being the bearer of a secret to come.
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8 Fake news, the crisis of deference, and
epistemic democracy
Diego Marconi
Fake news has been with us since the beginning, if not of history, of history writ-
ing. According to Thucydides (II, 48), at the time of the “plague” (probably a
hemorrhagic fever like Ebola) that hit Athens in 430 b.C. during the Peloponne-
sian war the rumor spread that the Spartans had poisoned the wells in Piraeus. The
ground for the rumor was that the epidemics had started there, not in Athens
proper, and Piraeus at the time had no fountains of drinking water, only wells. In
fact, the epidemics was coming from Africa, so that it would naturally hit the port
city of Piraeus before reaching Athens.
Many centuries later, the Great Fear of Summer 1789 and the ensuing violence
that devastated many regions of Eastern France was caused by rumors of forth-
coming attacks by invading Austrian troops, or by British marines having landed at
Brest, or by a regiment of Swedes led by the count of Artois (king Louis XVI’s
fiercely reactionary brother), or, most commonly, by “brigands”. Sometimes,
crowds of farmers in arms against the alleged brigands were themselves mistaken
for the brigands they were chasing (Shama 1989, p.428 ff.). Though the Great
Fear vanished with the end of the summer, the paranoid attitudes that had devel-
oped were there to stay, until the Terror and later.
That such “news” was widely believed does not require an explanation: we tend
to believe any news, for we tend to rely on testimony—any testimony. As David
Lewis argued, use of any language L—i.e., communication in L—is based on “a
convention of truthfulness and trust” in L (Lewis 1975). I.e., (1) we trust other
people to be trying to tell the truth most of the time, (2) we believe to be trying
to tell the truth ourselves most of the time, and (3) we believe other people to
share such trust and beliefs. Moreover, we are right to entertain such beliefs and
trust, for indeed most people, including ourselves, do try to tell the truth most of
the time. Otherwise, there would be no language (as a vehicle of communication,
as distinct from an abstract object); for a sign system that were used in such a way
that it could not be trusted to provide truthful information (most of the time)
would be of no interest for communication.
As, ceteris paribus, we tend to believe everything we are told, we tend to believe
fake news as well. Of course, to be believed, fake news must be communicated.
Nowadays, the web takes care of that, reaching unprecedented audiences: as of
June 2017, about 51% of the world population, or about 3,2 billion people. No
communication system in human history ever approximated such efficacy. How-
ever, for bad quality information to effectively reach an audience, filters on
entrance must be inoperative or ineffective. This is indeed the case, often enough,
with information that is communicated through the web as contrasted with tradi-
tional media. First, much alleged information is not subject to checking on
entrance: “There are no longer any gatekeepers: the journals and op-ed pages that
were once strictly edited have been drowned under the weight of self-publishable
blogs” (Nichols 2014); “The Internet lets a billion flowers bloom, and most of
them stink” (Nichols 2017, p.108). Secondly, motivation for self-checking is
weakened by the frequent possibility of anonymous (or, equivalently, pseudon-
ymous) contribution. Anonymous contributors avoid the risk of being held
responsible for spreading misleading or utterly false information. Thirdly, the very
form of many contributions (think of Twitter) creates habituation to lack of justi-
fication. We get used to taking seriously assertions for which no justification is
provided. Ungrounded opinion tends to be legitimized as a contribution—indeed,
the typical contribution—to public debate.
Post-hoc checking—However, what I would like to focus on is the lack or
inefficacy of post-hoc controls. An assumption of democratic theory is that the
“informed citizen” should be in the position to check the quality of publicly
available information.1 Probably, this was never entirely the case. However, it is
plausible to suppose that, until a few decades ago and limited to developed socie-
ties, a significant proportion of citizens who had access to public discourse also
possessed enough education and information to discard at least the most blatant
pseudo-scientific or pseudo-historical nonsense. But now, hyperfragmentation of
knowledge has made most disciplinary sub-languages so arcane as to be only
intelligible to sub-disciplinary experts. Factual considerations that are relevant to
public issues are only accessible to and can only be checked by such experts. It is
not just that the “informed citizen” is unable to judge whether an antitumoral
therapy is or isn’t viable all things considered; she cannot even understand, let
alone assess, positive or negative arguments concerning the therapy; indeed, she
does not really understand what the therapy consists in. Clearly, fragmentation of
knowledge has deeply affected the relation between knowledge and democracy, by
drastically reducing (perhaps destroying) the checking power of that minority of
citizens (“informed citizens”) who had been able to mediate, somehow, between
experts and “the people”.
A few years ago—before the “web revolution”—the philosopher Stephen
Toulmin drew from an analysis of the politically catastrophic consequences of
hyperspecialization the conclusion that we ought to move towards a different
intellectual world: one that would realize that theoretical physics should not be a
model for knowledge in general, and make more room for empirical observation,
1 E.g., the assumption could be seen as a necessary prerequisite of Rawls’ prescription
that liberty of conscience and freedom of association should guarantee that citizens
make “an informed and effective use” of their powers of deliberative reason (Rawls
1993, VIII, §9).
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everyday practice, and middle-range theories (Toulmin 2001). This, I believe, is
utopian. It is utterly unlikely that specialization will recede and that we go back to
more generalist competences and a better communication between the knowledge
community and ordinary citizens. On the one hand, scientific subcommunities are
jealous custodians of the fragmentation of knowledge, for their power is based on
it (as Toulmin himself shows). On the other hand, hyperspecialization has gener-
ated an immense amount of knowledge, much of which is useful and some of
which is vital: giving it up would be hard and managing it without relying on
mechanisms based on specialization would be impossible.
Hence, the only viable option for ordinary citizens, “informed” or not, is
deferring to experts: i.e., in matters involving knowledge that is not widely avail-
able they ought to (1) systematically side with expert over non-expert opinion, (2)
when experts disagree, side with the socially established experts rather than with
heterodox, self-proclaimed “experts”, (3) when there is serious disagreement
among established experts, wait until some majoritarian consensus is reached.2
The crisis of deference—However, as many have remarked and Tom Nichols
(2017) has shown in some detail, it seems that nowadays the experts’ authority is
systematically challenged, often on no particular ground:
Tackle a complex policy issue with a layman today, and you will get snippy
and sophistic demands to show ever increasing amounts of “proof” or “evi-
dence” for your case, even though the ordinary interlocutor in such debates
isn’t really equipped to decide what constitutes “evidence” or to know it
when it’s presented.
(Nichols 2014)
In Franca D’Agostini’s apt phrase, the experts’ “alethic right” to be “acknowl-
edged as reliable sources of truth” goes unrecognized (D’Agostini 2017, p.18).
Why? What are the reasons of such crisis of deference?
Perhaps experts themselves are to be blamed to some extent. John Ioannidis, a
professor of both Medicine and Statistics at Stanford, has specialized in showing
(based on a vast amount of research) that published scientific research is often
flawed—mostly, statistically flawed—so that its results are utterly unreliable. Con-
sidering only top medical journals, Ioannidis found that two out of three studies
were—in a matter of months, or a few years at best—effectively refuted by further
research, and, consequently, abandoned and forgotten. Looking at other fields
such as chemistry and physics he found much the same situation (see Freedman
2010). Such refutations of apparently “respectable” scientific results should not be
described as a normal aspect of “the advancement of science” (we all know that no
science is purely cumulative: some research is superseded by better research, new
2 A case in point has been the debate on climate change and human responsibility for it:
consensus was reached (in 2001) through a long and at times conflict-ridden process
that eventually involved about 1500 researchers, including every prominent climatolo-
gist in the world. See Marconi 2001.
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experiments make older hypotheses less plausible, previous research is re-con-
textualized and re-interpreted, etc.). Here we are talking about research that was
flawed from the beginning, and that—if Ioannidis is right—ought never to have
been published in the first place. It is hard to say whether such a situation is to be
brought back to the “publish or perish” craze due to competition on the job
market, or to the pressure of funding interests, or to personal ambition, or to a
combination of all such factors. In any case, it doesn’t speak for the reliability of
much scientific research and the intellectual honesty of many researchers. If one
adds to that the perverse synergy of self-advertising by scientists and the journal-
ists’ frequent lack of understanding of the science they are reporting, one can see
that the layman has many reasons to be wary of the scientific results that eventually
reach him.
However, such serious reasons for mistrusting both alleged scientific results and
vulgarization of them may not be the real ground of widespread lack of confidence
in scientific experts. It can be safely assumed that not many people are aware of
how precarious scientific research really is, and how misleadingly it is often pre-
sented. Instead, many choose to believe what is in fact rather infrequent, i.e., that
scientific research is deliberately distorted to favor the interests of Big Pharma or
some other economic Moloch. We’ll go back to that. But first, let us consider the
most time-honored explanation of mistrust of experts, namely Plato’s. According
to the father of philosophy, expert knowledge is often unpleasant, whereas people,
as a rule, choose to believe what they would like to be true:
If the physician and the cook had to enter into a competition in which chil-
dren were the judges, or men who had no more sense than children, as to
which of them best understands the goodness or badness of food, the physi-
cian would be starved to death.
(Gorgias 464d, tr. Jowett 1937)
Assuming, as the aristocratic Plato did, that most people “have no more sense than
children”, they will be prone to choose agreeable fake news over disagreeable (or
neutral) truth. But why should fake news be agreeable? I.e., why would people like
it to be true that vaccines or chemtrails (really, contrails) are dangerous, or that 9/
11 was masterminded by the Mossad or the CIA?
Here, social psychology may help. Some research has shown that conspiracy-
prone commentators on the web are particularly fond of beliefs that can be char-
acterized as anti-establishment: i.e., beliefs which, if true, would show the perver-
sity of this or that sector of the establishment (politicians, big corporations, official
science, or “the rich and powerful” in general), and which, therefore, the estab-
lishment is trying to keep from being publicly known. They are so fond of such
beliefs that they may even accept inconsistent propositions at the same time, pro-
vided they both have establishment-damaging implications (Wood & Douglas
2013). So, this may be one reason why people choose to believe (at least some)
fake news. If true, they prove the establishment’s wickedness on several grounds:
because of what they do (e.g., enforcing dangerous vaccines or GMOs on regular,
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innocent people), because they do it to make even more money, and because they
hide such truths from “the people”. It makes sense to suppose that a great eco-
nomic crisis would stimulate mistrust of the establishment and authorities in gen-
eral (of which experts are perceived as both part of and spokespersons for). So,
Plato’s explanation can be rescued (in part) by assuming that many people “love
to hate” the establishment: therefore, they are happy to believe anything that casts
a sinister light on some segment of it, whether or not experts endorse such beliefs
(if they don’t, that is because they are themselves part of the establishment, or on
its payroll).
Epistemic democracy—However, such social and political factors and the
ensuing attitudes are only part of the explanation. Another part is belief in epis-
temic democracy; i.e., the belief that every opinion is not just as legitimate as any
other, but as authoritative as any other. Freedom of the expression of opinions is a
constitutive principle of liberal democracy. However, it does not carry with it the
corollary that all opinions are equally valuable. Freedom of expression is compa-
tible with the notion that there are socially grounded entitlements that make some
opinions more authoritative than others, depending on subject matter. A trained
physicist is not necessarily more authoritative than me in matters of politics, or
morals, or cooking, or biking, etc., but she is more authoritative than me in mat-
ters of physics (including “chemtrails”). In a liberal-democratic society, such epis-
temic entitlements are not based on birth, or wealth, or political allegiance: they
are based on socially established educational processes and the judgment of
socially acknowledged communities of experts.
Yet, somehow, a different view has prevailed. Expert opinion is challenged on
several, non-exclusive grounds: (1) based on alternative opinions, often from
heretical “experts” that lack the customary entitlements or represent a tiny min-
ority of the relevant scientific community; (2) because experts are perceived as
biased in favor of established interests (e.g., they are suspected of being on some-
one’s “payroll”); (3) or simply because the customary entitlements are seen as no
valid ground for epistemic authority. The last reason to challenge expert authority
is often based, albeit implicitly, on the claim of epistemic democracy: in principle,
all citizens are epistemic equals; public choices should be the outcome of a
democratic process in which “everyone counts for one”,3 independently of his or
her a priori epistemic credentials.
However, as we know since Plato’s time, there is no such thing as epistemic
democracy. As far as justification of beliefs goes, we are not all on a par: different
people have different epistemic credentials (hence different authority) in different
areas, nobody is universally authoritative, and most people have very little author-
ity in most areas. These I take to be truisms. Nevertheless, they are widely
rejected.
3 “Uno vale uno” (one counts for one) has been a slogan of the Italian “Five stars”
movement, which won a relative majority in the national parliamentary election of
2018.
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Epistemic democracy, seen as a semi-conscious attitude, is part of the general
anti-élitism that inspires present-day populism in the Western world: it is anti-
élitism aimed at the knowledge establishment. However, it has a somewhat
“highbrow” antecedent in the late Richard Rorty’s opposition of solidarity to
objectivity (and reduction of the latter to the former). Philosophical realists, Rorty
argued, want to ground solidarity on objectivity (i.e., they want public choices to
be based on respect of objective truth), hence they must construe truth as corre-
spondence to reality. By contrast, pragmatists—in Rorty’s sense—wish to reduce
objectivity to solidarity: for them, truth is what is good for us to believe (“us” is
italicized). Prima facie, this looks like a vindication of Plato’s cook against the
doctor: truth is whatever we would like to be true. However, in the same context,
Rorty goes on to argue for a more respectable view, i.e., antirealism about truth:
“There is nothing to be said about either truth or rationality apart from descrip-
tions of the familiar procedures of justification which a given society -ours- uses in
one or another area of inquiry” (Rorty 1991, p.23).
In other words, “what is good for us to believe” should be understood as “what
our community (with its familiar procedures of justification, etc.) regards as fit to
believe”. Now this sort of antirealism, radical as Rorty intends it to be, surely does
not legitimize belief in a causal connection between vaccines and autism or in the
dangerous nature of “chemtrails”: indeed, such beliefs are inconsistent with “our
familiar procedures of justification” in the relevant areas of inquiry.
However, Rorty has had less cautious followers. The Italian philosopher Gianni
Vattimo offered a more radical interpretation of the reduction of objectivity to
solidarity. E.g., he wrote that he didn’t mind (George W.) Bush’s and Tony Blair’s
lies, provided they were “justified by a good end, i.e. by an end I share” (Vattimo
2009, p.14); the trouble was not their being lies, but that “they were told for the
purpose of waging a war that we don’t believe we can approve of”. Democracy
doesn’t need truth; indeed, “truth is a danger more than it is a value” (p.25). A
farewell to truth (the title of Vattimo’s book) “is the beginning and the very base
of democracy” as opposed to “a dictatorship of the experts, of Nobel prizes of the
several disciplines” (notice disparagement of experts; I’ll come back to that in a
moment). “Truth of politics is to be found first and foremost in the construction
of consensus and civic friendship, of communitarian sharing … that does not
depend on sentences being true rather than false” (pp.26–7). So, Rorty’s reduc-
tion of objectivity to justification procedures established within our community
has turned into the replacement of objectivity with “civic friendship” and the
sharing of beliefs that are chosen, it seems, independently not just of whether they
are true or false, but on whether they are justified or not by Rorty’s “familiar
procedures”. What I would like to emphasize in Vattimo’s kind-hearted pragma-
tism is not his distaste for objective truth but his opposing democracy to compe-
tence (“the dictatorship of experts”)—an opposition that Rorty, for one, did not
share. There is, of course, an issue as to whether we should interpret truth as jus-
tification, or replace truth with justification, as different schools of antirealism
believe. However, the issue of deference to experts is independent of which stand
we take in the realism/antirealism dispute. Neither view has negative implications
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for the reasonableness of deference: indeed, most antirealists (including a radical
antirealist like Rorty) tend to identify justification with competent justification,
which entails truth’s reduction to (or replacement by) the experts’ considered
opinion. It follows that deference to experts is highly reasonable, for it is not just
our best chance of hitting upon truth (as most realists believe): it is our only
chance of hitting upon epistemically valuable beliefs.
By contrast, basing public choices on pure consensus, with no room left for
epistemic authorities and deference (as in Vattimo’s view), presupposes epistemic
democracy: indeed, it makes epistemic democracy a prerequisite of genuine
democracy, as opposed to a “dictatorship of Nobel prizes”. I doubt that today’s
populist politicians, or the No-Vax people, are familiar with Vattimo’s recent
thought. However, Vattimo himself has always been extremely perceptive of the
Zeitgeist. So, perhaps a longing for civic friendship is behind all this. Unfortu-
nately, not much in the web debates seems to be permeated with friendly feelings.
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9 Idealism, empiricism, pluralism, law
Legal truth after modernity
Luke Mason
9.1 Introduction
Making a connection between ‘post-modernism’ and post-truth has by now
become a standard trope, both within academia and popular discourse, despite
post-truth’s only recent emergence as a concept. Such claims are often rather
vague and fanciful and lack an altogether credible account of either phenomenon
in many cases. This Chapter argues, however, that within a legal context, there is
the emergence of a legal post-truth which is the direct consequence of a concrete
form of post-modernity within legal practice and thought. While law may be called
upon to engage in judgments of ‘truth’ in numerous interesting ways, it does not
itself have any particular form of privileged access to the truth of statements or
allegations, even though it is often treated as doing so. However, the most per-
sistent question which law must deal with, and indeed the most persistent ques-
tion within legal philosophy, relates to a deeper form of inquiry into truth: the
question of legal truth. In simple terms this refers to the correctness of any parti-
cular proposition of law. Within legal theory, this expands to the larger question of
what makes, in general, any legal proposition valid, or true. Reflecting upon legal
scholarship through the lens of truth reveals that theories of law can be broken
down into two broad and radically distinct categories. On the one hand, there
exist empirical accounts of law which fundamentally understand questions of legal
truth as social questions whose answers are empirically demonstrable. On the
other hand, there are ‘idealist’ accounts of law which view legal content, and
hence truth, as existing in some way or other in a manner which transcends social
practice and which is autonomous from it. Both of these classical accounts, while
radically different, share an interesting paradox: they see truth in law as an objec-
tive fact, but one which is fleeting and distant, far from the paradigm of legal
certainty upon which the ideology of law is partly based.
However, such accounts of legal truth share many other unstated aspects, and
are largely based upon ideas which place the separateness and completeness of legal
systems at their heart, providing either a unified ideal or a unified empirically
observable social practice. However, they share a common flaw, namely the failure
to account for what might be called a post-modern phase of development in law, in
which ordinary legal questions now regularly require the complex and non-
hierarchical interaction of competing legal systems with different ‘truths’ and dif-
ferent ways of arriving at such truths. Such phenomena are commonly referred to
as legal or, at times, constitutional ‘pluralism’. This post-modern turn within law
has also produced, therefore, what we might call a form of post-truth within law.
This is particularly significant because it places under great strain both the
empirical and ideal accounts of legal truth and require us to re-elaborate an
account of what makes a legal proposition true. From certain perspectives, this
legal post-truth shares certain important aspects with the cultural phenomenon of
post-truth, namely its apparently capricious and deracinated nature.
However, it is argued in this Chapter that, in the legal context at least, post-
truth allows for the transcendence of the empirical/ideal divide and the revealing
of deeper forms of legal truth and our ability to account for them through theory
or, put more simply, explanation. Upon greater reflection, legal truth is generated
by the very forms of argument, or modes, which allow access to it. Such forms of
argument exist also to produce legal truths outside and between legal orders
where these appear to conflict or collide. While some legal scholars and others
claim that such pressures on structures of knowledge reveal the end of the poten-
tial for law to generate truth, it is argued here that, on the contrary, they require a
more open and more transparent use of the pure methods and modes of reason
which both reveal but also generate legal truth in the first place. This is relevant to
post-truth more generally in one specific way, despite the numerous idiosyncrasies
of legal truth and knowledge: when assertions of truth within structures of power
seem to come to embody the perspectivism and relativism used as methods of
deconstruction, the post-modern and deconstructionist projects themselves
require radical change: they stay true to their goal of deconstructing structures and
discourses of power by applying the classical epistemologies which are rejected by
those in power. Just as legal outcomes which are asserted rather than reasoned or
justified are most convincingly deconstructed through sober legal modes, so can
the post-modernist project find purpose in a world where dominant epistemes seem
to have come to embody a simplistic version of post-modernist critiques.
9.2 The mythologies and truths of law’s relationship with the truth
Law has a complex and autonomous relationship with the truth, in that it has its
own cognitive approaches and communities of practice which seek to arrive at
conclusions regarding the veracity of certain propositions. This is true in a least
two broad but largely disparate ways, only one of which is the concern of this
Chapter. The everyday encounter with the law, whether through legal practice or
through observation of the legal system at work in all its guises, reveals a social
institution which makes claims about its ability to judge questions of ‘truth’ or
‘fact’ outside the law itself, and even change the ‘truth’, or social ontology, of that
outside world. However, this is not the law’s most important relationship with the
generation or discovery of truth, nor its most controversial. Even a cursory exam-
ination of legal argument or legal theory and scholarship reveals that the most
fraught, and perhaps most important, question in law is what it is that makes a
94 Luke Mason
legal proposition true, or, more precisely, legally true. In order to focus squarely
on that question, it is first necessary to distinguish it from the separate, perhaps
instinctively more central, relationship between law and truth.
As is well-known to all people with a passing interest in the law, each legal
system has its own procedures which are used to allow the officials of that system
to reach decisions regarding the truth and significance and certain propositions of
fact. In this way, it could be said that law possess its own philosophy of science or
epistemology (Laudan 2006, Ho 2008). Perhaps more precisely, it could be stated
that each area of law within each legal system has a complex set of rules con-
stituting its own epistemology for deciding questions of fact in that field, which
might, at times, be quite different from other epistemologies within that same
legal system. In this manner, legal systems have complex rules of procedure and of
evidence regarding how and in what circumstances certain objects, propositions,
assertions and arguments may be presented within a legal forum, and how these
things are analysed, assessed and rebutted. Such rules often concern the order in
which these facts are presented and the ways in which they were obtained. Certain
legal systems, and certain areas of law, such as criminal law, have extremely strict
rules regarding the consequences of the breach of these procedural requirements,
such as the entire exclusion of that purported evidence (Stumer 2010). Equally,
the rules will often concern the manner in which evidence is questioned or pre-
sented, with important limits on this.
Equally, different legal systems will task different types of person with different
types of task in assessing the ‘truth’ of any such assertion, and the legal con-
sequences of such findings will depend on the purpose and type of legal proceed-
ing in the first place. In some cases, judges are tasked with making such decisions,
whereas in other legal systems or types of cases a mixture of judges and laypersons
or exclusively non-lawyers will be required to make decisions regarding such
questions of fact (Dammer and Albanese 2013). Sweeping typological categories
of legal system are often presented to draw general distinctions between types of
procedure in this regard. Thus we talk of inquisitorial systems versus adversarial
systems of procedure, regarding whether it is the court or the parties (or their
representatives) which are primarily tasked with investigating and presenting such
matters. Equally we talk of jury and non-jury based approaches, regarding whether
non-legal professionals are required to make certain types of decisions. In this
manner we see that law purports to make decisions regarding non-legal states of
affairs or events in order to reach conclusions which may have dramatic effects in
the real world, such as the incarceration or even execution of the accused in a
criminal trial, or the awarding of damages or other remedy in a dispute between
private parties. Of course, courts, as we shall see in the remainder of this Chapter,
are not only tasked with this form of epistemic task, as they also are required to
decide on the truth of propositions of law as well as fact. However, this function
of the Court as a forum for the purported resolution of fraught questions of dis-
puted truth is rather curious. Regardless of one’s understanding of the nature of
truth, to be discussed in detail in the remainder of this Chapter, our treatment of
the legal forum as an adjudicator of such matters probably bears little resemblance
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to other considerations of the truthfulness of propositions. While legal rules of
procedure put in place certain safeguards and privileges of access to seek to prior-
itise the trustworthiness of certain assertions of truth, as well as the rights and
interests of the parties concerned (Stumer 2010), it would seem almost axiomatic
that the legal process and the courts have no privileged access to ‘the truth’, even
if we were to consider ‘truth’ a complex matter of social convention. There is no
requirement, it would seem, for legal decisions to fit with broader social conven-
tions regarding decisions of truthfulness or their findings. Despite the legal pro-
cess’s privileged societal role in resolving questions of ‘truth’ for the purpose of
settling disputes and for questions of liability in a more or less satisfactory or fair
manner, such procedures and practices can tell us little about truth or the law’s
relationship with it more generally.
A more subtle version of this relationship between law and truth is to be found
not in the law’s adjudicatory role but in its legislative or law-making guise, that is
its ability, or at least purported ability, to ‘re-cast’ the world in its own image,
forging its own truth in the world in a broadly constructivist manner (Luhmann
2004). This occurs in two connected ways. In a straightforward sense, the law
changes the rules regarding behaviour and its consequences (Raz 1975). To the
extent that these rules are either followed or enforced, law has a peremptory rela-
tionship with certain ontological arrangements, with consequences for the truth-
fulness of propositions. Slightly more complex is the impact which the law has in
creating agents, actors, institutions or pathways for action through its regulatory
structures, such as creating the private law ‘person’ or the ‘employee’ of labour
law, by granting certain rights and responsibilities through their enactment (Sinz-
heimer 1976a, 1976b). The point here is important but should not be laboured:
law has the ability, alongside many other social institutions and phenomena, albeit
in an often more deliberate and codified manner, to project a ‘truth’ about the
nature, identity and interaction of people, and thus re-cast social ontology. In a
society in which law is effective and possesses this social function, the ‘truth’ of
propositions of social affairs will depend, to some extent, on those same proposi-
tions being contained within law, however implicitly.
The concept of truth, as evidenced in this volume more generally, and indeed
subsequently in this Chapter, is contested. The respective roles of epistemology
and ontology and their relationship with what we consider to be truth are recur-
rent themes within centuries of debate on this matter. As the preceding paragraphs
have demonstrated, the law, in its adjudicatory and legislative guises, has both an
epistemic and ontological ‘contribution’ to matters of truth and their nature.
However, these are rather minor and far from unique, in that major institutions
and social phenomena possess similar characteristics, with the law’s being more
significant and visible due to the law’s significance in resolving, for practical pur-
poses, disputed propositions and in arranging states of affairs pre-emptively
through a projection of its perspective onto the world through the social function
and/or enforcement of its rules. These questions are of minor significance in our
discussion of post-truth simply because they are socially and historically con-
tingent. The content of these rules could be different, and their significance and
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social role could change. They tell us little about law’s special relationship with
truth itself. This relationship is to be found elsewhere, that is in questions of the
truth of legal propositions.
Legal procedure might often appear to be centred around propositions of
events or states of affairs outside the law and their truthfulness, however in reality
this is not the nature of most legal practice. Legal practice is in fact largely based
around propositions of law, that is regarding what the law says or what it means.
Questions of whether someone ‘did it’ or is telling the truth are not questions
which the law has any privileged way of answering, although it is at times required
to do so and is treated as doing so. On the other hand, questions of whether, by
way of arbitrarily selected example, Article 11 of the European Convention of
Human Rights (ECHR) concerning Freedom of Association grants a right to
strike, and if so to whom and in what circumstances, is a matter upon whose
truthfulness legal thought and legal practice has some form of privileged access. It
is this question which this Chapter seeks to analyse.
9.3 The truth of legal propositions
In common parlance it is often uttered that ‘it is the law that…’. This might be
followed with a curious anecdote, such as ‘it is the law that you cannot take lions
into cinemas’ in a certain municipality, or something rather more serious or pro-
saic. Such statements are made as if they were propositions about something with
some kind of ontological status in the world, worthy of linguistic formulations that
mirror propositions about the natural and social world, such as ‘elephants have
tusks’. What is it to say that a proposition of law is true therefore, and what can
such reflections reveal about the present collection’s focus on the phenomenon of
post-truth? It is true that lawyers also make similar statements about the law,
containing propositions of legal truth, although they often leave unsaid the quali-
fying premise that they are talking about the law. However, much of the discourse
among lawyers revolves around disagreement, or at least the search for clarifica-
tion, about propositions of law (Dworkin 1986). Taking the example given at the
end of the previous section, it might be (and indeed is) plausible to disagree in
myriad different ways regarding whether and to what extent Article 11 of the
ECHR does include a right to strike (Ewing 2013). Such disagreements are not
simply incidental to legal practice or discourse. On one view, it is the function of
legal practice, and of legal reasoning, to provide for an appropriate forum to arrive
at the resolution of such disagreements.
Law’s mythology and surrounding political philosophy, such as the notion of
the Rule of Law, might be couched in terms which present the law as providing a
solid framework of justice based on clear and knowable rules (Fuller 1969, Kramer
2004, Wiener et al. 2012). However, the realities of legal discourse are far
removed from this in many ways, revealing the elusiveness of the resolution of
questions of the truthfulness of legal propositions (Mason 2014). As well as being
seen in the disagreements between practising lawyers and court judgments, this
can also be seen in two crucial ways within legal scholarship. Firstly, the great
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majority of legal scholarship, filling thousands of pages every year on every area of
law within every legal system, concerns discussion regarding the content of the
law, that is the truthfulness of certain propositions of law. Secondly, and possibly
more importantly from the perspective of this discussion, legal scholarship of a
more general nature, sometimes called ‘jurisprudence’ or the philosophy of law, is
primarily concerned with the nature of law (Hart 2012). While this is a complex
question with all manner of component parts, its most central and fundamental
aspect, and indeed the elements around which there is most animated disagree-
ment, is the question of truth within law, that is what it is that makes a proposi-
tion of law ‘true’ (Dworkin 1986, chap. 1).
The philosophy of law, or general jurisprudence as it is sometimes known, is a
surprisingly fraught area of scholarship to those who are unfamiliar with it. It seeks
to interrogate the fundamental components of the rather mysterious social practice
and/or ideal which we refer to as law. Attempts to characterise even the central
tenets of law and legal systems vary wildly, with heated debates regarding the
inclusion or exclusion of supposedly central elements. Such debates find their
roots in the philosophy of Ancient Greece, in particular Aristotle, and can be
traced directly through the work of Aquinas, to enlightenment philosophy of var-
ious stripes and all manner of Nineteenth and Twentieth Century philosophical
movements. Debates within legal theory have clear links to political philosophy,
the philosophy of language, ethics and metaethics and theories of social action and
social ontology, among other fields. However, legal philosophy is also a mature
field with an identifiable, if internally contested, canon of its own. The major dis-
agreements within legal philosophy tend to focus around the extent to which law
can be reduced to an observable social practice, and in which case of what type
(Hart 2012). Critics of such perspectives tend to underline the apparently inevi-
table moral component of law, either within identifying the nature of law itself (as
an inherently moral question) (Finnis 1982) or within the content of the law itself
(Dworkin 1986). However, this debate, between perspectives which sometimes
reductively labelled ‘positivist’ and ‘natural law’, in fact hides a far broader and
richer discussion within legal scholarship regarding how lawyers go about deter-
mining the truth of legal propositions. A small amount of explanation of the
complexity of this theme is warranted at this stage, before examining the com-
peting theories of truth, and the importance of ideas of post-truth within law.
Take the question posed earlier, regarding Article 11 of the ECHR. Paragraph
1 of that provision states that ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful
assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form
and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.’ All, or at least most,
lawyers and legal scholars would agree that this provision is what we might call a
valid ‘ground’ of law, at least if it remains in force in a relevant legal system. It is a
‘ground’ in the sense that it might form the basis of a legal proposition which
flows from it. As a written source of law in this respect, Article 11, and the ECHR
itself, is neither ‘true’ nor ‘false’, although a proposition regarding its validity may
be of course. The reason why the truth of legal propositions is fraught is that these
are things which are built upon legal grounds, which require additional work to
98 Luke Mason
enquire into their meaning (Patterson 1999). Propositions of a very general nature
do often flow directly from grounds of law in an uncontroversial manner, such as,
in the case of Article 11, ‘there is a right to freedom of association’, but as soon as
any detail is added to such a proposition, such as who is the bearer of such a right,
for instance individuals or organisations, or both, a large space has emerged
between the ground itself and potential propositions of law regarding its content.1
What might make any proposition of law true in any particular legal system will of
course, in the first instance, depend on the rules of interpretation and application
within that jurisdiction. This might include the place of certain rules of statutory
construction, the role of previously decided cases, and so on. The matter might
also require other grounds of law to be taken into account which might provide
other assistance in resolving the status of any proposition of law as true or other-
wise. Such matters, in particular in legal systems in which ‘constitutional’ or
‘supreme’ courts have an important role in interpreting the constitution and set-
ting the limits for legislative action, are of huge political and cultural import, and
the controversy around the resolution of such matters is well-known.
In particular legal systems, such matters are debated around the legitimacy of
certain approaches to legal reasoning, such as the fraught debate regarding ori-
ginalist, textualist, purposive and evolutive interpretation of the United States
Constitution (Sunstein 2015). Similar such debates are ongoing in most societies,
and in all communities of lawyers and legal scholars (Choudhry 1998–1999).
However, such issues exist around the content of law in all fields of law, not lim-
ited to large constitutional controversies (Dworkin 1986). On this reading, it is
perhaps less surprising to learn that the nature of the truth of legal propositions
might be said to be the most controversial and indeed central issue within general
jurisprudence or the philosophy of law. A general account of law seeks to under-
stand law from outside the perspectives of the snapshot perspective of one given
legal order, and instead attempts to understand law in a more universal sense. A
general account of law thereby seeks not to understand ‘what makes a proposition
of law true in legal system x’ but rather ‘what makes a proposition of law true in
general’. In this way, legal philosophy can transcend the parochial legal practices
of given legal systems and attempt to understand the nature of law more generally
and its relationship with other important concepts and institutions, such as the
State, politics, economics, morality, justice, coercion and language (Raz 2008,
Hart 2012). This is of course a tremendously ambitious project, seeking to over-
come the myriad differences between legal systems and their own philosophical
quirks. Indeed, some celebrated legal theorists abandon this catholic project to
some extent, deliberately seeking to explain a certain form of legal system in order
1 This question has recently been heard before the European Court of Human Rights,
and these precise issues were raised, with the Court ruling for the first time that Article
11 did include a limited right to strike. In particular, see Demir and Baykara v Turkey
(Application no. 34503/97) [2008] ECHR 1345. The same question has been asked
within other legal orders in which there exists a legal protection of freedom of asso-
ciation, with sometimes differing results, reflecting differing views of the nature of that
right (Fudge 2004, Langille 2009).
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to draw out broader lessons from its exemplarity (Dworkin 1986). The following
section seeks to locate the dominant themes of general jurisprudence within a
broader scholarly discourse about the nature of truth.
9.4 Truth and legal truth
Broadly speaking, philosophical accounts of the nature of truth can be cate-
gorised into two categories: those which see questions of truth as questions of
correspondence, and those which see them as questions of coherence (Kirkham
1995, Künne 2003, Burgess and Burgess 2011). While such a distinction would
be resisted by many commentators for numerous subtle, and indeed valid, rea-
sons (Strawson 1949, Tarski and Corcoran 1983), this distinction serves our
purposes here. On the one hand, therefore, there are accounts of ‘truth’ which
are related to an ontology and a metaphysics of the world, which exists outside
the content of the pronouncement of any proposition which might be said to be
true or false. Such accounts can be called the correspondence thesis (Russell
1906, Vision 2009). For instance, to say that the proposition mice eat cheese is
true would require there to be such things as mice and cheese and for mice to
eat cheese, and for this to refer to an action which exists in the world. This
presupposes a series of metaphysical assumptions or theses about the world,
including that there exist metaphysical facts. The alternative view of truth, which
can be labelled the coherence thesis, sees accounts such as the correspondence
thesis as problematic, in particular due to the atomistic nature of any given
‘truth’ in its account. The coherence thesis locates truth within a broader, more
holistic account of knowledge, understanding truth as stemming from a propo-
sition’s coherence with a more overarching understanding of the world or a
particular field (Joachim 1906, Walker 1989, David 1994).
While a correspondence thesis therefore sees truth as connected to a series of
ontologically extant discrete ‘facts’ within a myriad of truths and falsehoods, the
coherence thesis tends to speak more generally of ‘truth’ in the singular, that is
as an overarching approach to knowledge. And while the correspondence thesis
can be understood as linked to an understanding of truth as linked to meta-
physics and ontology, the coherence thesis can therefore be seen as connected to
viewing truth as an epistemological question. There are all manner of other
central controversies within the philosophy of truth which may also help us
understand certain questions within legal theory, primarily the centrality and
nature of language, however this will not form the basis of the discussion of the
remainder of this Chapter. Instead the discussion will focus on the non-linguistic
analysis of legal reasoning and practice and what this tells us about how propo-
sitions of law might be said to be true.
The truth of legal propositions is crucial because of the question of the
requirement to find the meaning of the law in any given area, whether to resolve a
dispute in an adjudicatory context or to work out the requirements of the law in
relation to one’s conduct and what the law requires of it. Twentieth Century legal
philosophy was most markedly characterised by the distinction between legal
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theorists who argued that law was essentially a question of man made rules or
standards of some kind which had an ultimate source, probably socially gener-
ated, and those who argued that, on the contrary, so deliberation regarding the
correct content of the law could be reduced to brute empirical facts in this way,
and that moral reasoning was ultimately the arbiter of legal content (Dickson
2001). Such questions generated a tremendous amount of rich, detailed scho-
larship which had a huge influence within the practice of law itself as well as the
philosophical and empirical study of other fields, from ethics to anthropology.
However, what this debate revealed was the centrality, as discussed in the pre-
ceding sections, of the question of the basis for the truth of legal propositions in
understanding the more general nature of law. This allows us to open up the
question to a far broader range of perspectives than are usually included in those
afforded the glamour of being included within ‘general’ accounts of jur-
isprudence. Legal analysis from movements such as law and economics, critical
legal theory, legal realism and various theories of legal interpretation also qualify,
on this basis, as theories of law in this central sense, in that they seek to explain
what makes a proposition of law true.
Due to law’s status as a social practice which consists of a community of
knowledge, i.e. people engaged in identifying and applying valid propositions of
law, most theories of law contain elements of both the ontological and epistemic
versions of ‘truth’ discussed earlier in relation to the correspondence and coher-
ence thesis respectively. On the one hand, law is a brute social fact meaning that
some aspect of accounting for the facts in the world is usually found within an
account of law. On the other hand, that fact is at least partly constituted by shared
practices which are used to determine the truth of legal propositions. To this
extent, legal accounts of truth therefore cut across the dominant distinction found
within general philosophical theories of truth, discussed earlier. However, it is also
true that theories of law tend to accentuate one or the other of these to a greater
or lesser degree, focusing on the empirically observable fact of the existence of
legal systems in the world as the basis of law, or, alternatively, on the structures of
reasoning against which legal propositions are measured. Nonetheless, it is argued
here that a different dichotomy characterises disagreement about legal truth. This
distinction is broadly between those accounts of law which see the truth of legal
propositions as dependent on empirically observable facts, and those who view it
as based on ideals or values. This distinction might be superficially seen as map-
ping loosely onto the correspondence/coherence dichotomy discussed earlier,
however this would be a misleading assumption in various ways.
The most central instance of the empirical theory of legal truth is that exem-
plified by HLA Hart’s (2012) practice theory of law in which law is understood as
a system of rules whose validity (i.e. status as true propositions of law) rests on an
ultimate social practice, a conscious convergence of behaviour amongst legal offi-
cials. This social practice is, according to Hart, a social rule containing the criteria
to make, change, interpret and abrogate the other rules of the legal system. Ulti-
mately, Hart’s account of law seeks to explain law as an empirically observable
(social) fact which is nonetheless normative, that is a question of rules and capable
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of generating obligations and rights, etc. This also gives us a rather general
account of what makes legal propositions true for Hart: a legal proposition is true
if it meets the criteria contained within the empirically observable social practices
of the legal community in that particular space. From a general perspective,
therefore, legal truth is simply a matter of observing what people do and the rules
they feel under an obligation to follow. In this way, Hart is part of a much broader
empiricist ‘positivist’ tradition within legal philosophy which broadly agrees about
the notion of law as an observable practice characterised by certain forms. Positi-
vists of this type might disagree with Hart about what the form and nature of that
social practice are, or the form that laws come in, however there is a fundamental
agreement regarding the socially located nature of answers to questions of the
truth of legal propositions (Bentham 1970, Raz 1980, Austin 1995).
More difficult to place in this tradition is the equally influential work of Hans
Kelsen (1960), who refused to locate his theory of law into social practice, con-
sidering the content of law, and therefore the truth of legal propositions, to be a
matter of legal logic alone rather than its ultimately social nature. However, for
Kelsen, the validity of a law was dependent upon its having been passed according
to the requirements of a hierarchically superior norm within the legal system, a
system whose ultimate validity was ultimate simply ‘assumed’, as the ultimate
norms of the legal system were not authorised by any higher norm within the legal
system itself. Despite its rather ethereal nature, Kelsen’s theory can also be
understood as an empirical one when it comes to the truth of legal propositions,
as, regardless of the ultimate validity of a legal system, the question of whether a
higher norm has authorised an inferior one is ultimately an observable and there-
fore empirical question, even if the understanding of this innate structure was a
question of something approaching logic, at least an internal, or pure, legal logic
for Kelsen. Such accounts as those of Hart and Kelsen were influential in the
Twentieth Century, and indeed continue to be so, in that they take legal language
and concepts, such as its apparently rule-based nature, seriously, while seeking to
separate it from what they saw as entirely separate issues of its specific content and,
more specifically, its morality or justice. These were separate questions for Kelsen
and Hart. In the end, Hartian and Kelsenian accounts of the nature of law differ
regarding law’s ultimate source and how we should explain this; however they see
legal truth as resting on empirically observable facts.
However, there exists a strong counter current within legal scholarship which
rejects this attempt to reconcile the apparently rule-based nature of law with its
apparently socially contingent and empirically observable grounding. Such argu-
ments, most commonly associated with a family resemblance concept commonly
referred to as legal realism, claim that talk of ‘rules’ or similar concepts within law
is misleading, because rules are inherently indeterminate in their real world effects,
and that the truth of legal propositions comes through the examination of the
application of the law in the real world (Holmes 1897). In its most widely known
form, legal realism states that a proposition of law is, at best, a prediction of the
application of the law by a legal official (Leiter 1995). Its truth is therefore to be
determined by observation of that application. This vision of law embraces in a
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more holistic manner the atomistic form of truth inherent in the correspondence
thesis discussed earlier, rejecting the rule-based components of modern legal
positivism as unempirical. Brian Leiter (2007) has recently referred to the legal
realist movement as naturalising jurisprudence, that is, in the terms of inquiry of
this Chapter, seeking to locate the truth of legal propositions in the empirical tra-
ditions of the natural sciences. There exist other forms of legal realism which differ
in extremely important ways, but which can be understood as seeking to identify
the truth of legal propositions within observable social practice.
A rather separate tradition of legal realism seeks to locate the ‘truth’ of legal
propositions not in the adjudication of disputes but rather in the social function of
the law, i.e. the usage that is made, in practice of the rules of law, which may be
radically different from the abstract principles within legal language (Renner
1929). Again, the truth of a legal proposition can therefore only be grasped by
looking into the social practices concern. This second form of legal realism views
the truth of law’s content as located within the users’ rather than the adjudicators’
empirical use of the law. A more complex, and harder to categorise, inheritance of
the legal realist movement is the critical legal theory movement, which sought to
deconstruct in a more aggressive manner the assumptions and categories of the
law, but not simply by trying to relocate these within adjudication or usage
(Unger 1983, Kennedy and Klare 1984). Critical legal theory instead builds on
the work of post-structuralist and deconstructionist theory in particular to seek to
break down categories and assumptions, in particular those which obfuscate or
legitimate power structures. For the critical legal scholar, the truth of legal pro-
positions is therefore found in deeper ontological structures which are hidden
within ostensibly different legal structures. These are accessed through a complex
form of deconstructionist epistemology; however the lineage from the legal realist
perspective should be clear, at least for the purposes of the goals of this Chapter.
Finally, there exist radically sceptical accounts of the truth of legal propositions,
which reject out of hand the notion that there is any form of legal truth as such, at
least in an ontological sense. Accounts of economic materialism such as that of
Marx see law as simply an ideology upon the genuine economic base of social
reality: the truth of legal governed relationships is therefore to be grasped entirely
outside the law and in the brute social relationships of the world (Marx and Engels
1970, Pashukanis 1978, Cohen 2000). The difference between the various
‘empirical’ accounts of legal truth can be understood, broadly, as different views
regarding, on the one hand, the nature and importance of rule following practices
and, on the other hand, the extent to which the law’s ostensible content directly
impacts upon such practices.
There exists a broad set of alternative accounts of the truth of legal propositions
which takes a radically different view. Rather than seeing the truth of legal pro-
positions as being located, ultimately, within social practice, such theories of law
see the law’s content as autonomous from social practice to a large extent. Instead
such accounts of law see the truth of legal propositions as based on one form of
reason or another. Ultimately, while such theories sometimes also see such legal
phenomena as resting on a shared social practice, they transcend a mere empirical
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account of law due to their understanding of legal reasoning as capable of being
presented in an ideal and often holistic form. There are numerous accounts of the
truth of legal propositions of this type, many of which are extremely sophisticated.
However, they can be grouped together loosely into a broad typology.
On the one hand, there are those theories of legal truth which see the content
of law as somehow immanent, stemming from the internal logic of the legal
system. Such accounts are often grouped together under the label ‘legal formal-
ism’ (Horwitz 1975, Weinrib 1987). The answer to any question regarding the
truth of a legal proposition can be gleaned, on this view, from an examination of
the inherent structures, institutions and concepts of the legal system. This is par-
ticularly applied to private law, that is, the law regulating questions of civil obli-
gations between individuals, such as contracts, which are often subject to logic-
type analysis of the structure of legal thought (Weinrib 2012). What is striking
about this account of legal truth is that it sees legal truth as entirely resting on
matters internal to law. As we shall see in the subsequent section, this is not as
misguided as many of its critics often claim, as there is a certain autonomy to legal
reasoning which cannot be neglected in the proper understanding of the revealing
and indeed generating of legal truth. However, critics of such a view abound,
pointing out that the resolution of questions of legal content often stems not from
logic but rather from some other aspect of legal reasoning, which leads to the
discovery of the truth of legal propositions (Patterson 1999).
However, the most well-known, but extremely varied, family of ideas in this
respect are accounts which are loosely known as natural law theories (Finnis
1982, George 1994), although this term might be refuted by certain proponents
of such ideas. This tradition insists that an understanding of true legal propositions
depends on an understanding of the moral purpose, principle or aspirations of the
law, or indeed of law in general. For certain natural law theorists, this is a based on
an Aristotelean notion of central cases within epistemology (Finnis 1982, chap. 1),
while for others it is based on a more prosaic attempt to understand the purpose
of law in regulating behaviour (Fuller 1969). Such accounts of law hold that laws
which do not reflect morally good content, are, at best, laws in a less central
manner. They are, therefore, less true than morally good laws, or laws which meet
requirements for morally good laws. Such views of law see legal truth as resting on
certain ideals: those of ethics and justice. It is here where one sees the breakdown
in the parallel between the dichotomy between the idealist and empiricist visions
of truth in law explained here, and the coherence and correspondence theories
which characterise the philosophical literature on truth. Accounts of legal truth
which rest on moral coherence in fact refer, explicitly or implicitly, to a meta-
ethics and an ontology of morals which exists somehow in the real world, to which
truth in law corresponds.
On the other hand, certain other accounts of the role of morality within legal
content, and hence the truth of legal propositions, seek to explain the inevitably
moral component of valid legal propositions through a more coherence-based
approach of legal truth. Theorists such as Ronald Dworkin (1986) account for the
truth of legal propositions through the importance of the moral interpretation of
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previous legal decisions and grounds of law, leading to a vision of law in which
legal values and principles are diffused across the legal system as a whole. In this
manner, Dworkin creates an interpretivist account of law based on the role of
moral values within legal thought, but one which echoes the overarching thesis of
legal formalism, that is, that legal truth ultimately stems from innate answers
already contained within that legal system. The ostensibly similar interpretivist
account of Stanley Fish (1980, 1981–1982) sees interpretation as equally central
to the question of the truth of legal propositions, but emphasises that the coher-
ence of legal truth stems not directly from moral values, but rather the structures
of the legal community’s shared practices. Fish’s account in this manner fits less
neatly into the empiricist/idealist divide which has been constructed here. There
exist other accounts of legal truth which are based on other ideals and the law’s
coherence with them, such as the law and economics movement, which, in its
strongest form, sees the truth of legal propositions as resting on their coherence
with economic forms of analysis (Posner 1987). It would be equally possible to
construct similar accounts of the truth of legal propositions in relation to other
ideologically driven accounts of law and its content.
This sweeping survey of legal scholarship and the philosophy of law has revealed
that the central questions of legal theory regarding the nature of law can be
understood as disagreements about the nature of legal truth. Truth is a fraught
thing in that it is difficult to characterise, and this stems from disagreement about
the nature of disagreement in law and what such disagreement is about. As we
have seen, the theoretical characterisation of legal truth differs slightly from the
more general characterisation of truth within philosophy. This can partly be
attributed to the purported ‘normative’ or obligation-generating nature of law,
but also to the inherently socially located nature of the legal system, and its com-
plex interaction with the world which it seeks to regulate. Accounts of truth of
legal propositions place different weights and accentuations on different elements
of these aspects.
However, the closed nature of legal thought, in that it is both a self-contained
form of truth, existing for legal purposes alone in many respects and in the sense
that each legal system will have its own sets of conditions or approaches for pro-
ducing and finding the law, means that accounts of post-truth at first glance seem
either somewhat forced or superficial in nature. Legal truth differs from truth in a
more general sense because it is self-contained, at least to some degree. What is
‘true’ in one legal system might not be true in another, and might not be true at
all when the proposition is removed from the legal context. Legal truth is already
removed from other accounts of truth and at times indifferent to this betrayal of
other standards of the truth of propositions.
9.5 The transcendence of the legal system and legal post-truth
Twentieth Century legal philosophy has been the site of dramatic disagreements
regarding the nature of law, and, as a consequence, the nature of legal truth. This
has been animated not only by a desire to fully understand the law’s social and
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moral role, but also due to an attempt to use the law to resolve both complex
structural social issues and the most horrendous depths of human individual and
collective depravity, such as Nazi atrocities, genocide and war crimes (Fuller 1958,
Hart 1958, Messner 1959). However, legal theory has generally focused on law
from a different perspective, seeing law as primarily related to its systemic appurte-
nance. For all their differences, legal realists, legal positivists and legal inter-
pretivists see law and legal truth as being contingent on the legal system within
which the claim is being made. Those theories of legal truth which do not do this,
such as those which see law as based on correspondence with moral or economic
theory, can indeed be criticised for failing to take into account this systemic quality
of law. In essence, in their starkest form, theories of law which see legal truth as
being parasitic on other forms of knowledge, truth or ontology, are insufficiently
legal in their account. Accounts which see legal truth as doubly bounded by both
systemic belonging and a certain account of the epistemology seem to give a more
realistic account of legal truth to those familiar with legal processes or the law’s
social function.
However, it is here where our consideration of legal truth merges meaningfully
with a consideration of post-truth. Post-truth is a meaningful term when it fits
within a breakdown of traditional epistemic or cognitive frameworks for under-
standing truth. An examination of the identification of valid propositions in such
circumstances might yield either the emergence of a new account of truth, or
reveal deeper structures of the nature of truth which are more universal in nature.
Legal practice and scholarship has come in recent years to be concerned with an
increasingly conspicuous phenomenon which has come to characterise legal pro-
cesses and practice: legal pluralism (Griffiths 1986, Teubner 1997, Michaels 2009,
Itzcovich 2012). Legal pluralism and its close relation, constitutional pluralism
(Krisch 2010, Maduro 2012), are observable trends in which more than one legal
system occupies the same legal space and purport to give answers to the same legal
questions (Walker 2005, Avbelj and Komárek 2008). This might include national
law, European Union law, international law, transnational trade law, religious law
and sports law also giving different answers to the same question, with no clear
rules regarding the hierarchy of such claims. This differs markedly from normative
pluralism, a sociological phenomenon in which the law competes with other
sources of rules and norms to regulate or structure behaviour, and from the mere
co-existence of legal systems, such as two separate national legal systems, whose
relationship is regulated by rules concerning the conflict of laws and other frame-
works in the case of a potential clash (Twining 2009, Ehrlich and Ziegert 2017).
Legal pluralism has emerged in its modern guise due to the proliferation of spe-
cialist, international, supranational and transnational legal systems and sources
which claims pre-eminence and peremptory status in their role in determining the
truth of legal propositions within any given context. The emergence of legal sys-
tems such as that of the European Union, said by its own Court to be an auton-
omous legal order,2 possessing primacy over national law, even their constitutions,
2 Case 6/64 Flaminio Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585.
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has underlined the significance of such developments (Avbelj and Komárek 2008,
Itzcovich 2012). This becomes a ‘live’ issue in particular when another legal order
refuses to accept the claim of supremacy or primacy in any clash between the
demands of the legal system. This has happened on occasion, for instance, within
higher courts of European Union Member States, which have refused to accept
the general proposition that EU law ranks higher than the fundamental constitu-
tional principles and rights of the domestic legal order.3 It is in such circumstances
that one may speak meaningfully of a legal post-truth within the post-modern legal
order (Douglas-Scott 2013), characterised by claims of ultimate legal truth and
status, but whose validity depends ultimately, it would seem at least, on perspecti-
val questions. In conditions of legal pluralism, questions of legal truth seem sub-
ject to an inevitable deep epistemic pluralism (Walker 2002), in which one’s very
way of knowing is relativised. At this point, even if there is a manner of being
broadly confident about characterising the truth of legal propositions within legal
systems, such accounts become apparently useless when trying to resolve questions
of selecting between different answers given by competing legal systems, or indeed
seeking to reach a compromise and composite ‘third’ answer which makes room
for both approaches.
This is law’s post-truth moment. What can it tell us about either truth in a post-
truth world, or legal truth in general? The resolution of conflicts of competing
legal truths can, in reality, only be resolved if there is a comprehensible language
or mode of thought to mediate between legal putatively separate legal orders.
Prominent theorists of this area of law differ as to the mode of resolution of such
conflicts. Some accounts embrace the apparently extra-legal nature of this sce-
nario, and claim that such legal answers can only be reached in a non-legal way, as
such conflicts are, in effect, political (Krisch 2010). If there is a resolution to such
issues they lie outside the usual legal frame of reference and truth conditions or
framework. This differs markedly from the traditional adjudication-focused legal
realist approach, considered earlier, in that such accounts generally take seriously
the idea that in any given legal system one can enumerate with reasonable accu-
racy the application of general but indeterminate rules. Where the answer depends
on radically opposed epistemologies or legal ontologies, such an account also falls
short. On this view, the legal post-modern moment is the end of legal truth and a
move into a form of post-truth, or perhaps post-legal truth, where law is sub-
sumed by political or other means of resolving legal questions. Alternative visions
reject this bleak vision of the interaction of legal ‘ways of knowing’ and their
inability to communicate with each other to provide some account of legal truth.
Theorists such as Mattias Kumm (2005, Wiener et al. 2012) argue that legal
pluralism creates a forum in which shared values across legal systems can emerge
and a dialogue can be created which allows for the discovery of a legal pluralist
truth. The possibility of this depends on their being a meta-epistemic frame to
allow for the discoverability of such truths, and the overcoming of a stark form of
legal perspectivism.
3 BVerfG 73, 339, 22 October 1986 (‘Solange II’).
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Such an account of legal truth is only plausible if the empirical accounts of legal
truth based on observable, social practices and the idealist accounts of legal truth
based on coherence-type theories of systemic legal truth are incorrect somehow,
or at least both fail to capture the essence of legal truth. If post-modern legal fra-
meworks of law and legal pluralism can yield circumstances in which a legally valid
outcome emerges, the nature of legal truth must be subtly different to the domi-
nant accounts which currently exist, as truth within law must be capable of being
uncovered in a manner which is recognisable, at least to some degree, beyond the
epistemic and ontological frames of putatively hermetically sealed legal systems. It
is the contention of this author that this is, at least in part, the case. This is due to
the fact that legal truth is in fact generated through certain forms of reason or
argument, that is, certain modes of reasoning (Bobbitt 1989, Patterson 1999,
Altieri 2016). Such a modal account of law flips the correspondence and coher-
ence accounts of law on their head and sees legal truth as produced by certain
forms of qualifying arguments. Legal answers are not true by virtue of their fitting
within a certain framework or corresponding to a set of observable facts. Without
the modes of argument which accompany them and indeed justify them, putative
legal truths are simply that: putative. Modes of argument within law are not simply
ways of accessing legal truth which exists somehow beyond those arguments.
Instead those arguments result in the truth of the proposition. The modes of
argument or justification which might justify a certain proposition of law, such as
that Article 11 of the ECHR contains a right to strike, might of course depend on
the particular legal culture in some ways. However, many of these modes are lar-
gely recognisable in one form or another between legal cultures: historical forms
of reason based on the grounds of law and their application and interpretation;
prudential forms of reason based on the impact of a particular interpretation of the
legal grounds; moral considerations of various types; and so on. Once it can be
grasped that legal truth is produced by a form of reason, the prospect of legal
truth ‘existing’ when legal systems come into conflict can make a far greater
degree of sense. The modes of legal reasoning can still apply to questions beyond
the accepted answers within each legal system and can mediate between their
answers. Of course, there then exists the second order question of meta-modal
levels of reasoning, that is, how one mediates between these different forms of
reasoning where they generate different answers. This is a problem which exists
both within and between legal systems. The major problem with much legal
theory, as can be seen in the previous section, is that it prioritises one of these
multifarious modes of reasoning and states that legal truth ultimately hangs pre-
dominantly or exclusively on that. Ultimately, there is no modal resolution to
meta-modal conflict: one can only hope that the confrontation between different
modes of thought reveals either synergies between them or discrepancies in the
application of one or some. Legal post-truth is ultimately a form of legal truth
stripped down to its starkest nature: the result of complex multi-modal forms of
reasoning. It is only where we deny the nature of legal truth in the first place that
this becomes problematic. Within the legal context, truth is not dependent on a
pre-existing realism or ontology: epistemology and ontology are interlinked: legal
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argument produces legal fact. The possession of legal truth is always the possession
of the legal modes which generate that truth.
What does this tell us about the law’s ability to shed light on the post-truth
phenomenon, and indeed era, more generally? Law’s ontological epistemology,
or modal constructivism, as sketched in this Chapter, helps us to understand how
legal truth in both its classical and post-modern contexts depends on a deeper
form of engagement with its raw methods, and, potentially, a greater openness
in their use to see what kind of result this endeavour might reveal. Within the
emergence of the discourse of post-truth, and the phenomena that this refers to,
the worst perspectivist aspects of post-modernism, initially intended as a form of
critique or deconstructivism, have become embedded within the practices
themselves. This phenomenon, of displacing appropriate modes of thought with
critical or deconstructive perspectives, is also seen regularly within law, such as
when economic analysis of law gets mistaken for a higher form of legal reason
and substituted for a legal mode of thought. At this point, the classical legal
modes of reason must take on the deconstructive role, unpicking the perspectival
post-truth in critical fashion. This is equally possible in a more general world of
post-truth: what is the norm and what is the radical deconstruction depends on
the structures of power and control of the dominant discourse, as the post-
modern tradition tells us.
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10 A political and deliberative virtue?
The epistemic trust in trustworthy epistemic
authorities
Davide Pala
10.1 Unpacking post-truth. The mistrust in trustworthy epistemic
authorities
In 2016 the Oxford English Dictionary defined post-truth as an adjective “relating
to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping
public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief”.1 This definition of
post-truth is good if we look at its denotative power. It allows us to capture all of
those cases that seem instances of post-truth: the election of Trump in the U.S.
and Brexit in the U.K., for example, but also the anti-vaccinations movements, the
denialism of climate change, and so on.
Notwithstanding, the definition above is problematic. First, by focusing on
personal beliefs, it ends up either too opaque or misleading, thus either over-
simplifying or misunderstanding post-truth itself. At a first approximation, post-
truth seems indeed a highly multidimensional phenomenon referring to a vast
array of diverse beliefs, which can be subsumed under the label “personal beliefs”
only at the price of either oversimplification or misunderstanding. Let me clarify
this point. Several speeches given by Trump are arguably better captured by the
concept of bullshit (Frankfurt 2005) than that of personal beliefs. This is because
the feature that stands out in these speeches is more Trump’s indifference to
truth—which is precisely the hallmark of bullshit—than his personal convictions
(which in fact we do not really know). Consequently, in this example the reference
to personal beliefs is misleading.
As far as opacity, instead, the decision to invade Iraq made by the U.S. and allies
in 2003 provides an interesting example. This decision, which was grounded on
the—we now know, false—belief that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction,
probably represents an instance of political self-deception, in which the personal
beliefs of several individuals were part of much more complex cognitive and non-
cognitive mechanisms.2 In this same spirit, then, it would not be too speculative to
hypothesize that post-truth comprises also stubborn beliefs, forms of wishful
1 https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/post-truth
2 See Galeotti 2015.
thinking 3, and ideological beliefs. Briefly, the idea of post-truth needs to be
unpacked, and to this end the concept of personal beliefs is not very helpful.
Second, in the definition under analysis something important is missing, which
prevents us from grasping a feature that is both distinctive and basic of some
expressions of post-truth. This something is arrived at by noticing that, even if
emotions and personal beliefs did not distort our access to objective facts, in sev-
eral cases an immediate and direct access to them would be by definition out of
reach for most of us. For example, I might be not deeply influenced by my emo-
tions and personal beliefs, and yet, if I am not a medical doctor, I will not have
direct access to the objective fact that “vaccines are safe and do not cause autism”.
Furthermore, I will not have first-hand evidence supporting the belief that “vac-
cines are safe and do not cause autism”, nor will I have the capability to under-
stand the claims relative to the evidence that justifies this belief. Finally, it is likely
that I will never acquire the expertise necessary to develop this capacity (Hardwig
1985: 337–339).
The point to stress, then, is that Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of post-
truth, because of its outcome-oriented focus on the neglect of objective facts, lacks an
important reference to the recognition that, in all domains in which we are not
experts, our access to objective facts is never direct or non-mediated. Rather, it only
occurs through epistemic authorities, that is, experts, and their claims concerning
objective facts.4 In particular, in all of those domains in which we are laypersons, we
have access to objective facts only by trusting epistemic authorities and their claims
about the objective facts. That we trust and not merely rely on them can be shown
in the following way (section 10.2): if my medical doctoral turns out to be an
impostor, I will not simply feel disappointed; I will rather feel betrayed, in that I had
entrusted her with the task to look after one valuable good, i.e. my health; on the
other hand, we will just feel disappointed if Kant breaks his regular habit of having a
walk around 5p.m., on which we counted (Baier 1986: 235).
These remarks become more relevant if it is highlighted that we, as human
beings with limited epistemic capabilities, and citizens inhabiting complex and
specialized societies (Fricker 2006: 225–229), live, in all domains in which we are
not experts, in a condition of epistemic dependence (Hardwig 1985; section 10.2),
which makes us vulnerable to experts. And yet, if the epistemic authorities are
trustworthy, and their claims are justified on the basis of the standards of scientific
inquiry, there are both epistemic and moral reasons to show trust, or better, epis-
temic trust in them and their claims, or so I will argue.
What is then the link between epistemic trust and post-truth? The link is that
some expressions of post-truth, such as the anti-vaccination movements and the
denialism of climate change, share a distinctive and basic feature, which is precisely
the manifestation, within democratic public debates leading to the elaboration of
3 See Lynch 2013.
4 I adopt an intuitive understanding of objective facts, according to which objective facts
are phenomena that, differently form thoughts and/or feelings, exist in “external”
reality.
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public policies, of mistrust in trustworthy epistemic authorities as for beliefs that are
fully justified and almost undisputed in the scientific community—i.e. beliefs that
are justified according to the non-controversial standards of scientific inquiry, and
on which an overwhelming majority of scientists (usually around 97–98%) agree.
Look, in this respect, at the Italian anti-vaccinations movements. Although the
claim “vaccines are safe and do not cause autism” is fully justified and undisputed
within the scientific community, No-Vax movements reject it, and show mistrust
in immunologists. According to some, immunologists know that vaccines may
cause autism, but they do not communicate this information because there are
well-paid by pharmaceutical corporations. For others, instead, immunologists are
blind to the effects of vaccines to the extent that they are more sensitive to scien-
tific authorities than evidence. Something similar happens in the case of climate
change too5: climatologists are mistrusted either because they make us believe that
there is a scientific consensus where in fact there is none; or they are politically
biased—or so we are told by climate change denialists.
Despite their similarities, between these two cases there is a significant differ-
ence. While anti-vaccination movements have only partly succeeded in influencing
public debates in matter of vaccination policies, the same does not hold for climate
change, where denialism is widespread. Data confirm this. On the one hand, cli-
matologists overwhelmingly—i.e. 97–98% of them—agree on the threefold fact:
(i) that climate change is occurring; (ii) that this fact is alarming; and that (iii)
humans are casually responsible for it. On the other hand, though, if we look, for
instance, at American citizens, we notice that (i) 16% of Americans deny that cli-
mate change is occurring; (ii) 48% of them question its seriousness; and (iii) 50%
think that human activity has no role in causing it (Oreskes 2007: 70–71; Ander-
son 2011: 149–153; Almassi 2012: 32–33). These discrepancies can be observed
in many other countries as well.6 It is therefore not mere negligence that in the
last 30 years we have not taken measures counteracting climate change or its
effects.
In this work I propose to understand the manifestations of post-truth men-
tioned earlier in a way that highlights the role of both epistemic trust and epis-
temic authorities in our access to objective facts. Manifestations of this kind of
post-truth should be then understood as consisting in the attitude of those citizens
that, in democratic public debates, mistrust trustworthy epistemic authorities, in
regard to beliefs that are fully justified and almost undisputed within the scientific
community. This latter fact deserves attention: the beliefs at stake here, which may
be covered by the concept of post-truth, are only those on which there is an
overwhelming scientific consensus—e.g. beliefs such as “vaccines do not cause
autism” and “climate change is occurring”. Other more disputed beliefs, on which
there is genuine, as opposed to illusory, disagreement among experts, will not be
5 I am assuming that immunologists and climatologists are a good example of trust-
worthy epistemic authorities. See section 10.5.
6 See www.ipsosglobaltrends.com/climate-change-as-a-result-of-human-activity/
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considered, nor treated as a possible manifestation of post-truth, precisely because
the disagreement on stage is genuine rather than illusory7 (section 10.4).
Before proceeding, two caveats are needed. First, one could argue that my
account of post-truth is partial to the extent that, besides mistrust, also a more
neutral lack of trust can be observed in the examples earlier. I agree with this, but I
want to stress that mistrust rather than lack of trust is the prevalent attitude, and
that in the normative account of post-truth that I will provide this distinction is
not particularly relevant. Indeed, both the lack of trust and the mistrust are to be
considered prima facie bad according to my normative account, in that they show
the absence of what I shall call the political and deliberative virtue of the epistemic
trust in trustworthy epistemic authorities (section 10.3, section 10.5).
Second, it might be objected that my account is still too outcome-oriented,
because I focus on mistrust rather than its causes. I answer this by noticing that it
is risky to develop a normative account starting from an analysis of such causes.
The resulting account would be dependent on the explicative analysis that has
been adopted. Yet, several explanations of the causes of the mistrust in experts can
be advanced, and all of them have some plausibility. Some might claim that
behind mistrust there are self-deceptive beliefs, and others might point to other
forms of motivated irrationality. Also, by focusing on experts rather than lay-
persons, it can be argued that the mistrust in experts is partly to be traced to
experts themselves, as they sometimes fail to effectively communicate their trust-
worthiness. Moreover, as for scientific experts, one could maintain that the mis-
trust in them is due to the fact that nowadays science is perceived as threatening,
imperialistic, and politically biased (Kitcher 2011: 15–20). Finally, it might be
stated that the salient causes of the mistrust in scientific experts are irresponsible
mass-media, the segregation of social networks by partisan affiliation, so-called
cultural cognition, i.e. the tendency of people to assess risks on the basis of cul-
tural values (Anderson 2011), and/or propaganda made by political parties and
corporations (McKinnon 2016). Briefly, there are several possible explanations of
the mistrusting attitude shown by citizens toward experts, and all of them capture
something prima facie true. Hence, instead of trying to show that one explanation
has greater explicative power than the others, and then developing a normative
framework on such a probabilistic and partial consideration, I find it theoretically
safer to focus first and foremost on mistrust alone, as the most basic fact, and the
easiest to ascertain. This does not imply that the causes of mistrust in experts are
overlooked. They rather come on stage in a different phase, i.e. the non-ideal
phase, when the evaluation of the mistrusting attitude is applied to real citizens
(section 10.5).
With this in mind, one could now ask: how should we assess this specific post-
truth attitude? Which is the most appropriate normative framework? Answering
this question is the aim of this chapter. To accomplish this, I will proceed as
follows.
7 On genuine disagreement among experts and the criteria to employ to choose the
epistemic authority to trust: Goldman 2001; Coady 2006.
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First, I will provide a definition of three key concepts of my chapter, i.e. epistemic
dependence, trustworthy epistemic authority, and epistemic trust (section 10.2).
Second, I will advance my main argument, and argue that the mistrust in trustworthy
epistemic authorities that is shown by citizens in democratic public debates concerning
the elaboration of public policies, as for beliefs that are fully justified and almost
undisputed within the scientific community, is prima facie bad for democratic socie-
ties. The reason is that citizens that show this attitude do not possess what I shall call
the political and deliberative virtue of the epistemic trust in trustworthy epistemic
authorities (ETITEA), which is of paramount importance for democratic societies.
This is so for both epistemic and moral reasons, as I will show (section 10.3). Third, I
will answer some objections that can be raised against my thesis (section 10.4). Finally,
I will employ my normative account to provide an evaluation of the post-truth attitude
of those citizens that mistrust climatologists regarding fully justified and almost
undisputed beliefs such as “climate change is occurring”, and argue that such attitude
is prima facie bad (section 10.5).
10.2 Epistemic dependence and epistemic trust
Our ordinary experiences and interactions show us that we are not fully autono-
mous knowers—provided that one assumes an evidence-based account of justified
beliefs and knowledge. As for most of the justified beliefs and knowledge that we
usually employ, we rather depend on the testimony of others. Moreover, we
cannot fully overcome this condition of dependency, in which a division of the
epistemic labor is implied (Fricker 2006: 225–227). For example, we normally
believe that “smoking cigarettes causes cancer”, even if we do not have direct
access to the evidence that supports this statement; cannot truly understand and
assess the evidence-based reasons that justify it; and will never be able either to
have direct access to the evidence that supports this statement, or appreciate the
evidence-based reasons justifying it (Hardwig 1985: 337–339). The same, clearly,
holds for an incredibly vast amount of beliefs on which we normally count—for
example, beliefs such as “planes can fly because, at a certain speed, air pressure is
lower above their wings”, and “the poor performances of my laptop are due to an
old battery”. What, then? Should we conclude that we ordinarily believe many
things without any justification, i.e. without either evidence or evidence-based
reasons supporting them?
As John Hardwig has shown, the answer is negative. According to Hardwig,
the beliefs mentioned, and many others, can be rightfully retained by laypersons
and understood as justified, in that their justification lies in the appeal to a cer-
tain appropriate epistemic authority. That is to say, laypersons can justifiably
believe or know that p, even if they lack evidence or evidence-based reasons that
p, to the extent that they know that E, i.e. a competent and sincere epistemic
authority, evidentially believes or knows that p. There are, to put it differently,
also non-evidential, i.e. testimonial, but justified reasons for believing or
knowing that p (Hardwig 1985). A reductio ad absurdum can support this
claim. If there were no justified testimonial reasons for believing or knowing
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that p, but just evidential ones, then we could justifiably believe or know only
those things for which we have first-hand evidence. Yet these things would be
very few. Also, historical knowledge would be nonsensical (Fricker 2006:
227), and, actually, the entire scientific enterprise would not properly qualify
as knowledge, given that to develop new scientific knowledge epistemic
authorities themselves have to rely on the testimonial evidence provided by
other epistemic authorities (Hardwig 1991). As these conclusions are
implausible, testimonial evidence has to be recognized as capable of providing
us with good reasons for believing or knowing that p—provided that the
epistemic authority on which we rely has some specific features that I will
present in a moment.
The justificatory power of testimonial evidence results even more significant if
we consider that testimonial evidence is pervasive. All of us rely on it most of the
time, i.e. in every domain in which we are not experts and, therefore, have no
access to the evidence or the evidence-based reasons that support a certain belief
that p. Not even epistemic authorities in D1 can escape from it, to the extent that
in all of those domains that are not D1 they are not experts. This implies that all
of us, experts included, live in a condition of epistemic dependence, in which we
depend on the testimony of others. In other terms, all of us can justifiably believe
many things only because these beliefs are justified by the appeal to a certain
epistemic authority. As a consequence, a division of epistemic labor, between lay-
persons counting on testimony on the one hand, and epistemic authorities
endowed with evidential justificatory power on the other, is part and parcel of
both our ordinary lives and knowledge itself. While it is true that this division of
epistemic labor makes us vulnerable to epistemic authorities, in that, although
sincere and competent, these authorities are not immune to bona fide mistakes, at
the same time it creates the conditions of possibility for justifiably believing and
knowing most things for all of us.
Notice that the condition of epistemic dependence mentioned earlier, to
which from now on I will refer as the fact of epistemic dependence, is not only
shared, more or less equally, by everyone, but it is also inescapable. Two facts
show this. First, as human beings, we are creatures with limited epistemic cap-
abilities. While we can believe all sorts of things, our intellect is too small and
life is too short for evidentially justifying all of them on our own (Hardwig
1985: 335). We therefore cannot but depend on the testimony of others.
Second, as citizens, we live in complex and sophisticated societies composed of
several social sub-systems (e.g. the juridical domain; the economic one; etc.). To
be able to understand and appropriately act in each of them, a high degree of
expertise is required. Yet, given our limited epistemic capabilities, it is impossible
for us to obtain this level of expertise in all of them. Again, then, we cannot but
depend on the testimony of others.
At this point, one significant element should be added to the picture. When we
come to believe that “smoking cigarettes causes cancer”, we are not merely relying
on the epistemic authority of medical doctors. We are rather showing epistemic
trust in them. Indeed, when we simply rely on others, we count on their
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predictable behaviors, i.e. habits or regular patterns due to fear or other reasons,
and act on this basis (Baier 1986: 234–235; Jones 1996: 14–15). But this is not
what happens when we come to believe that “smoking cigarettes causes cancer”
because medical doctors claim so. We do not believe this statement because we
count on the fact that medical doctors usually look after their patients’ health as a
regular habit imposed by their profession or the fear of consequences they would
face should they harm their patients—not only, at least. We rather come to believe
this statement for stronger reasons, which can be subsumed under the label epis-
temic trust. The question is then the following: what is epistemic trust? The best
way to answer this question is to, first of all, define what trustworthiness is. From
this definition, the concept of epistemic trust can then be derived straightforwardly
(Jones 2012: 61–62; Almassi 2012: 43). Let me then first ask: what is trust-
worthiness? In particular, what is a trustworthy epistemic authority?
In the literature there is agreement on the fact that an epistemic authority E in
domain D can be said to be trustworthy in relation to a certain agent A, if two
conditions apply. First, E has a certain level of competence in D with regard to p,
and, second, it has some positive motive toward agent A. Although not precise, this
definition is telling. It highlights that to be trustworthy an epistemic authority has
to possess two basic features, epistemic the first one, and affective the second one.
Also, the definition mentioned proposes to understand trustworthiness as having a
three-place structure (Jones 2012: 62). In other words, to qualify as trustworthy
an epistemic authority A has to be (1) competent in domain D as for p, and it has
to show (2) some positive motive toward (3) agent A. These elements need some
comments.
The first element (1), i.e. competence, is self-justifying. An epistemic authority
lacking any kind of competence would not be trustworthy in any meaningful sense
of the term, nor would it sensu stricto qualify as an epistemic authority. Similarly,
the further specifications of the first element—restricting competence to a certain
domain, in regard to certain beliefs—are obvious. As stated before, one cannot but
acquire competence only in some specific domains. Moreover, in these specific
domains the acquired competence will not cover all of the sub-domain areas, but
just a few of them.
The second and third elements, instead, referring to (2) some positive motive
showed by authority E toward (3) agent A, signal that trustworthiness implies a
certain level of awareness from the epistemic authority E that she is counted on by
agent A (a) and a disposition to act accordingly (b), without ill will (c). To show
this, think about the following three scenarios. In the first scenario (c), medical
doctor M knows that we count on her, and yet, she intentionally lies to us about
our health, i.e. she shows ill will; in the second scenario (b), M is still aware that
we count on her, but, every time we suffer from a disease, she decides not to
communicate this information to us, since in her practical deliberation she gives
more weight to our husband’s desire not to let us be informed about our health
than to our explicit willingness to be informed on it—this time M finds that the
fact that we count on her is rarely a compelling reason to act accordingly; finally,
in the third scenario (a), M is simply not aware that we count on her in regard to
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our health, so she looks after our health-related interests without including—
at least in part—in them our expectations from her (Jones 1996: 9–10). In
these scenarios it would be rather hard to call M trustworthy. Trustworthi-
ness, then, comprises both a certain positive disposition of the epistemic
authority (2), and an agent whose expectations are taken into account by the
epistemic authority itself (3).
Although these considerations are shared in the literature, among scholars there
is still disagreement on what specifically means that the authority in question has
some positive motive toward us. Moreover, often scholars adopt an intuitive
understanding of competence, thereby not unpacking this concept. For example,
Annette Baier maintains that having a positive motive is to show a minimal good
will, intuitively grasped. The expertise component is instead left unspecified, but it
is clear that she has in mind a broad idea of competence, and understands it in
either technical or moral terms—in this latter sense, also a friend can be competent
or not (Baier 1986: 234–236; Cf. Jones 1996: 7). More detailed work is then
provided by Ben Almassi and Klaus Kappel, respectively. The first one claims that
by positive motive we should mean a conscientious attitude in epistemic authority’s
presentation of testimony that p. He then argues that to be trustworthy an epis-
temic authority has to be competent in a certain domain D, but, besides letting
the reader guess that he shares a technical—as opposed to moral—idea of com-
petence, influenced by Alvin Goldman’s idea of expertise (Goldman 2001), he
does not add further qualifications (Almassi 2012: 34 and 43–44). On the other
hand, the second one states that a trustworthy epistemic authority is both sincere
and competent in domain D, i.e. the authority can decide questions in D with a
high reliability, and likely has many true beliefs as for questions raised in D
(Kappel 2014: 2016).
Despite their differences, these proposals share two problems. The first problem
deals with how we should specify what counts as a positive motive. To this end,
the suggestions made earlier are not very helpful. In detail, the idea of minimal
good will (Baier) is misplaced. Indeed, “on a particularly vexatious morning I find
myself snarling misanthropically at the whole world, yet I can still come through
for some of those who are counting on me, even if not with a smile” (Jones 2012:
67). On the other hand, either conscientiousness (Almassi) or sincerity (Kappel)
do not tell us the whole story on the positive motive behind trustworthiness.
Indeed, what about honesty, integrity, and the like? Are they not, sometimes, part
of what being trustworthy means (Jones 2012: 67–68)? If this is the case, then the
best way to define the idea of positive motive is to reason from a more abstract
perspective, able to capture the common feature shared by positives motives such
as sincerity, honesty, integrity, and so on. In this direction, it comes out that the
common feature that is looked for is, as Karen Jones has shown, responsiveness.
Indeed, when an authority E has some positive motive toward us, this means that,
regardless of the specific motive at stake, be it conscientiousness, sincerity, or
many others, in any case E will find the fact that we count on her to be a com-
pelling reason for acting as counted on—where compelling reasons stand for rea-
sons hardly outweighed by other evaluations (Jones 2012: 71). As far as positive
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motive is concerned, therefore, being trustworthy is being responsive to the fact
that the other is counting on you—no matter the specific motive behind.
The second problem of the proposals mentioned deals with the idea of compe-
tence, that is either too broad (Baier) or, even when conceived of in stricter terms
(Almassi, Kappel), not well specified. To solve both questions, I propose, first, to
adopt the strict rather than broad understanding of competence, namely the more
technical meaning, as opposed to the moral one. This choice is justified in that I
focus not on trustworthiness per se, but rather on epistemic trustworthy authorities.
Given this, I propose, second, to unpack competence having in mind the features
that are commonly attributed to cognitive or intellectual experts (Goldman 2001:
91–93; Anderson 2011: 146–147). Specifically, my idea is that a competent epis-
temic authority E in domain D should have the following, necessary but likely not
sufficient, characteristics: (1) E has received adequate training in D, and possesses
adequate skills and methods to work in D; (2) E possesses a substantial amount of
justified beliefs in D and is possibly able to produce new beliefs in D; (3) E’s
competence is corroborated by several fellow experts; (4) E’s competence has a
public dimension.
Although a full justification of these features is beyond the ambitions of this
chapter, some comments are needed. The first feature (1) is meant to highlight
two aspects. This first aspect is that E cannot qualify as competent in D if it has a
specialization in L; the second aspect is that E can be said to be component in D
only if it has at least adequate skills and methods to work in D, where adequate
means “complying with the methodological standards required by D, and more
general standards as well—e.g. E abides by the basic principles of logics”. The
second feature (2) wants to capture the fact that intellectual competence is not a
comparative matter: being competent is more than having more justified beliefs
than others; it is rather to have a significant amount of justified beliefs, possibly
conjoined with the capacity to develop new ones (Goldman 2001: 91–92). Fur-
thermore, the expression “justified beliefs” is to be read as “beliefs justified
according to the justificatory standards of D and more general ones”. The third
feature (3) is then arrived at by noticing that if the epistemic authority of E is
acknowledged by none or just a few followers, then E cannot be considered a
competent epistemic authority (Coady 2006). Finally, the last characteristic (4)
underscores that the standards certifying competence have to be not only techni-
cal, but also publicly approved and acknowledged—in this sense, if E is compe-
tent, then it will have (good) institutional credentials.
From this analysis, it follows that a trustworthy epistemic authority E in D is
an authority that has, first, competence in D, in the sense explained earlier; and,
second, it is an authority that is responsive to the fact that some agents A count
on her.
That said, I can now answer my initial question and provide a definition of
epistemic trust—granted that (epistemic) trust has a three-place structure corre-
sponding to the three-place structure of trustworthiness (Jones 2012: 61). In this
direction, I claim that A has epistemic trust in epistemic authority E that holds that
p in domain D, to the degree that A regards E as competent in her acceptance of p
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in domain D, and responsive to the fact that A counts on E as for p in D.
Hence, A takes E’s testimony that p in D as providing evidence for p in D.
Conversely, A shows epistemic mistrust in E that holds that p in domain D, to
the degree that A regards E either as not competent in her acceptance of p in
D, or as not responsive to the fact that A counts on E as for p in D. So, A
refrains from taking E’s testimony that p in D as providing evidence for p in D
(Cf. Almassi 2012: 43).
Two points of this definition deserve attention. The first point is that in my
account epistemic trust is understood as a twofold attitude, i.e. both as a doxastic
attitude and an affective attitude: the doxastic attitude is A’s judgment about the
competence of B, while the affective attitude is A’s optimism about the respon-
siveness of B (Jones 1996; 2012). The second aspect to highlight is that the kind
of trust here in analysis is epistemic, in that it is evidence contributing, i.e. we
adopt beliefs on the basis of trust (Kappel 2014: 2010).
To summarize, I have argued that we live in a condition of epistemic dependence
that is inescapable and exposes us to the need of massively relying on the evidential
testimony of others. Furthermore, I have claimed that most of our beliefs are justi-
fied by the appeal to an appropriate trustworthy epistemic authority, namely an
authority that is both competent in a certain domain, and responsive to the fact that
we count on it in that specific domain. Finally, I have specified that the adoption of
testimonial beliefs is made possible by epistemic trust, that is the doxastic and non-
doxastic attitude according to which we regard an epistemic authority in a certain
domain D both as competent in D and responsive to the fact that we count on her
in D. Even if these considerations do not exhaust such complex issues, they are
sufficient for supporting the main argument of my chapter.
10.3 The (non-exhaustive) ideal of democratic public debates
I now want to advance the main thesis of my chapter. This thesis is the following:
The epistemic mistrust in trustworthy epistemic authorities showed by citizens
in democratic public debates concerning the elaboration of public policies, as for
beliefs that are fully justified and almost undisputed within the scientific com-
munity, is prima facie bad for democratic societies. This is so from both an
epistemic and moral point of view.8
The main reason for claiming this is that citizens showing this mistrusting attitude do
not possess the political and deliberative virtue of the epistemic trust in trustworthy
epistemic authorities (ETITEA), which is demanded by the non-exhaustive9 ideal of
8 This mistrusting attitude is prima facie rather than simply bad, because, in the non-
ideal phase of my approach, the acknowledgment of the factors hampering citizens to
show ETITEA will lead me to mitigate my initial moral evaluation. See section 10.5.
9 The ideal is non-exhaustive because it only covers the relation between laypersons and experts
as for fully justified and almost undisputed beliefs within the scientific community.
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the good citizen publicly debating in democratic contexts. According to this ideal, in
light of the fact of epistemic dependence (section 10.2), citizens publicly debating in
democratic contexts trust trustworthy epistemic authorities10 as for fully justified and
almost undisputed beliefs—and these beliefs only, as a way to reduce the prudential
and moral risks engendered by plainly and fully unjustified beliefs, i.e. beliefs that are
not in line with the non-controversial methods and conclusions of scientific inquiry.11
Specifically, by employing the rawlsian idea of public reason, I want to show that
ETITEA is required by three ideas characterizing my ideal: (a) the idea of rational
citizens; (b) the idea of reasonable citizens; and (c) the idea of responsible citizens.
Before clarifying my thesis and elaborating these three ideas in turn, let me expose
two assumptions which my ideal takes as starting points, and one remark on
ETITEA.
The first assumption of my argument is that I take for granted the rawlsian idea of
public reason. I assume, in other words, that public debates over the constitutional
essentials and questions of basic justice of democratic societies have to be conducted in
terms that cannot be rejected by anyone, as their outcomes are implemented through
coercive acts to be justified to everyone. Also, I postulate that Rawls is right in idealizing
citizens debating in democratic contexts both as rational, i.e. capable of basic means-
end reasoning, and reasonable, i.e. endowed with a sense of justice (Rawls 2005).
Differently from Rawls, though, I agree with those scholars arguing that the ideal of
public reason should be broadened in scope, to cover every question of justice, rather
than only the most basic ones. This is because, in very rough terms, it is hard, if not
arbitrary, to distinguish between basic and non-basic questions of justice, and, besides,
these issues are strictly interconnected (Greenawalt 1994). Moreover, even if this dis-
tinction were clear, in both cases it would be a matter of public debates leading to coer-
cive acts, which are to be justified to everyone, i.e. publicly and in political terms, in order
to be respectful (Quong 2011: ch. 9). Furthermore, I employ the ideal of public reason
for aims that diverge from the rawlsian ones. I do not adopt it as a benchmark for
ascertaining the legitimacy of public decisions. In my account it is rather a standard
enabling us to distinguish between good and bad attitudes of citizens debating in
democratic contexts, where “good”means “consistent with the ideal of public reason”,
while “bad”means “not consistent with it”. Finally, in my account of public reason the
idea of both rationality and reasonableness are reinterpreted in epistemic terms. In other
terms I ask: what does it mean being a rational and reasonable citizen given the fact of
epistemic dependence? This puts my account close to those trying to show the socio-
epistemic assumptions of political liberalism (e.g. Buchanan 2002).12
10 The assumption here is that in my ideal the trustworthiness of epistemic authorities can
be easily ascertained by citizens.
11 I talk about fully justified rather than true beliefs mainly because a truth-focussed fra-
mework would be rejected by skeptics about truth. In other words, the choice to focus
on justification rather than truth best serves my political—in rawlsian sense—aims.
There are also epistemic reasons supporting this choice: e.g. Leite 2010.
12 Furthermore, the conclusions I draw partly challenge the claim that Rawls does not
provide us with tools for arguing that public reason must be in line with non-con-
troversial scientific methods and fully justified beliefs. Cf. Jønch-Clausen, Kappel 2016.
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The second assumption of my ideal is that I share Allan Buchanan’s claim that,
in democratic societies, reducing as far as possible the prudential and moral risks
engendered by plainly and fully unjustified beliefs is a value of paramount impor-
tance. As a matter of fact, beliefs that can be justified only through procedures
deeply distant from the standard methods of scientific inquiry or even violating
more general norms, such as the principles of logics, too often lead us to commit
either serious prudential or moral mistakes, which can even erode the democratic
character of our societies. Think of the belief that Jews are an unclean and thieving
race, or the belief that blacks are intellectually inferior: the first one has played a
relevant role in bringing about Shoah, while the second belief has contributed to
the creation and preservation of both slavery and apartheid (Buchanan 2004). To
these beliefs I also add beliefs such as “vaccines cause autism” and “climate change
is not occurring”. Not only because these latter beliefs do not meet minimal
standards of scientific justification, as the former, but also because they expose us
to risks that are comparable to the aforementioned ones: the belief “vaccines cause
autism”, if widespread, might cause harmful pandemics; more worrying, the belief
“climate change is not occurring” represents a threat to the survival of humanity.
Differently from Allen Buchanan, though, the prudential and moral risks I am
thinking about are quite specific. In particular, by prudential risks I mean mistakes
in means-end reasoning, i.e. flaws affecting rationality. These risks should not be
overestimated. Remember that at stake here there are collectives that in demo-
cratic public debates, after finding an agreement on some collective goals to
pursue, debate over the supposedly best means allowing to attain these goals. If
these means are chosen on the basis of plainly and fully unjustified beliefs, they will
likely be inappropriate, not to say counterproductive, thereby not allowing to
reach the desired aim. Think about a society whose members have acknowledged
that children’s health is an important aim to fulfill. In this society, nonetheless, the
majority believes that “vaccines cause autism”, and, therefore, vaccines are pro-
hibited. Needless to say, the desired aim would not be attained.
On the other side, by moral risks I mean two risks. The first risks are dis-
respectful behaviors brought about by epistemic immodesty. Even if in the literature
this term is used to denote citizens’ disbelief that even the best reasoners can dis-
agree about the considerations that they are barred from appealing to (Leland, van
Wietmarschen 2012), I understand it as citizens’ unwillingness to acknowledge
their epistemic dependence, and to act accordingly. This often produces dis-
respectful behaviors—e.g. arrogant behaviors—directed toward both experts and
those citizens that, contrary to the former, acknowledge the social division of
epistemic labor (section 10.3.2). The second moral risks I am concerned about,
instead, consist in the low or very low consideration for the reasonably foreseeable
harmful consequences of one’s own actions. Indeed, if plainly and fully unjustified
beliefs provide the informative basis from which public policies are developed,
then foreseeable harms will become ordinary business.
As a consequence of these reflections, it is clear that democratic societies should
be concerned with the reduction of the prudential and moral risks engendered by
plainly and fully unjustified beliefs.
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In light of this, I can now clarify why ETITEA is here developed as a poli-
tical—and deliberative—rather than moral virtue.13 It is not simply that the
principle justifying ETITEA—i.e. the reduction of the risks engendered by
plainly and fully unjustified beliefs is something good—is political in the raw-
lsian sense (Buchanan 2004; section 10.4), it is also that ETITEA is not about
the moral character of individuals, nor does it represent a component of a
flourishing life. Rather, ETITEA is first and foremost an attitude deriving from
the acknowledgment of the fact of epistemic dependence in conjunction with
the assumption that ideal citizens of democratic societies have two central
powers, i.e. the capacity of basic means-end reasoning and to show a sense of
justice. Third, ETITEA is a political rather than moral virtue also because it
covers only a very small set of beliefs—as opposed to any sort of belief—i.e.
the plainly and fully unjustified ones, in that they expose us to significant
prudential and moral risks, which democratic societies should reduce. Besides,
ETITEA is political because of its context-specificity: it comes on stage only in
public debates, but it has nothing to say of what happens in clubs, churches,
and so on. Finally, citizens not showing ETITEA are not considered bad citi-
zens. It is just their mistrusting attitude that is said to be prima facie bad,
because of the risks it produces.
That said, it is now time to develop ETITEA in more detail, by deriving it from
the threefold idea of rational citizens (section 10.3.1), reasonable citizens (sec-
tion 10.3.2), and responsible citizens (section 10.3.3). Let me start with the first
one, i.e. the idea of rational citizens.
10.3.1 Rational citizens
In my ideal of democratic public debates, citizens are taken to be, first of all,
rational. This is a minimal assumption, as it simply implies that, in public debates,
citizens normally want to act successfully, i.e. they want to choose the most
effective means to pursue certain common ends. In other words, citizens are
rational to the extent that they are not disposed to elect means that will likely
make their actions either unsuccessful in terms of fulfilling the desired goal, or less
successful than those actions that employ other known means. In this regard,
rational citizens also know that beliefs that are fully justified and almost undis-
puted within the scientific community—in those cases in which they are avail-
able—lead to successful actions more likely than plainly unjustified beliefs. This is
an implication of the idea of rationality advanced: if citizens are rational since they
want to choose the most effective means to pursue certain goals, then they will
also want to ground their means-related choices on reliable, rather than crude and
untested, beliefs.
If this is the case, then in my ideal rational citizens face a problem. As a matter
of fact, they can easily ascertain that, in all domains in which they are laypersons,
13 While many scholars have tried to argue that epistemic trust might be a moral virtue,
none has understood it as a political and deliberative virtue.
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they have not and cannot acquire—exclusively on their own—those fully justified
beliefs that would contribute to the success of their actions. This is so because
rational citizens are aware that there are too many domains of beliefs and knowl-
edge, and that their intellect is too small to autonomously develop fully justified
beliefs in all of them. What, then, should rational citizens do, given that they want
to act successfully, i.e. on the basis of fully justified beliefs, when they are available,
but, on the other hand, they possess fully justified beliefs only in those very few
domains in which they have expertise?
My solution to this problem is straightforward. First, to count as rational and,
therefore, to be able to choose the most appropriate means to fulfill certain aims,
citizens should dismiss the idea of absolute epistemic autonomy as irrational
(Hardwig 1985). Indeed, absolute epistemic autonomy, namely the idea that
individuals should keep and act on the basis of only those beliefs for which they
can autonomously provide evidence, brings about irrational outcomes. After all, if
absolute epistemic autonomy were the epistemic condition on which citizens have
to rely, then they would hold (fully) justified beliefs only in those few domains in
which they have evidential expertise, while in all of the others, given human lim-
ited epistemic capabilities, they would hold beliefs that are crude and untested, i.e.
(fully) unjustified. Also, being based on these latter beliefs, the choice of the
means to attain the preferred goals would most likely be inappropriate, thus pro-
ducing unsuccessful actions.
Second, rational citizens should acknowledge their epistemic dependence and
show trust in trustworthy epistemic authorities—especially with regard to fully
justified and almost undisputed beliefs, given that they most likely lead to suc-
cessful actions. By trusting trustworthy epistemic authorities and their testimonial
evidence, indeed, citizens’ actions would arguably be more successful than those
actions based on beliefs developed in a condition of absolute epistemic autonomy.
That is to say, by showing the virtue of ETITEA, notably in regard to beliefs that
are fully justified and almost undisputed within the scientific community, when
present, citizens would be in the position to elect the most effective means to
pursue their goals. This implies that ETITEA significantly contributes to reducing
those prudential risks—i.e. mistakes in means-end reasoning—engendered by fully
and plainly unjustified beliefs.
Two key points should then be stressed. First, rationality itself requires that
citizens show ETITEA as for fully justified and almost undisputed beliefs, as
the best way to choose the most effective means to pursue certain goals.
Second, by showing ETITEA, citizens reduce those mistakes in means-end
reasoning that are engendered by plainly and fully unjustified beliefs—con-
versely, by mistrusting trustworthy epistemic authorities as for beliefs that are
fully justified and almost undisputed, citizens make something prima facie bad
from both a prudential and epistemic point of view, in that they do not prop-
erly take into account the mistakes in means-end reasoning engendered by fully
unjustified beliefs, thereby increasing the probability of bringing about unsuc-
cessful actions.
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10.3.2 Reasonable citizens
The second feature that citizens in my ideal possess is reasonableness. Reason-
ableness is a rawlsian concept elaborated to express two basic ideas: very roughly,
the first idea is that citizens, provided that they are reasonable, respect a reciprocity
constraint, therefore they restraint themselves from advancing in public debates
sectarian arguments, since they would not be endorsed by everyone; the second
idea is that reasonable citizens acknowledge the burdens of judgment—i.e. the fact
that assessing evidence is complex, weighing political and moral values is difficult,
our concepts are inherently vague, and our life experiences show great variations—
and, therefore, realize that under conditions of freedom people endorse a plurality
of different but reasonable world-views (Rawls 2005: 47–58).
In general terms I share this characterization of reasonableness, and I find it
an essential component of a framework that takes seriously the fact of reason-
able pluralism. Nonetheless, it is incomplete. In particular, as for the burdens
of judgment, there is a basic epistemic fact—that is relevant for those caring
about the respect that citizens owe each other—which, though, Rawls has
overlooked. This fact is that, as far as we know, in every human society there is
an inescapable and pervasive social division of the epistemic labor. This can be
proved in two ways.
First, we can notice that individuals come to endorse different world-views
not, let’s say, in “isolation”, but rather by trusting certain authorities—and not
others. Think about Scientist-Carl and Islamic-Matt: undeniably, both of them
have formed their world-views not on their own, but rather via some intellectual
authorities. This implies that when one disagrees with others on certain issues,
this disagreement is not simply about antagonist personal beliefs, but it is rather
an antagonism between a set of diverse but coherent beliefs that belong to dif-
ferent and well-structured structures of thought, all of them prima facie deser-
ving respect.
Second, if we take as basic the fact that assessing evidence is complex, weighing
political and moral values is difficult, our concepts are inherently vague, etc., we
should similarly take as basic the fact that we live in an unamendable condition of
epistemic dependence in all domains in which we are not experts. This is some-
thing that we experience in our daily life: we depend on the authority of lawyers
when we face juridical problems; we rely on physicians when we suffer from a
disease; and so on. A fortiori this holds true as for those beliefs that are fully jus-
tified and almost undisputed in the scientific community: with regard to their
validity, we massively rely on the epistemic authorities of scientists. Moreover, the
recognition of this common condition of epistemic dependence deals with our
concern for the respect that citizens owe each other, as I will show in a moment.
In light of this, my proposal is to revise the rawlsian idea of the burdens of
judgment in such a way as to include in it the fact of epistemic dependence, i.e.
the fact that we have to constantly rely on the evidential testimony of others, in all
domains in which we are laypersons. After all, we are creatures with limited epis-
temic capabilities, whose limits cannot easily be overcome, and, besides, we live in
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complex societies in which expertise is needed, but at the same time accessible for
one single individual in only very few domains (section 10.2).
If my proposal is plausible, then in my idea of democratic public debates rea-
sonable citizens will understand that epistemic dependence is a condition that each
of them more or less equally shares. In other words, reasonable citizens will con-
ceive of their society as a network of multiple epistemic dependencies, where every-
one relies on others in a roughly similar measure. For example, as for fully justified
and almost undisputed beliefs, reasonable citizens will acknowledge that all of us
depend on the epistemic authority of climatologists when climate change is at
stake; that all of us depend on the epistemic authority of medical doctors when it
comes to vaccines; etc.
As in the case of Rawls, some epistemic and moral consequences follow from the
acknowledgment of the burdens of judgment. As for the epistemic consequences,
by recognizing the fact of epistemic dependence as a condition that all citizens
more or less equally share, reasonable citizens should be led to show ETITEA in
regard to fully justified beliefs as a way not to result epistemically immodest toward
themselves and each other—where, to recall it, epistemic immodesty is the attitude
of those citizens that deny their constitutive epistemic dependency (section 10.2).
To explain this, a fictive scenario might help. In my ideal, reasonable citizens
should reason in the following manner: “I depend on many others as for many—
fully justified—beliefs, so I need to trust trustworthy epistemic authorities”; and:
I am not epistemically fully autonomous in more or less the same way as my
co-citizens, experts included, thus I should trust trustworthy epistemic
authorities, as they do, notably in regard to beliefs that are fully justified and
almost undisputed in the scientific community.
As we can see, therefore, an attitude of epistemic modesty should follow from the
acknowledgment of citizens’ common and interlinked epistemic dependence.
The reduction of citizens’ epistemic immodesty has an important moral con-
sequence as well. Epistemic immodesty, indeed, often translates into disrespectful
behaviors, which negatively affect both the public respect that citizens owe each
other and the moral quality of public debates. If citizens think of themselves as
fully autonomous epistemic agents, then, first, they will likely disrespect experts, in
that their competence will be disregarded. This could be publicly shown through
arrogant statements directed at experts—e.g. “I am as competent in D as you”,
charges of political bias or even physical threats. Second, those citizens trusting
trustworthy epistemic authorities will be considered either not endowed with
some minimal epistemic capacities, or biased in favor of epistemic authorities
because of self-interest. Needless to say, the moral quality of public debates
resulting from a majority of citizens exhibiting epistemic immodesty would be very
low. In reverse, by showing ETITEA, reasonable citizens reduce their epistemic
immodesty, and this, in turn, involves minimizing the moral risk of being dis-
respectful toward co-citizens, be they layperson or experts. In other words, if citi-
zens acknowledge that all of them—experts included—rely on the epistemic
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authority of experts, then immodest and arrogant behaviors will diminish. This is a
remarkable result for democratic societies—imagine a society where experts and
citizens trusting them were constantly ridiculed or threatened; this society would
certainly be in peril from a moral perspective. Additionally, these remarks acquire
further weight if one remembers that the focus of my ideal are beliefs that are fully
justified and almost undisputed in the scientific community, i.e. beliefs such as
“climate change is occurring”. As for them, epistemic immodesty of citizens seems
wholly misplaced, because of the high level of scientific agreement on such beliefs,
and, a fortiori, in that disrespectful behaviors deriving from it appear particularly
bad.
The key point, then, is that the recognition of the fact of the common epistemic
dependence requires that citizens show ETITEA, notably as for beliefs that are
fully justified and almost undisputed in the scientific community, as a way to
reduce their epistemic immodesty. This, in turn, minimizes the moral risk of
exhibiting disrespectful behaviors toward co-citizens, which is something bad that
democratic societies should seek to avoid.
10.3.3 Responsible citizens
The last feature that citizens in my ideal have is responsibility. By this term, I mean
that citizens count as responsible to the extent that they do not want their public
policies to unduly harm others, where “unduly” stands for “without any justifica-
tion” (Cf. Torcello 2011). To put it slightly differently, responsible citizens have
what Rawls calls a sense of justice in that they want to avoid causing reasonably
foreseeable harms. In more formal terms, then, the idea of responsibility employed
here is outcome oriented, and for this reason it might be called outcome-responsi-
bility (Cf. Miller 2007: 87–90).
Besides this, in my ideal, responsible citizens are aware of two facts. The first
fact is that public policies based on fully and plainly unjustified beliefs likely harm
others. This follows from the acknowledgment that actions based on an informa-
tive basis which is blind to the available evidence or even contradicts it cannot but
engender harmful consequences—think of the consequences that people might
suffer from if they act on the basis of the fully unjustified belief “vaccines are not
safe”. The second fact that citizens recognize is that they cannot autonomously
shape—fully—justified beliefs in all of those domains in which they are not
experts. This is so because they take seriously the fact of epistemic dependence as a
condition that everyone shares.
As a consequence of this awareness, responsible citizens should be led to show
ETITEA in all of those domains in which they are laypersons—especially when
fully justified and almost undisputed beliefs are at stake, given their low probability
to cause harms. In this way, first, they let public policies be based on (possibly
fully) justified beliefs, and therefore deeply reduce their probability to cause
harms—which is their way to act in a responsible manner. Second, the moral risk
of not properly taking into account the harmful consequences of one’s own
actions is significantly reduced. In reverse, citizens commit something prima facie
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bad by mistrusting trustworthy epistemic authorities as for fully justified and
almost undisputed beliefs, in that the harmful consequences of one’s own actions
are not properly considered.
The key point to stress is therefore that the virtue of the ETITEA as for beliefs
that are fully justified and almost undisputed in the scientific community is
required by the idea of responsible citizens, as a way to reduce the moral risk of
not properly considering the harmful consequences of one’s own actions.
To sum up, in my ideal of democratic public debates the virtue of the ETITEA
with regard to fully justified and almost undisputed beliefs is required by ration-
ality, reasonableness, and responsibility as a way to reduce the prudential and
moral risks engendered by plainly and fully unjustified beliefs. Consequently, the
mistrust in trustworthy epistemic authorities as for beliefs that are fully justified
and almost undisputed within the scientific community is prima facie bad.
10.4 Possible objections
Before employing the normative framework just outlined to assess the case of cli-
mate change (section 10.5), I want to briefly answer some objections that can be
raised against my ideal.
The first objection claims that my ideal does not fit into rawlsian political liber-
alism. This is so (a) either because the core value underpinning it, i.e. the good-
ness of reducing the prudential and moral risks engendered by plainly and fully
unjustified beliefs, refers to a comprehensive rather than political view, according to
which the value of managing such risks should trump other moral considera-
tions—while many doctrines reject this normative primacy (Talisse 2008); or (b)
because it is illiberal to recommend that citizens should defer to epistemic
authorities because of their epistemic dependency. My reply to this is twofold.
As for the first question (a), I want to stress that the core value of reducing the
prudential and moral risks engendered by plainly and fully unjustified beliefs is
political rather than comprehensive to the extent that, first, it is acknowledged by
all those who accept the fact of epistemic dependence, which, as far as I know, is
endorsed by both the scientific community and several religions, either reasonable
or unreasonable. Second, this core value is retrospectively arrived at by simply
employing the threefold idea of rational, reasonable, and responsible citizens,
which are the political building blocks of political liberalism. No further philoso-
phical or religious conviction is employed to this end. Finally, I have not claimed
that the value of reducing the prudential and moral risks engendered by plainly
and fully unjustified beliefs has absolute normative primacy. It is of course a core
value, but other moral values, which I have not discussed might sometimes prevail
over it, given certain conditions—think of a democratic society in which trust-
worthy epistemic authorities are always deferred and never criticized: despite citi-
zens’ epistemic dependency, in this society citizens should be clearly encouraged
to advance both epistemic and moral objections to experts’ claims.
The second question (b) grasps something significant. There is a seeming ten-
sion between the epistemic reasoning of my argument, on the one hand, and the
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political one, on the other: the former might lead us to demand that citizens defer to
experts with regard to any sort of belief, not just the fully justified and undisputed
ones, given the fact of epistemic dependence; the latter, instead, requires to preserve
citizens’ autonomy. This apparent tension, though, is solved, in favor of the political
side, if one recognizes that my ideal simply prescribes that democratic societies
arrange an epistemic environment where ETITEA can flourish; no-one is forced into
showing it. Moreover, in my ideal it is certainly a good thing if citizens rely on experts
as for all of those beliefs on which they are not competent. Yet, it does not prescribe
so, nor does it reduce the room for disagreement in regard to more disputed beliefs—
see more on this later. It just judges prima facie bad the mistrust in trustworthy
epistemic authorities with regard to beliefs that are fully justified and almost undis-
puted within the scientific community—and these set of beliefs only, given the serious
prudential and moral risks that they exhibit. Briefly, my ideal remains within the
borders of political liberalism.
The second objection follows the previous one and states that in my ideal citizens
are denied their autonomy, both as epistemic agents and moral ones. In my ideal, the
objection goes, citizens should simply defer to experts. Yet this focus on citizens’
deferential behavior does not match liberal concern for citizens’ autonomy. I answer
this by noticing that, as for citizens’ epistemic autonomy, in my ideal it is actually
enhanced, for two reasons. First, by stressing citizens’ epistemic dependency, citizens
are led to embrace a more plausible idea of epistemic autonomy, according to which
agents can be epistemically autonomous provided that they trust some trustworthy
epistemic authorities, and not in spite of them. To be truly epistemically autonomous
is, in other words, to recognize one’s reliance on the evidential testimony of others,
not to deny it. In my ideal, then, epistemic autonomy is simply reshaped in more
plausible terms. Second, in my ideal citizens keep the epistemic capacity to advance
objections, even powerful ones, to experts’ claims—granted that they have acquired
some competence in the domain at stake. The point is that these objections have to
be evaluated by experts, as for their validity (Hardwig 1985: 342). But this is not to
diminish citizens’ epistemic autonomy; it is rather to value experts’ competence—
experts that are, after all, citizens as laypersons.
On the other hand, from a moral perspective, in my ideal, all of the citizens,
experts included, are considered on a par, and when it comes to moral and/or
political disagreements—concerning, for example, the specific ways to implement a
certain policy—they are understood as epistemic peers, that is, very roughly, with
an equal epistemic power to formulate moral and/or political proposals and
objections (Cf. Peter 2013).
The third objection claims that my ideal is partly misguided because, first, even
when we take into account fully justified and almost undisputed beliefs, there is
always disagreement among epistemic authorities, rather than full consensus; second,
it is not true that citizens that mistrust experts choose to exclusively rely on their
epistemic autonomy: it is rather that they trust other supposed epistemic authorities.
I reply that, first, it is undeniable that even in regard to fully justified and
almost undisputed beliefs there is not full unanimity among experts. For
example, around 97–98% rather than 100% of climatologists take as fully
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justified the claim “global warming is occurring”.14 Yet the disagreement at
stake here is illusory rather than genuine—in other words, it is not a matter of
disagreement (section 10.1). Indeed, the remaining 2–3% of climatologists not
believing that climate change is occurring do not count as trustworthy epis-
temic authorities in my account, either because they are politically biased or
are not truly competent (Oreskes 2007; Oreskes, Conway 2010). Also, this
likely holds for many other domains—think about the alleged disagreement on
claims such as “cancer is not caused by psychological phenomena”. Besides,
provided that full unanimity cannot be found on any beliefs, it is a mistake to
treat beliefs on which there is an overwhelming scientific consensus as closer to
truly disputed beliefs than to beliefs on which in idealized conditions there
would be full unanimity. If we conceive of all beliefs as points on a scale where
at one extreme there are truly disputed beliefs and, at the other, beliefs on
which ideally there is unanimity, it is clear that fully justified and almost
undisputed beliefs are closer to the latter extreme.
Second, as for the claim according to which citizens opt to trust other presumed
epistemic authorities rather than to exclusively rely on their epistemic autonomy, I
answer that social media show that this reading is partly mistaken. In social media,
those individuals that mistrust trustworthy epistemic authorities too often show what
I have called epistemic immodesty, i.e. they do not recognize their epistemic depen-
dence, and treat experts disrespectfully by means of arrogant claims such as “I am
competent in D as you” or “you lie because of self-interest” (section 10.3.2). Only
after this initial phase they start looking for alleged epistemic authorities—which in
most of the cases are either not trustworthy, or not epistemic authorities at all—able
to support their beliefs, as they are continuously and publicly challenged by trust-
worthy epistemic authorities. The starting point is full epistemic autonomy; the search
for supposed epistemic authorities confirming one’s own beliefs follows.
The fourth objection can be summarized through the following question: “What if
it comes out that trustworthy epistemic authorities are wrong on certain seemingly
fully justified and almost undisputed beliefs? In light of this risk, is it still desirable to
suggest that citizens should trust them?” The answer is: “yes, it is”. This is so because,
on the one hand, trustworthy epistemic authorities in D are far less exposed to the
risk of making mistakes as for beliefs in D than laypersons. On the other, trust is by
definition a risky attitude (Baier 1986: 235–240), even when the trustee is a trust-
worthy epistemic authority. Indeed, both knowledge and the standards of justifica-
tion are fallibilist (Leite 2010), and, besides, bona fide mistakes may occur.
Finally, the last objection states:
in ideal conditions it is not hard to understand which epistemic authorities are
trustworthy among the available ones, but this is not true in the real world,
where many circumstances hamper an easy identification of them. Similarly, in
non-ideal scenarios it is difficult for citizens to ascertain whether on certain
beliefs there is an overwhelming consensus or not.
14 Oreskes 2007; Anderson 2011.
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I reply by stressing that, while both claims detect real difficulties (section 10.5), it
is likewise true that, as Elisabeth Anderson has argued, citizens, even those with a
low level of education, can identify trustworthy epistemic authorities and verify
whether on certain beliefs there is an overwhelming consensus by simply surfing
Wikipedia (Anderson 2011).
10.5 Conclusions. The case of climate change
I have argued that the mistrust in trustworthy epistemic authorities, as for
beliefs that are fully justified and almost undisputed within the scientific com-
munity, that is showed by citizens within democratic public debates leading to
the elaboration of public policies is a peculiar manifestation of post-truth (sec-
tion 10.1). I have then advanced my main argument. In particular, after pro-
viding a definition of three core concepts of my chapter, i.e. epistemic
dependence, trustworthy epistemic authorities, and epistemic trust (section
10.2), I have claimed that this post-truth attitude is prima facie bad for
democratic societies—from a prudential point of view, an epistemic perspective,
and a moral one. I have defended this thesis by stating that citizens showing it
do not possess the political and deliberative virtue of the ETITEA, which is
demanded by the non-exhaustive ideal of the good citizen publicly debating in
democratic contexts. I have developed this ideal and shown that, in light of the
fact of epistemic dependence, citizens publicly debating in democratic contexts
should trust trustworthy epistemic authorities as for fully justified and almost
undisputed beliefs, as a way to reduce the prudential and moral risks engen-
dered by plainly and fully unjustified beliefs—and these beliefs only. In detail,
by employing the rawlsian idea of public reason, I have argued that ETITEA is
required by three ideas characterizing my ideal: (a) the idea of rational citizens;
(b) the idea of reasonable citizens; and (c) the idea of responsible citizens
(section 10.3). Finally, I have answered some objections (section 10.4).
To draw some conclusions it can now be useful to briefly reason on a real-word
case, i.e. the case of climate change. As for it, I have already noticed that, if one
looks, for example, at American citizens, the situation to address is the following.
On the one hand, 97–98% of climatologists agree on the threefold fact (i) that
climate change is occurring; (ii) that this fact is alarming; and that (iii) humans are
casually responsible for it. On the other hand, (i) 16% of Americans deny that
climate change is occurring; (ii) 48% of them question its seriousness; and (iii) 50%
think that human activity has no role in causing it. In other words, in regard to
the beliefs i–iii, 16%, 48%, and 50% of Americans, respectively, show either a lack
of trust or explicit mistrust in climatologists as for three fully justified and almost
undisputed beliefs (section 10.1). How should we judge this attitude?
If my ideal is sound, and, besides, we take for granted that climate experts in
climate change are trustworthy epistemic authorities, their trustworthiness is pub-
licly acknowledged and more or less easily verifiable by citizens, and, finally, the
beliefs i–iii provide a good example of fully justified and almost undisputed beliefs,
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then it follows that Americans’ public mistrust in climate experts as for climate
change is prima facie bad for their democratic society.
Specifically, first, this mistrusting attitude shows a failure in rationality, to the
extent that it contributes to choosing the alleged best means to address the environ-
ment on an informative basis that is crude and untested, thereby reducing the prob-
ability of fulfilling the desired aim. The prudential risk of not electing the appropriate
means to attain the preferred goal, i.e. the preservation of environment, is therefore
not properly acknowledged. Second, the public mistrust in climatologists showed by
Americans is unreasonable because, by not taking into due account the fact of citi-
zens’ common epistemic dependence, an attitude of epistemic immodesty follows.
This, in turn, increases the moral risk of having disrespectful behaviors directed at
both experts and those laypersons that trust climatologists. Third, this mistrusting
attitude toward climatologists and their claims is irresponsible, since citizens that show
it run the moral risk of not carefully considering the likely harmful effects of the public
policies they are contributing to shaping.
This is not the whole story, though. One should also investigate, on a non-ideal
level, if there are relevant obstacles, for which citizens are not wholly responsible,
that, nonetheless, prevent them from showing the virtue of the ETITEA—in cli-
matologists, in the case here at stake. The acknowledgement of these obstacles
might prompt us to mitigate our moral judgment. And this is precisely the path
that we should undertake as for climate change. As a matter of fact, it has been
convincingly argued that propaganda made by multinational corporations, with
strong interests in not tackling the problem of climate change (McKinnon 2016),
and, on the other side, irresponsible mass-media, presenting climatologists’ beliefs
on climate change and non-experts’ contrary ones as if they were on a par
(Anderson 2011), have played an important role in preventing citizens from
showing epistemic trust in climatologists. In light of this, the moral evaluation of
the mistrust in climatologists as for climate change developed here should be
understood as provisional. Further work, in which more detailed non-ideal con-
siderations on those factors impeding citizens from showing ETITEA are taken
into account and weighted, is needed.
To sum up, I have developed a normative framework enabling us to understand
why the mistrust in trustworthy epistemic authorities that is showed by citizens in
democratic public debates concerning the elaboration of public policies, as for
beliefs that are fully justified and almost undisputed within the scientific commu-
nity, is prima facie bad for democratic societies. I have argued that this mistrust is
prima facie bad as it exposes citizens to the prudential risk of choosing inap-
propriate means to pursue their own collective aims, and the moral risk of both
disrespecting each other, and not taking properly into account the harmful con-
sequences of their public policies. Complementarily, I have shown there are both
epistemic and moral reasons for showing trust in trustworthy epistemic authorities
as for beliefs that are fully justified and almost undisputed in the scientific com-
munity. Finally, I have suggested that as propaganda made by corporations
through complicit politicians on the one hand, and irresponsible mass-media, on
the other, have contributed to preventing citizens from showing ETITEA,
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politicians and mass-media have the twofold duty to stop behaving irresponsibly,
and to create an epistemic environment where the ETITEA as for fully justified
and almost undisputed beliefs can flourish.
References
Almassi, B. (2012). Climate Change, Epistemic Trust, and Expert Trustworthiness. Ethics
and the Environment, 17(2), pp. 29–49.
Anderson, E. (2011). Democracy, Public Policy and Lay Assessment of Scientific Testi-
mony. Episteme, 8(2), pp. 144–164.
Baier, A. (1986). Trust and Antitrust. Ethics, 96, pp. 231–260.
Buchanan, A. (2002). Social Moral Epistemology. Social Philosophy and Policy, 19(2), pp.
126–115.
Buchanan, A. (2004). Political Liberalism and Social Epistemology. Philosophy & Public
Affairs, 32(2), pp. 95–130.
Coady, D. (2006). When Experts Disagree. Episteme, 3(1–2), pp. 68–79.
Frankfurt, H. (2005). On Bullshit. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Fricker, E. (2006). Testimony and epistemic autonomy. In: J. Lackey, E. Sosa (eds.), The
Epistemology of Testimony. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 225–250.
Galeotti, A. E. (2015). Liars or Self-Deceived? Reflections on Political Deception. Political
Studies, 63, pp. 887–902.
Goldman, A. (2001). Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust? Philosophy and Phenomen-
ological Research, 63(1), pp. 85–110.
Greenawalt, K. (1994). On Public Reason. Chicago-Kent Law Review, 69(3), 668–689.
Hardwig, J. (1985). Epistemic Dependence. The Journal of Philosophy, 82(7), pp. 335–349.
Hardwig, J. (1991). The Role of Trust in Knowledge. The Journal of Philosophy, 88(12), pp.
693–708.
Jones, K. (1996). Trust as an Affective Attitude. Ethics, 107(1), pp. 4–25.
Jones, K. (2012). Trustworthiness. Ethics, 123(1), pp. 61–85.
Jønch-clausen, K., Kappel, K. (2016). Scientific Facts and Methods in Public Reason. Res
Publica, 22(2), pp. 117–133.
Kappel, K. (2014). Believing on Trust. Synthese, 191, pp. 2009–2028.
Kitcher, P. (2011). Science in a Democratic Society. New York: Prometheus Books.
Leite, A. (2010). Fallibilism. In: J. Dancy, E. Sosa, and M. Steup (eds.), A Companion to
Epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 369–370.
Leland, R. J., van Wietmarschen, H. (2012). Reasonableness, Intellectual Modesty, and
Reciprocity in Political Justification. Ethics, 122(4), pp. 721–747.
Lynch, K. (2013) Self-Deception and Stubborn Belief. Erkenntnis, 78(6), pp. 1337–1345.
Mckinnon, C. (2016). Should We Tolerate Climate Change Denial? Midwest Studies In
Philosophy, XL, pp. 205–2016.
Miller, D. (2007) National Responsibility and Global Justice. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Oreskes, N. (2007). The scientific consensus on climate change: how do we know we’re
not wrong? In: J. F. C. DiMento, P. Doughman (eds.), Climate Change: What It Means
for Us, Our Children, and Our Grandchildren. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 65–99.
Oreskes, N., Conway, E. (2010). Defeating the Merchants of Doubt. Nature, 465, pp.
686–687.
134 Davide Pala
Peter, F. (2013). The Procedural Epistemic Value of Deliberation. Synthese, 190, pp. 1253–
1266.
Quong, J. (2011). Liberalism without Perfection. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rawls, J. (2005). Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.
Talisse, R. (2008). Toward a Social Epistemic Comprehensive Liberalism, Episteme, 5(1), pp.
106–128.
Torcello, L. (2011). The Ethics of Inquiry, Scientific Belief, and Public Discourse. Public
Affairs Quarterly, 25(3), pp. 197–215.
A political and deliberative virtue? 135
11 Truth, facts, alternates and persons
Or, whatever has happened to post-
modernism?
Tracy B. Strong
For, dear me, why abandon belief
Merely because it ceases to be true.
Cling to it long enough, and not a doubt
It will turn true again, for so it goes.
Most of the change we think we see in life
Is due to truths being in and out of favor.
Robert Frost, “The Black Cottage”
Hamm: Did you ever think one thing?
Clov: Never.
Samuel Beckett, Endgame
As we all know, the news is filled these days with discussion of “post-truth,”
“alternate facts,” “lies,” “misleading statements,” and much more. “News” itself is
called into question as “fake.” Many worry that a significant portion of the US
population, and in particular much of its present administration, reject the validity
of science and any objective determination of what are “facts.” It is worth noting
here that while of a new intensity, these immediate political concerns are not in
fact new – they certainly date back to the George W. Bush administration and
likely in a perhaps attenuated form to prior administrations.
Some might call this a consequence of (at least part of) post-modernism – and
some have. And there appears to be a certain amount of credible evidence that
during the 1970s, the CIA actively promoted interest in post-modernism (J.
Derrida, R. Barthes, M. Foucault, G. Deleuze, and so forth) in order to undercut
the authority of more Marxist oriented thinkers (L. Althusser, J-P. Sartre, M.
Merleau-Ponty, S. de Beauvoir).1 In the late 1960s and early 1970s, several of my
friends in graduate school wrote dissertations on Marx – good ones – only to find
that three years later no one seemed interested. Indeed, some decades ago, I
wrote a basically sympathetic review of Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow’s book
1 See Gabriel Rockhill, “The CIA Reads French Theory: On the Intellectual Labor of
Dismantling the Cultural Left,” The Philosophical Salon. Los Angeles Review of Books, 28
February 2017.
on Foucault, only to ask at the end why the name of Karl Marx was not
mentioned.
In the face of all this, and having spent much of my professional career in an
attempt to understand and make the thought of Friedrich Nietzsche and others
available, what am I to do? Nietzsche, after all, appears explicit: “Against that
positivism which stops before phenomena, saying ‘there are only facts,’ I should
say: no, it is precisely facts that do not exist, only interpretations…”2 Elsewhere he
asserts that “there are no things in themselves, that the very notion of a ‘thing’ is itself
a construction.”3 Not only are there no facts, but Nietzsche will push the point
further. In an entry entitled “The Researcher,” he writes: “There are many kinds
of eyes. Even the sphinx has eyes – and consequently there are many kinds of
‘truths’ and consequently there is no truth.”4 Nietzsche’s point, however, is not to
provide support for the Trump administration press secretaries.
Nietzsche’s point is not that truths are many – a kind of becoming pragmatic
pluralism – but that anything that can be designated as true necessarily contains
multiplicities and contradictions. “All truth is simple – is that not a double (zwei-
fach) lie?”5 This aphorism from Twilight of the Idols is a short version of the more
extended Nachlass entry: “All truth is simple: that is a double lie (zweifach).
Everything that is simply is plain imaginary, it is not ‘true.’ However what is real,
what is true, is neither single (Eins) nor indeed ultimately reducible to singular-
ity.”6 What is at stake is rather the concept of what a “fact” is.
Philosophically, the matter is more complex – one forgets the impact that
the publication of the Critique of Pure Reason had on the world. Kant had
shown that in fact we never perceive the world as it is an sich but only that
which our senses make available to us. His achievement in the First Critique
was to have shown the following. First, all experience is experience of and
only of appearances; second, that whatever it is that appearances are of is
something that cannot be the object of experience; third, that we can know
only how it is that we have experiences; and fourth, that it is in reflecting on
how it is that we have experience and knowledge of experience that we can
ground reason. This was immediately recognized as the source of a radical
new conception of philosophy, one that admitted the full force of skepticism
but did not remain mired in it. It was also recognized as having released
what in 1792 Jacob Oberreit called a “gigantic horror” on the world. The
replacement, as it were, of God with the noumenal (that about which noth-
ing is knowable) changed the human position in the world. As Nietzsche
remarks in Schopenhauer as Educator:
2 F. Nietzsche, The Will to Power (Random House. New York, 1967), 481.
3 F. Nietzsche, Kritische Studien Ausgabe (de Gruyter. Berlin, 1998), 12.141 (hence-
forth KSA, volume number and page number).
4 KSA 11.598.
5 KSA 6.59: Twilight of the Idols.
6 KSA 13.478–9. I am assisted in the passage by B. Babich, Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Sci-
ence (Albany, NY, SUNY Press, 1992), 112–113.
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This danger of the despair of truth attends every thinker who sets out from
the Kantian philosophy providing he is a vigorous and whole man in suffering
and desire and not a mere clattering thought – and calculating – machine…
As seen, however, as Kant might start to exercise a popular influence we shall
be aware of it in the form of a gnawing and disintegrating relativism and
skepticism…. We cannot decide whether what we call truth is really truth or
rather it only appears to us to be such.7
Onemight compare this to contemporary bloodless interpretations of the First Critique.
Nietzsche does seem to me to describe, already in 1874, pretty much the
situation that concerns us today, now not only in the rarefied air of epistemology
but in everyday political life. How did it come about?
By the middle 1960s, two separate but related intellectual forces were taking root in
American social sciences and humanities. Both were a response to the positivism that
had dominated the professions in the period immediately following the Second World
War. The appeal of that positivism was wide-spread – in social science, in philosophy, in
the New Literary Criticism – and was itself in great part a reaction to what appeared to
have been an extremely dangerous subjectivism and irrationalism in the 1930s. It is
worth noting here that most of the Anglophone political theory written since the
Second World War has been done so on the more or less explicit basis of making sure
that “it never happened again.” I have written an entire book trying to get away from
this prejudice. In any case, both of these reactions – to be discussed – had the effect of
breaking the intellectual hold – or were at least taken to have broken the hold – of the
positivist understandings of the social world and of how one should go about trying to
understand that world.
I shall deal shortly more directly with the question of positivism and its survival.
Nietzsche did not think it dead.
What were the philosophical or conceptual developments of the period? Into
this positivist vision of the world came a critique that was branded with the
shorthand name of “Kuhn.” Thomas Kuhn’s book, The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions, argued that claims about the world carried with them participation in
a broader understanding – to some degree social, historical and epistemological in
nature – without which those claims would not be possible. Kuhn called these
broader understandings “paradigms.” Kuhn, in other words, appeared to question
the distinction between two forms of speech or knowledge, between the expressed
and the un- or inexpressible.
Soon, everyone was citing Kuhn.8 Crudely, what most people took him to have
done – whether or not they approved of it – was to have brought “values” or
7 KSA 1.355 (SE 3). See also B. Babich “Ex aliquod nihil: Nietzsche on Science, Anar-
chy and Democratic Nihilism,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 84.2
(Spring 2010): 231–256, to which I owe the quote from J. Oberreit, a Swiss doctor
and philosopher, partly responsible for the recovery of the Nibelungen sagas.
8 And the matter was broader: the term “Social Construction” as in Peter Berger and
Thomas Luckmann’s 1966 book, The Social Construction of Reality, stood in for or
rather with Kuhn in the social sciences. Citations were at 50–60 a year in the early
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cultural commitments back in scientific discourse. It is important to realize that in
this reading of Kuhn, however, “values” were still understood precisely in the
terms that positivism had cast them in. They were, in other words, the not-
objective, the non-cognitive and so forth. Kuhn was thus accused by many of
irrationalism. That facts, as one learned to say, were “theory [or value] laden,” and
“embedded” in “webs of meaning” did not, however, in fact join culture, value or
meaning any more tightly to the world, nor make knowledge of these things any
more shareable. The emphasis was rather in the other direction – a scrim of
“values” before all those places where we might look for facts supposedly loosened
the grip of world on facts.
This terrain was fertile enough to foster a second development. Pretty soon, those
who read Kuhn in this manner – whether favorably or not – were or had been
reading Wittgenstein and allowing themselves free passage between paradigms, pic-
tures, forms of life and language-games. Central here was the claim taken from
Wittgenstein that language, or certain linguistic conventions, so shape our under-
standing of the world that we do not see around their corners. Wittgenstein’s apo-
thegm that “a picture held us captive” came to stand for a peculiar kind of blindness
forced on one through language itself.9 For many who were favorable to this so-
called “linguistic turn,”10 however, Wittgenstein’s proposition about imprisonment
became rather a slogan of supposed liberation. For if what seemed to constrain our
thought was merely a picture, then it would certainly seem one could get out of it,
or at least change pictures – or so it appeared. The irony here is that Wittgenstein’s
passage actually expresses rather a disappointment with knowledge. Wittgenstein
continues: “And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language
seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.” The irony is compounded in that two dis-
appointments are captured here simultaneously: the initial one, a disappointment
with the failure of knowledge to satisfy its own inveterate demands (in the Investi-
gations this appears as the demand or hope for a crystalline pure ideal of language),
and the succeeding one, a disappointment with this initial disappointment – a find-
ing of the latter to be in effect empty, a disappointment with success. It is this
second disappointment that drives Wittgenstein to his famous turning around of the
axis of his investigation (PI 108) – the equivalent for him of an earlier periagoge in
an even more famous cave. I shall have more to say about such turnings later.
In the social sciences, however, it was not long before some were proclaiming
that “what you see depends on where you sit.”11 Kuhn’s paradigms – already
1970s, jumped to 120 in 1974, and then ranged between 140 and 160 a year until the
early 1990s. See Andrew Abbott, Chaos of Disciplines (Chicago. University of Chicago
Press, 2001), Chapter 3 and esp. pp 89ff. Were one to add such books as Burkhart
Holzner’s Reality Construction in Society, the count would go much higher.
9 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford. Basil Blackwell, 1958),
paragraph 115. (Henceforth PI in the text.)
10 The term was originally Gustav Bergman’s. See the discussion in the “Introduction,” in
Richard Rorty, ed. The Linguistic Turn (Chicago. University of Chicago Press [1967]).
11 I believe that Graham Allison gave this expression currency, generalizing a maxim of
Douglas Price. See Graham Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston. Little Brown, 1971).
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carried from scientific practice into socio-politico analysis – were now radicalized
by being located in the plurality of “language games” that were suddenly found to
mark the differences among everything from academic disciplines to political pro-
jects. Ironically, since Wittgenstein’s earlier work, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophi-
cus, had been a central document in the rise of positivism (whether properly
understood or not), his later work, the Philosophical Investigations, acquired its
prestige in part as a recantation of an earlier “positivism.”12
I shall not be concerned here directly with the status and importance of Kuhn’s
work for the social sciences. However, leaving aside the question of whether or
not those who read Kuhn got him right – and the answer to that would have to be
for the most part “no” – it is important to realize that Kuhn’s work drew heavily
on those developments in philosophy just noted, developments associated with the
designation “ordinary language philosophy,” a practice of philosophy variously
associated with the work of J.L. Austin and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Its most pro-
minent contemporary American practitioner is Stanley Cavell, who has extended
Austin and Wittgenstein beyond any point that might have otherwise seemed
obvious. Kuhn was himself a colleague of Cavell’s at Berkeley and is clearly influ-
enced by him. Kuhn was also influenced – as he later admitted and this is relevant
to the debates of the status of science – by Ludwig Fleck, The Genesis and Devel-
opment of a Scientific Fact, in which Fleck introduced the notion of a Denkstil and
a Denkkollectiv – the clear parents of “paradigm.” As one commentator has writ-
ten, Fleck argued:
that a pure and direct observation cannot exist: in the act of perceiving objects
the observer, i.e. the epistemological subject, is always influenced by the
epoch and the environment to which he belongs, that is by what Fleck calls
the thought style.13
Many of us greeted these developments with enthusiasm and furthered them in
print. How do they tie it to the developments which we now resist, or rather make
fun of, in the political realm?
Linda Zerilli, to take just one case, finds herself distressed that in the present
political context “truth is quickly becoming a casualty.”14 What about truth? Can
one place a claim to “truth” in a larger context? Or, are such claims against which
one cannot argue: facts are not values and the world merely needs to be under-
stood accurately and appropriately. Let me take up the point by Nietzsche that
truth is always many. Yet it is not clear that the context should not shape our
12 The work of Cora Diamond and James Conant has called this into definitive question.
13 Sofia Siwecka, “Genesis and Development of the ‘Medical Fact’. Thought Style and
Scientific Evidence in the Epistemology of Ludwik Fleck,” Dialogues in Philosophy,
Mental and Neuro Sciences, 4.2 (2011): 37–39. For a fuller discussion see Babette
Babich, “Calling Science Pseudoscience: Fleck’s Archaeologies of Fact and Latour’s
‘Biography of an Investigation’ in AIDS Denialism, and Homeopathy,” International
Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 29.1 (2015): 1–39
14 In her contribution to the symposium in Theory and Event (JSTOR on line) 9.4
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judgment. Take the following case having to do with distress over scientific truths
or facts.
In 1925, Tennessee passed the Butler Act forbidding the teaching of evolution
in the state and providing for a fine of between $100 and $500 for each offence.
Williams Jennings Bryan, several times presidential candidate, Secretary of State
under the first Wilson administration, had been an important force behind the bill.
He was one of the most politically progressive white politicians in the country:
among his other accomplishments were strong support for the direct election of
Senators (1913), for the progressive federal income tax (1913), female suffrage
(1920) and Prohibition (1920).
The state of Tennessee also required the teaching of a text book by George W.
Hunter called Civil Biology (1914), which clearly, if briefly, set out what it
understood as a kind of theory of evolution. On page 196, the text concluded its
discussion of race by indicating that there have evolved five races of humans, to
wit, the Ethiopian, Malay, American Indian, Mongolian and “the highest type of
all, the Caucasian”. This last was the only race to whom the predicate “civilized”
was applied and the text continued by suggesting some possibilities for the
improvement of the race.
A group of citizens in Dayton, Tennessee got together and persuaded a local
teacher, John Scopes, to claim that he had, in using this text book, taught evolu-
tion and was hence in contravention of the law. A trial ensued, with Bryan a cen-
tral figure in the prosecution and Clarence Darrow, fresh from having obtained a
sentence of life in prison rather than a death penalty for the confessed and brutal
19-year-old murderers Nathan Leopold and Richard Loeb, both from very rich
families. In his summation for that case, Darrow had invoked the following:
Nature is strong and she is pitiless. She works in mysterious ways, and we are
her victims. We have not much to do with it ourselves. Nature takes this job
in hand, and we only play our parts. In the words of old Omar Khayyam, we
are only ‘Impotent pieces in the game He plays Upon this checkerboard of
nights and days, Hither and thither moves, and checks, and slays, And one by
one back in the closet lays.’ What had this boy had to do with it? He was not
his own father; he was not his own mother….All of this was handed to him.
He did not surround himself with governesses and wealth. He did not make
himself. And yet he is to be compelled to pay.15
The children (19 years old), he successfully argued, were products of the merci-
lessness of nature, hence not (fully) responsible.
Bryan was an evangelical Christian who believed in the truth of the Bible. He
also knew a good deal about Darwin, more in fact than the defense. And he cer-
tainly knew more about the Bible than did Darrow. The point here is that Bryan’s
opposition to the teaching of evolution had to do both with his Christian funda-
mentalism and with the fact that the theory of evolution appeared to justify the
15 Online at www.larryfike.net/darrow/
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claim that some beings (or races) were superior to others and could be used, as he
pointedly reminded Darrow, to mitigate responsibility for a confessed vicious
murder. He also knew that during the First World War German militarism had
legitimated itself by appeals to Darwin.
Bryan had prepared a speech by which to respond to Darrow but never got to
give it for the judge ruled the direct examination of him by Darrow to be irrele-
vant. Here is part of what he would have said:
Science is a magnificent force, but it is not a teacher of morals. It can perfect
machinery, but it adds no moral restraints to protect society from the misuse
of the machine. It can also build gigantic intellectual ships, but it constructs
no moral rudders for the control of storm tossed human vessel. It not only
fails to supply the spiritual element needed but some of its unproven hypoth-
eses rob the ship of its compass and thus endangers its cargo. In war, science
has proven itself an evil genius; it has made war more terrible than it ever was
before. Man used to be content to slaughter his fellowmen on a single plane—
the earth’s surface. Science has taught him to go down into the water and
shoot up from below and to go up into the clouds and shoot down from
above, thus making the battlefield three times a bloody as it was before; but
science does not teach brotherly love. Science has made war so hellish that
civilization was about to commit suicide; and now we are told that newly
discovered instruments of destruction will make the cruelties of the late war
seem trivial in comparison with the cruelties of wars that may come in the
future. If civilization is to be saved from the wreckage threatened by intelli-
gence not consecrated by love, it must be saved by the moral code of the
meek and lowly Nazarene. His teachings, and His teachings, alone, can solve
the problems that vex heart and perplex the world….16
Except probably for the last two sentences, I imagine that most of us here would
generally agree with the rest of this statement. My point here is that there is no
such thing as a claim by science or even a “scientific truth” divorced of contexts –
and the plural is important. One context of science adduced here by Bryan is that
science destroys. Can one speak of science without regard to the worlds in which
it exists and which it fosters – a negative answer is the lesson that we might learn
from Heidegger’s analysis of technology?
What about this? In response, someone might make a distinction between what
one might call “evolutionism” and evolutionary theory. The former would be
associated with Thomas Huxley, Herbert Spencer and others who sought to use
what they understood of Darwinism to claim the superiority of the more advanced
species. The second would be the refusal to attribute “superiority” to those species
that survived. It is, however, the case that still today the idea of progress is asso-
ciated with evolution and with science. Like it or not, however, as Judith Schule-
vitz wrote in The New York Times Books Review on January 22, 2006, many
16 Online at www5.csudh.edu/oliver/smt310-handouts/wjb-last/wjb-last.htm
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people (on both sides of this fence) remained “convinced that evolution has large
scale social and theological (or anti-theological) implications.” (See the interview
with Daniel Dennett in the NY Times Magazine the same day and the review of
his most recent book in New York Review of Books by Thomas Nagel.)
Yet for most of us, “science” plays a central role – we are as disturbed, it appears, by
the proposal to teach “intelligent design” in American secondary schools as we are by
Bush’s administration’s justification of the war in Iraq or Trump’s gutting of the EPA
and Global Warming policies – or, more accurately, we think them part of the same
syndrome. Prior to 1925, evangelical Christians such as Bryan were among the
socially and politically most progressive forces in the United States. Today, for most
of us, evangelical Christians are very often allied with the forces that have brought us
the Iraq War, the gutting of EPA, the skewing of the tax code in favor of the very
wealthy, and so forth. My point, however, is that the teaching of evolution or of
anything always takes place in a context and that politically this matters as to what we
conceive of as science. All is maculate.
Thus a second question: Can the scientific teaching of evolution be considered
independently of (a) the political contexts in which it sits, and (b) the fact that it is
taught as if a scientific theory were simply true? Actually, to begin to understand the
theory of evolution properly one needs a good knowledge of cellular and even mole-
cular genetics – and this shows us that there are still a lot of unexplained spaces in the
theory. This question, however, means that one must rely on what counts as authority
in this particular case. The question here is if any authority is final. Hobbes’ objection to
Boyle was in fact political rather than scientific; it was an objection to the kind of
authority the Royal Society and the experimental community claimed (see Steven
Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump, 1985). Steven Shapin has
shown in A Social History of Truth (1995) that positive results were always validated by
named gentlemen, whereas negative ones were referred to unnamed underlings.
What might be done? Suppose someone were to argue something like this: in
our world correct political judgment has been made increasingly difficult or
impossible due, as Jeremy Elkins has claimed, to the “leveling of strong institu-
tions and institutional norms under the weight of raw political will”.17 The insti-
tution often thought to be much at fault has been the weakness of the
contemporary American press. Against this some hold out the “ideal of an inde-
pendent press” as the “singly most important potentially countervailing non-gov-
ernmental institution in a democracy” (11). An independent press is one
committed to “the truth” (his italics) and to contributing to an “informed political
dialogue.” It should be “independent of partisan considerations” (13) although it
“cannot avoid” being a political actor. It is to be “independent,” “to continually
examine its assumptions,” and this is importantly necessary “for a democracy that
aims to be deliberative and discerning in its judgments” (15–16).
Who could be distressed by this? Well, consider what claims are implicit: (1)
democracy is a deliberative process; (2) deliberation depends on having a com-
mitment to the truth; (3) “truth” is independent of partisan considerations; (4)
17 Jeremy Elkins in Theory and Event, op cit. cited by page in text.
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the press is or should be beholden to no one but its own professional standards,
which include “informing the public on matters of public importance.” We are not
far from The New York Times’ professed motto “All the news that is fit to print.”
In such a vision, truth is conceptually separate from “facts” for simply “pub-
lishing whatever facts one has most easily at hand” will not do. This seems to me
quite right. But Elkins and others usually continue the argument in a manner I
find wrong. It is said that the press needs to report those facts that “conduce
towards reasoned public understanding, deliberation, and judgment.” And here I
have a number of problems or questions.
In the first place, what is “the press”? One of the consequences of transformations
in the technologies of communication is that there are multiple presses and sources.
Anyone caring to seek out the kinds of facts that a person might think relevant to
furthering discourse could have done so. The problem is the proliferation of media
sources such that everything is reported in one place or another. In the United States,
for most liberals this is The New York Times, it would seem, or National Public Radio:
one should read the economist Paul Krugman (which I do avidly). On my cable
network, however, I count at least 20 different news sources, including Chinese TV,
Al Jazeera, Fox News, BBC, etc. It is not that the news that a liberal might want is
not available but that there is, as it were, too much of it. The very proliferation of
sources is fragmenting – at one point (until say the late 1960s), everyone listened to
more or less the same popular music because there were relatively few stations. Today
the FM band (and now a fortiori with broadcast systems like Sirius Satellite, Spotify)
has something for every taste and can in no way contribute to the forming of
common tastes. What used to bring people together into a few complex and not-
coherent groups with multiple and only partially overlapping values now divides
people. People can go to what they know rather than have what they do not know
come to them. The proliferation of media sources is also a proliferation of what is
designated as fact. And any claim to fact is, for the sake of fairness, entitled to its 15
minutes of prime time.
Secondly, the particular medium of television is important. At least two thirds of
Americans get most of their news from TV and over half get all their news that
way. Particularly here, the medium exists in an economic system that demands
profit and profit is gained by increasing the number of listeners. Two solutions to
this demand are prevalent: the first is a reliance on voyeurism, epitomized as “if it
bleeds, it leads.” The second is more insidious: the cutting down of the attention
time needed for any issue, such that something new is always appearing. Dan
Hallin18 has shown that the average length of a clip in which the president spoke
on national news shows went between the 1960s and the 1980s from close to two
minutes a night to around 18 seconds. American half-hour evening news pro-
grams did not start until 1963. And it is in that context that everything is shorter.
This is not an argument that more time leads to truth, but that less time does not
lead to thought.
18 Hallin is a member of the UCSD Department of Communication.
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A third issue exacerbates these tendencies. Coast to coast live television was not
possible before 1951 and not standard until the 1960s, but now almost all
broadcasts from chains with the resources to have extensive staff are national. This
means that their broadcasts are now oriented towards no audience in particular,
and must try to offend the least number of viewers possible. As a result almost no
political news that is politically relevant locally gets broadcast. John Gaventa, then
of the Highlander Center, found that two different communities of miners in two
different Tennessee valleys both got their news from Nashville and had no
knowledge of the similarity of their problems. The consequence of the second and
third factors is that very few people have access to issues that affect them directly.
It is thus not enough to call for deliberation. As Lynn Sanders points out:
“Deliberation is a request for a certain kind of talk: rational, contained, and
oriented towards a shared problem”.19 In the first place, these issues are partisan
issues – it would be personally wrong – I would harm myself were I – to agree
with, or acknowledge the possibly at least partial correctness of, some of those
who hold positions different from mine. In the second, the media technology and
the structure of the communication industry mitigate against the provision of
supposedly necessary information and will continue to do so. Thirdly, “delibera-
tion” is in any case not precisely what is needed. What is need is the formation of
groups of people sharing overlapping sets of problems, the solution to any one of
which is not compatible with the solution to some other, such that they realize
they are not alone – partisanship formed from the need to accept contradictions.
In 1967, while I was canvassing about the Vietnam War, I found that in house-
hold after household, on the same street, I would be told, “Well, I am against the
war, but no one else here is.” Michael Schudson, in his Discovering the News
(1978), argues that the highly partisan Penny Press of the end of the eighteenth
century was essential to the development of a politically democratic (and market
oriented) society. I have some sympathy with Speaker of the House of Repre-
sentatives Joseph Cannon’s pronouncement that in the days before the idea that
the press should be independent:
men representing papers in sympathy with the party in power were alert to
present the record their party was making so that the people would know its
accomplishments, and those representing the opposition party were eager to
expose any failures on the part of the Administration.
When this gave way to “independent” journalism as an ideal (and hence to the
development of a professional class), Cannon continued, “The cut of a Congress-
man’s whiskers or his clothes is a better subject for a human interest story than
what he says in debate.” (This from Cannon’s autobiography of 1925, Uncle Joe
Cannon.) The helplessness of the would-be “independent” media in the face of
the present administration’s planting of stories (which are then quoted as factual
news by the planter on Meet the Press), the practice of hiring supposed reporters to
19 Lynn Sanders “Against Deliberation,” Political Theory, June 1997, p. 370.
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ask soft-ball questions, the development of media channels dedicated to a parti-
cular ideological point of view – why are these sources so popular? (The O’Reilly
Factor on Fox has been the top “news” show). All of these practices are such that
the solution is not going to come from dedication either to producing more
deliberation or to “the truth.” Schudson again: “When a news story is written so
that the readers do not know whether to cheer or boo, this represses emotional
identification with political issues, persons and parties.”20
For me, the problem lies as much in the fact that the role of institutionalized
groups formed by partially overlapping consensuses (we used to call them political
parties) has been greatly attenuated over the last 50 years – you have only to look
at the 11 candidates for the recent Presidency election in France, each with their
new “Party” – and that this is encouraged by the idea of an “independent” press.
A political party lays “claim to the whole individual and the partisan act by
requiring a consolidation of reference groups, a decision as to which loyalties the
individual values most.”21
Informed deliberation is not the way most people make decisions, nor should it
be. I do not by and large go out to gather all possible information, examine all
sides of the issues and debate them: and I have a lot more disposable time and
more education than do most people. Instead I make decisions based on what the
people I trust and work with decide to do. This is not always true and it was in the
past more true than in it is now. If I bowl alone it is not just that I lack social
capital: I lack the opportunity to share political feelings and judgments.22
I find myself, however, in partial disagreement with any reference to “the
community” finally having to decide whether to “teach the science of human ori-
gins at all” (p.32). Elkins immediate reifies “the community” (as “it”) and indi-
cates that if “it” decides to teach evolution, it must do so scientifically (and not in
any of the religious or pseudo-scientific frameworks that now proliferate). As I
read him, Elkins wants to deal with the issue by raising the question of the “var-
ious kinds of truth claims” and indicate that some of them are not the kind “with
which a pluralistic-agonistic political ideal is concerned.”
Let me take up here these questions. First, I am simply in the dark about what
pre-existing entity “the” community refers to. I should have thought that estab-
lishing communities (in the plural) was the problem. Second, much more attention
has to be given to the rather casual claim that if evolution is taught it must be
taught “scientifically.” That idea needs to be taken apart (that is what we call
deconstruction). What does this entail? In a recent film, The March of the Pen-
guins, we are astonished by the fact that Emperor penguins each year undertake in
the Antarctic winter to march together 70 miles to the same brooding area; after
conception and delivery of the egg, the females march back the 70 miles to get
20 Michael Schudson, “In All Fairness. Definitions of fair journalism have changed over
the last two centuries.” Media Studies Journal, Spring/Summer, 1998, 40.
21 Cited from Wilson Carey McWilliams, The Idea of Fraternity in America (Berkeley and
Los Angeles. University of California Press, 1973), 71.
22 See Christopher Beem, The Necessity of Politics. Reclaiming American Public Life
(Chicago. University of Chicago Press, 1999).
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food, returning two months or so later to the spot where the foodless males are
taking care of the eggs (through the Antarctic winter!). Why do they do this? We
(scientifically) ascribe their ability to do this to “instinct.” “Instinct,” however, is
simply a word for the fact that we have no idea how the penguins manage to
accomplish this feat, let alone of why they do it. Note that to ascribe their beha-
vior to traits acquired during “evolution” is similarly to cover over the fact of not
knowing how or why. “Instinct” and “evolution” are in fact terms we use to avoid
saying that we don’t know. Since we “know” – science tells us – that animals do
not get together and form a plan, give each other reasons, organize themselves
coherently, they must make these treks because of “instinct,” an empty suitcase of
a word. (And here recent work on animals raises all sorts of fundamental ques-
tions.) Likewise with intelligent design: we “know” that it is a crock scientifically.
What this in fact means, however, is that we have an account that humans could
have evolved into what we see without that account requiring that there be a
Creator (or a designer). But logically speaking, the fact that we can give an
account that does not need a Creator does not mean that there is none, unless we
take Ockham’s razor to be the foundation of all thought (in which case an ana-
logous argument would apply). I am not saying there is a creator, nor do I believe
there is or was one: I am simply pointing to the fact that the claim that there is not
one is part of the assumptions of evolutionary science as we know it. Not needing a
factor is insufficient: LaPlace’s response to Napoleon will not do.
And this involves some intellectual problems. In the Timaeus, Plato proposes an
account of the origins of human beings, a model of an ideal city, and a cosmolo-
gical account of the universe. “Pre-scientific myth,” one tends to conclude. Yet
have convincingly argued that the Timaeus operates on an axiomatically based
scientific model, “in the strong contemporary sense.”23 Plato even allows
(Timaeus 54–55) that anyone who could propose another model that fits the facts
better would have a better theory. The authors conclude generally that if a theo-
rem contains more information than is to be found in the set of axioms of the
system of which it is a part, that the theorem is therefore formally undecidable.
This holds as true for Plato in the Timaeus as it does for modern Big Bang and
other theories (including that of evolution). And I won’t even raise the question
of string theory. This is a necessary quality of all claims to knowledge: the world will
always be more than we can make of it. To hold any theorem about the world
therefore requires the acceptance of some assumptions that are not logically com-
pelled. This is one of the reasons that science is not only never fixed but cannot
be. The Stanford anthropologist Tanya Luhrman, in When God Talks Back 24, has
shown that evangelical Christians have a highly developed discourse of verification
of claims about God talking to one, and the claims one might be entitled to make.
23 L. Brisson and F. Walter Meyerstein, Inventing the Universe: Plato’s Timaeus, the Big
Bang, and the Problem of Scientific Knowledge (Albany, NY. SUNY Press, 1999), 18.
24 T. Luhrmann, When God Talks Back (New York. Vintage Reprint, 2012).
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11.1 Third question: Is science (just) about truth? Is there not (also?)
a lot more?
Doing science means participating in a pre-existing and changing community of
discourse. As Wilfred Sellars argued, in any inquiry, one is required to:
think thoughts of the form ‘We (one) shall do (or abstain from doing) actions
of the kind A in circumstances of kind C.’ To think thoughts of this kind is
not to classify nor to explain but to rehearse an intention. 25
Thomas Kuhn argues that science holds as values (not as rules), “accuracy, scope,
fruitfulness and simplicity.” And it is not always obvious which approach is “more”
fruitful, “more” accurate and so forth, nor what to do when these values conflict,
as they often do.26 That the earth rotates on itself rather than is rotated around
may become a more fruitful understanding but for some time it left up in the air
the question of why objects fall in a straight line. (See on related issues Ludwig
Fleck, The Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact (1979).) We are
approaching Nietzsche’s complexity here. Even someone as supposedly committed
to the fact-value distinction as Max Weber knew that all thought must operate on
necessarily unquestioned presuppositions. He writes: “Kant’s epistemology …
proceeded from the assumption that ‘scientific truth exists and it is valid’ and then
went on to in quire what intellectual assumptions are required for this to be
(meaningfully) possible.”27 Note what he calls “an assumption.”
We should be under an obligation to reconstruct axiomatically any theory we
have of the world. That those axioms exclude certain other ones is true: but they
do not disprove them. This is why Nietzsche referred to science as the newest form
of the “ascetic ideal.” Suppose one asked a fundamentalist Christian what he or
she saw if and when he or she looked at modern science. I suspect they would see
something like that first part of my earlier citation from Bryan (the part I claimed
the audience considered here also agreed to).28 And here they would also be the
inheritors of Nietzsche’s claim that after the death of God humankind will see
wars the like of which have never been seen before. Science, it would appear, is
about conquest (as Bacon saw, scientific knowledge is power). This is part of the
axiomatic structure of science. It is also true that science gives us flush toilets, the
Airbus A380 and safety razors. Whether or not one can have one without the
other is, to me, not an obvious matter.
25 Wilfred Sellars, Science, Perception and Reality (London. Routledge and Keagan Paul,
1963), 42.
26 Thomas Kuhn, “Reflections on my Critics,” in I Lakatos and Musgrave, Criticism and
the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge. Cambridge University Press, 1970), 262.
27 Max Weber, “Science as a Vocation,” The Vocation lectures, Owen and Strong (eds)
(Hackett, 2004), 28–29.
28 On the centrally important question of how to speak with such groups, see Romand
Coles, Beyond Gated Politics: Reflections for the Possibility of Democracy (Minneapolis,
MN. University of Minnesota Press, 2005) and Luhrmann, op. cit.).
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Let me take now the claim that much in our world displays a “contempt for the
truth” – or simply ignores it. There are four possible forms of contempt here. The
first is a kind of Platonic “noble lie” – the fact that someone – often with power –
feels that something not being true is less important than the good that it allows.
The second is something like what Adorno said in Minima Moralia about the
Germans, that they never tell a lie that they don’t believe to be true. A third is that
one just does not care.
Let me expand just a bit: There are three possibilities and they need to be dis-
tinguished. First would be that those in power simply do not need to care for
truth when it is a matter of power and conflict. This is the stuff of empires. “Of
the gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a necessary law of their nature
they rule wherever they can,” say the Athenians to the Melians, and they go on to
indicate that such has always been and always will be the law for those with power.
Second is the attitude that actions should appear as founded in and on truth.
Here it is politically useful that people at least believe that the government is tell-
ing the truth when it gives reasons for its actions. This raises the question of the
relation between truth and the appearance of truth. This is a kind of debasing of
Platonism or of Edmund Burke’s “politics well-wrought veil.” It is also dangerous
in that after a while, as Nietzsche pointed out, when something is repeated long
enough, you yield to it.
Third, there is the question of what the actors themselves believe. It is con-
ceivable (and I indeed think it the case) that Bush/Cheney/Rumsfeld and now
Trump, Bannon, Kushner actually believe that they are bringing or trying to bring if
not social justice to those who have been pushed aside by the tyranny of Saddam
Hussein or now by neo-liberalism, then at least “greatness” to a realm in which it
had supposedly been notably lacking under the previous regime. They are not
cynical but serious. Here the problem is not so much a contempt for the truth such
as the fact that claims to truth are not necessarily checked by the world. I should
note here that some years ago a lot of people who complained about the apparently
non-moral Realpolitik of Henry Kissinger suddenly then found themselves com-
plaining about the apparently moral aims (bringing democracy to Iraq) of the Bush
administration. (“There’s a higher Father that I appeal to,” answered Bush when
queried by Bob Woodward about what his father thought of his policies.)29 Should
an American not want for the administration to do what will make his or her
country great again – especially if your experience of the last 20 years has not been
great? Should one not want to bring democracy to Iraq?
The answer is that, given what I have said, these are the wrong questions, and
cannot be posed until other issues are dealt with. I think then that the concern
with lies whether they be Platonic, or Adornoesque, and thus with “truth” is the
wrong approach to our situation. I have given some reasons to doubt about the
actuality of “truth,” certainly as it pertains to the socio-political world, although I
would argue it also pertains to the “scientific” one – and gave some reasons for
29 Cited from Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York. Simon and Schuster, 2004),
421.
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that also. It is not clear that the “truth will set you free” as the old civil rights song
had it – a song I sang in a company of those who firmly believed it.
Now the most important truth-claims formulated in speech for politics are
factual truths – they are synthetic, I think a posteriori, and, most impor-
tantly, they can be and are talked about – thus they have the quality of never
being compelling but of always being contingent: they can always be called
into question. Therefore, the case is not that the truth will set you free but
that it is only in and by allowing ourselves to be subject to the compulsions
of our freedom to speak as we must that we can save what could be called
truth. But what does this freedom involve? First, it means acknowledging and
accepting the claim that freedom makes on us. At least one of the things that
Rousseau meant by “forced to be free” was that freedom had the quality of
compulsion.30 Freedom requires of us that the path we take be our own
path – dein eigenes Weg, as Kant put it. The central question here is what is
meant by “own.” We can, of course, always refuse this compulsion and most
often we do so, as Theodor Adorno, Erich Fromm and others have shown.
Second, knowing the truth is in any case not the problem. It is rather, I
borrow a term from Stanley Cavell, “acknowledging it.” What does this mean?
Picture: You are late. You know you are late. I know you are late. I know you
know you are late. You know I know you know you are late – this is the third
man problem in philosophy. Such knowledge is not enough. You have to do
something specifically appropriate to the particular situation – in this case likely
say something like: “I am sorry I was late, I …” and fill in an appropriate
excuse (your child was sick; the car broke down; there was an accident on the
highway; but probably not “I was having too much fun in bed”). When Trump
says something false it is not that he does not know that it is false that matters,
but that he does not, perhaps cannot, acknowledge it. And to not acknowl-
edge it is to be missing something about himself much more than it is an
attempt to deceive.
What is he missing? And this understanding has, for me, the consequence of
making our political situation even more perilous than one might have thought.
The problem is not that the administration lies; the problem is not that people do
not or cannot deliberate. The problem is rather that the administration lacks any
sense of responsibility to that human capacity that can make discourse public. And
to lack that responsibility is to be a tyrant.
In what does tyranny consist? In the Persian Letters, Montesquieu argued
that it consists in requiring that others have no existence for oneself except
that which one allows them. This seems to me exactly right. What is missing in
Trump et al. is an acknowledgement that there are those who, still to some
shrinking degree, think that they (the administration) are of the same com-
munity as he. (I lack this sense increasingly: I note with political distress that
30 See Steven Affeldt, “The Force of Freedom: Rousseau on Forcing to be Free,” Political
Theory (June, 1999) and Tracy Strong, Jean Jacques Rousseau and the Politics of the
Ordinary, second edition (Lanham, CT. Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), 299–333.
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when Trump comes on the TV, I turn to the World Poker Tour.) It is not
simply a matter of knowing (all there might be to know) something about
citizens, but acknowledging (by the administration) what the administration
does and did know. Cavell again:
Acknowledgment goes beyond knowledge not in the order, or as a feat, of
cognition, but I the call upon me to express the knowledge at its core, to
recognize what I know, to do something in the light of it, apart from which
this knowledge remains without expression, hence perhaps without posses-
sion. Acknowledgment of the other calls for recognition of the other’s specific
relation to oneself, and that this entails the revelation of oneself as having
denied or distorted that relationship.31
The key word is specific – there is no universal quality. To allow the other a
voice is to recognize something about one’s relation to the other – that there
is the relation of being human – and to recognize one’s constant temptation
to deny that relation. My existence as human depends on theirs and this in
turn on the acknowledgment that no one’s soul or self or body is his or her
own.
11.2 Last question: What have we lost with this administration? What
have they lost?
There is a fourth possibility, to which I have some more sympathy but about
which I am not completely clear. It occurs at the end of John Ford’s great
account of the price one pays for civilization, for commonalty, the price of the
valence of liberty. I refer of course to The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance.
Briefly: a frontier town. Two men are outside of or beyond the law: one a
good man, John Wayne; the other a vicious brute, Lee Marvin. To the town
comes an Eastern lawyer, Jimmy Stewart. Stewart, who is incompetent with a
gun nevertheless, gets himself into a gun battle with Marvin. Unbeknown to
any except Stewart, Marvin is shot by a hidden Wayne (Wayne and Stewart are
both in love with the same woman). Stewart is greeted as a hero, marries the
woman, eventually elected governor, then Senator, then ambassador to the
UK. At Wayne’s death many years later, he and his wife come back to the
town for the funeral. Stewart is interviewed by the paper and tells the story of
what actually happened the night Liberty Valence was killed. At the end of the
account, the editor tears up his notes; a young reporter says “aren’t you going
to print that?” The editor turns to him and us: “This is the West, young man.
When the legend becomes fact, print the legend.” Legends do become facts:
my country is now facing competing legends, or more accurately one side has
a legend and the other may be searching for one. Hence what will be facts is
necessarily politics. Or, in the words of Kurt Vonnegut at the end of the
31 Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason (Oxford. Clarendon Press, 1979), 428.
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introduction to his novel Mother Night, “You are what you pretend to be;
therefore be careful about what you pretend.”32
I hope that with this the import of my epigraphs has become clear:
For, dear me, why abandon belief
Merely because it ceases to be true.
Cling to it long enough, and not a doubt
It will turn true again, for so it goes.
Most of the change we think we see in life
Is due to truths being in and out of favor.
Robert Frost, “The Black Cottage”
Hamm: Did you ever think one thing? Clov: Never.
Samuel Beckett, Endgame
Frost’s poem appears to be relativistic or even conservative but it is in fact a version of
the last thesis on Feuerbach: “All previous philosophy has merely interpreted the world.
The problem, however, is to change it”33 – this is not a call to the barricades but a claim
that our epistemological and philosophical problems derive from the form of life that
we live. Thus also, Wittgenstein in Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics:
The sickness of a time is cured by an alteration in the mode of life of human
beings, and it was possible for the sickness of philosophical problems to get
cured only through a changed mode of thought (Denkweise) and mode of life,
not through a medicine invented by an individual.34
Beckett tells us that no thought is an island, apart from a main. And hence the
truth is a misnomer. To sum up: I have at the start adduced a citation from
Nietzsche about positivism and his resistance to it: what this entails, we can, I
think, now see better.
What follows from this is challenging. I return to my promissory note about posi-
tivism. Central to positivism had been three claims. The first was that there was a
clear-cut conceptual separation between facts and values and that, in consequence,
values were subjective, not of the world, and could and should be kept apart from
one’s analysis of social reality. This was not a denial that values were “important” but
it was a denial that values were objects of knowledge.35 I have denied this.
32 Kurt Vonnegut, Mother Night (New York. Delta Reissue, 1998), vi.
33 Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, XI. Marx-Engels Selected Works (Moscow. Progress
Publishers, 1969), 15.
34 Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, (57 – translation modified).
35 See James Conant, “Must We Show What We Cannot Say” in Paul Guyer and Hilary
Putnam, eds. The Senses of Stanley Cavell (Bucknell, PA. Bucknell University Press,
1998), esp 252–253.
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The second claim was parent to the first. It was a claim that propositions about
the world could and should be made to speak for themselves – thus that proposi-
tions about the world should have a validity independent of he or she who
advanced them. One could and should clearly separate the speaker from the
spoken, for if one did one’s work right not just empirical claims about the
world but concepts themselves would stand independently of the speaker. In
its simplest form, the claim was that a statement like “mass equals force times
acceleration” was true independently of who said it and of when, where and of
what it was said. I have denied this also.
The third claim derived from the first two. It held that certain forms of
discourse (claims to knowledge) were responsible and responsive to the real
world in ways that other forms (one might think of them as emotive, or
expressive) were not.36 In the first form honesty towards the world required
something of the thinker; in the second anything (apparently) went. IT fol-
lowed form this that should a statement about the world not be “true,” over
time the world would provide the means of rejecting it. I have denied this
separation.
What does it commit me to? These rejections commit me to the position
that the validity of a statement – its truth value – depends first of all on
who is making it to whom. The first judgment should be about the soul,
only then about what is claimed as fact. This is gnomic: perhaps too much. It
is, however, much like what Wittgenstein noted down in 1931:
It seems to me that the story of Peter Schlemihl should read like this: He
makes his soul over to the devil for money. Then he repents it and the Devil
demands his shadow for ransom. But Peter Schlemihl still has a choice
between giving the Devil his soul, or sacrificing, along with his soul, life in
community with other humans.37
Like Huck Finn, we must choose life and community and accept that this may entail
going to hell. Why does the devil demand the shadow? In King Lear (Act I, sc 4), Lear
36 See the discussion in Stanley Cavell, Themes Out of School (Chicago. University of
Chicago Press, 1984), 36.
37 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value (Chicago. University of Chicago Press,
1980), 14. LW changes the story. In the story, Schlemihl sells his shadow to the Devil
for a bottomless wallet (the gold sack of Fortunatus), only to find that a man without a
shadow is shunned by human societies. The woman he loves rejects him, and he him-
self becomes involved in guilt. Yet when the devil wants to return his shadow to him in
exchange for his soul, Schlemihl, as the friend of God, rejects the proposal and throws
away the bottomless wallet besides. He seeks refuge in nature and travels about the
world in scientific exploration, with the aid of seven-league boots. When overtaken
with sickness, he is reconciled with his fellow men who take care of him, and in regard
for his sickness do not look for his shadow. Finally, however, he returns to his studies
of nature and finds his deepest satisfaction in communion with nature and his own
better self.
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asks “who is it who can tell me what I am?”The Fool answers: “Lear’s shadow.”Rather
than take “shadow” to be what Lear is, we might also read this passage as telling us that
it is our shadow that can tell us who we are. For only bodies have shadows. What might
we lose if we lose our shadow, what may we have already lost? Our shadow, our soul,
our body, our self? No wonder we flail at the insubstantial.
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12 The post-truth in painting
Enrico Terrone
Experience-based theories of depiction (e.g. Wollheim 1980, Hopkins 1998), just
as recognitional theories (e.g. Schier 1986, Lopes 1996), rest upon two pillars.
The first one is seeing-in broadly understood, that is, the visual experience of what
is depicted that a picture elicits from a suitable viewer. The second one is the
standard of correctness, that is, the norm that seeing-in should abide by in order
to count as an appropriate experience of what is depicted. While seeing-in is eli-
cited by the picture’s appearance, the standard of correctness is established by the
picture’s history.
Surely, much more theoretical effort has been devoted so far to figure out
seeing-in rather than the standard of correctness. The latter has been discussed
almost exclusively with respect to the distinction between intentions and causal
mechanisms involved in the production of a picture. In this respect, there is a
significant consensus among scholars on the fact that the maker’s intentions nor-
mally fix the standard of correctness in the case of handmade pictures while causal
mechanisms normally do so in the case of photographs (cf. Newall 2011). How-
ever, some scholars have pointed out the relevance of intentions to the standard of
correctness of photographs (cf. Hopkins 1998) while others have emphasized the
relevance of causal mechanisms to the standard of correctness of handmade pic-
tures (cf. Lopes 1996).
In this chapter I argue that there is a distinction that is more essential to the
standard of correctness than that between standards fixed by intentions and stan-
dards fixed by causal mechanisms. The former distinction, indeed, does not con-
cern what fixes the standard but what the standard itself does. In this respect,
there are three different ways in which the standard of correctness can be con-
ceived, namely, with respect to kinds, individuals, and standpoints. I will call them
kind-standard, individual-standard, and standpoint-standard. In sections 12.1–
12.2, I will analyze the role that each of them plays in our relationship to pictures.
I will argue that the kind-standard and the individual-standard can be relevant also
to ordinary perception, whereas the standpoint-standard is specific to the pictorial
experience. In section 12.3, I will illustrate my account of the standard of cor-
rectness by examining a famous controversy on Van Gogh’s painting “Shoes”
(1886). Then, in sections 12.4–12.6, I will propose an ontology of depiction
according to which a picture is constituted by both its visual appearance and its
standard of correctness. Finally, in section 12.7, I will explore the consequences of this
ontological account for what concerns the relationship between pictures and post-truth.
12.1 The kind-standard and the individual-standard
The notion of a standard of correctness has been introduced by Richard Wollheim
in his essay “Seeing-as, seeing-in, and pictorial representation”, included in the
second edition of his book Art and its Objects (Wollheim 1980). Wollheim states
that the visual experience elicited by a picture, namely seeing-in, is necessary but
not sufficient for an appropriate appreciation of that picture. Even though seeing-
in puts significant constraints on what we can recognize in a picture, it only pro-
vides us with a visual appearance that might correspond to several things. For
instance, in face of Goya’s “El niño azul”, seeing-in allows us to exclude that the
object depicted is an eagle or an apple, but it does not allow us to establish whe-
ther this is a child or a doll. And even if we successfully guess that what is depicted
is a child and not a doll, we still need to establish who that child is.
Wollheim characterizes the standard of correctness as the norm that establishes
what is depicted by a picture among the things that one can see in it: “What the
standard does is to select the correct perception of a representation out of possible
perceptions of it” (Wollheim 1980, 137). This characterization by Wollheim
involves a commitment to some conceptual penetration of perception, so that a
grasping of the standard can change the perception of what is depicted. I think it
would be better to avoid this commitment. That is why, in what follows, I will opt
for a more neutral formulation: what the standard of correctness does is to select
the correct understanding of a representation out of possible understandings of it.
While seeing-in just provides us with some possible understandings of a picture,
the standard of correctness allows us to select the correct one out of them.
In order to exemplify the standard of correctness, Wollheim (1980, 138) con-
siders two cases:
The standard, it will be observed, applies both to representations of parti-
cular things and to the representations of things of a particular kind as the
following examples bring out. In a certain sixteenth-century engraving,
ascribed to a follower of Marcantonio, some art-historians have seen a dog
curled up asleep at the feet of a female saint. Closer attention to the sub-
ject, and to the print itself, will show the spectator that the animal is a
lamb. In Holbein’s famous portrait in three-quarters view (coll. Thyssen) I
normally see Henry VIII. However, I may have been going to too many
old movies recently, and I look at the portrait and, instead of seeing Henry
VIII, I now find myself seeing Charles Laughton. In each of these two
cases there is a standard which says that one of the perceptions is correct
and the other incorrect, this standard goes back to the intentions of the
unknown engraver or of Holbein, and, in so far as I set myself to look at
the representation as a representation, I must try to get my perception to
conform to this standard.
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From Wollheim’s perspective, the standard can establish both the kind and the
individuality of what one sees in a picture. In the case of the sixteenth-century
engraving, the standard establishes that what one sees in the picture belongs to the
kind “lamb”, not to the kind “dog”. In the case of Holbein’s portrait, the stan-
dard establishes that the individual one sees in the picture is Henry VIII, not
Charles Laughton. According to the terminology introduced earlier, the former is
a kind-standard whereas the latter is an individual-standard.
At this point, one might wonder whether any picture has both an individual-stan-
dard and a kind-standard for all the things depicted. This seems excessive. For many
pictures, the kind-standard seems to be sufficient. It would be awkward to state that an
appropriate experience of Renoir’s “Bal du moulin de la Galette” requires that one
knows the identity of all the persons depicted. In this case, recognizing them as
belonging to the kind human being seems to be enough. What matters in this case, as
suggested by the title, is rather the correct identification of the location in which the
scene depicted occurs. An appropriate understanding of this painting requires that one
treats that dance as occurring in Paris in the 1870s. Treating that dance as occurring,
say, in Naples in the 1830s would be compatible with the seeing-in experience elicited
by “Bal du moulin de la Galette” but not with its standard of correctness. This shows
that the standard of correctness can concern not only kinds and individuals, but also
places and times. In the following section, I will argue that the standard concerning
places and times is specific to the pictorial experience whereas the requirements on
kinds and individuals can also apply to ordinary perception.
12.2 The standpoint-standard
If I show you something saying “look at that”, your response can be assessed according
to something like a standard of correctness. Going back to Wollheim’s examples, if I
show you a lamb but you wrongly treat it as a dog, your response is inappropriate with
respect to a sort of kind-standard. Likewise, if I show you Roger Federer over there but
you mistake him for your friend Alan Smith, your response is inappropriate with respect
to a sort of individual-standard. In this sense, one can extend both the kind-standard
and the individual-standard from the domain of pictorial experience to that of ordinary
perception. Yet, with respect to place and time, there is a crucial difference between
ordinary perception and pictorial experience. In the case of ordinary perception, the
place of the scene seen is here, in front of us, and the time when it occurs is now, when
our very perception is occurring. By contrast, the pictorial experience, as such, does not
tell anything about the place in which and the time at which the scene depicted occurs.
In fact, ordinary perception warrants that the perspective from which we per-
ceive a certain scene is the standpoint that is currently occupied by our body.
Thus, ordinary perception automatically informs us about the place in which and
the time at which the scene perceived occurs, namely, here (i.e. where our body is)
and now (i.e. when our experience occurs). By contrast, in pictorial perception the
perspective from which we perceive a certain scene does not correspond to the
standpoint that is currently occupied by our body. Thus, pictorial perception, as
such, does not tell us anything about the place in which and the time at which the
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scene depicted occurs. In principle, we can locate the scene depicted at different
places and times. We need the standard of correctness in order to associate the
perspective from which we see the scene depicted to a certain standpoint having its
own spatiotemporal location. This is what I call the standpoint-standard, which
allows us to select the correct spatiotemporal location of the scene depicted out of
possible spatiotemporal locations of it.
There is a category of pictures for which the standpoint-standard is clearly cru-
cial. These are the pictures supplied by surveillance cameras and CCTV systems.
An appropriate perception of what is depicted by a surveillance camera requires
that one knows where the camera is placed, as well as whether it is recording now
or, if not, when it recorded the scene depicted.
In the pictorial perception provided by a surveillance camera, the kind-standard
and the individual-standard are as dispensable as they are in ordinary perception, in
which we can see something moving over there without knowing what it is. But
the standpoint-standard is indispensable. If one watches a surveillance camera
without abiding by its standpoint-standard, one surely is not having an appropriate
understanding of the scene depicted.
The standpoint-standard can play an important role not only in surveillance
cameras and CCTV systems, but also in other categories of pictures. For instance,
digital cameras now typically include metadata specifying when and where (viz.
date, time, longitude, latitude) a certain photograph was taken. In old analog
photographs, a similar role was often played by the title. Consider Cartier-Bres-
son’s photograph “Juvisy, France. 1938”. The standard of correctness of this
photograph does not require that we know who is the man sitting on the left, or
which kind of wine he is pouring in his glass, or which kind of food he has left in
his dish. Rather, what matters for an appropriate appreciation of this photograph
is the information provided by the title, which tells us that the standpoint from
which we see the scene depicted is at a certain location in Juvisy at a certain
moment in 1938. In fact, the standard of correctness of this photograph requires
that we see the scene depicted as what one could see from such a standpoint.
The same is true for many paintings. I have mentioned earlier Renoir’s “Bal du
moulin de la Galette” but one can easily find other examples. Consider for
instance Constable’s “Beaching a Boat, Brighton”. The title provides us with an
indication of the kind of event that we should see in the picture (viz. the beaching
of a boat) but it also specifies a place (viz. Brighton), which one can supplement
with a time if one considers the year in which the painting was made (viz. 1824).
Thus, an appropriate appreciation of “Beaching a Boat, Brighton” requires that
one associates the perspective from which one sees the scene depicted with a
standpoint located in Brighton in the 1820s.
So far I have characterized the standpoint-standard in terms of place and
time, but there is a third parameter that is worth considering, namely world. In
paintings such as “Bal du moulin de la Galette” or “Beaching a Boat,
Brighton”, let alone photographs such as “Juvisy, France. 1938”, the stand-
point is implicitly located in the actual world. Yet, there are pictures in which
the standpoint is located in a possible world which is different from the actual
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world. For instance, both Gericault’s “Le Radeau de la Méduse” and Bosch’s
“The Ship of Fools” depict people on a boat, but the standpoint-standard of
the former prescribes to locate the scene in the actual world whereas the
standpoint-standard of the latter prescribes to locate the scene in a possible
world. Just as it is crucial to a proper experience of “Le Radeau de la Méduse”
that one perceives the scene depicted as having its place in the actual world, it
is crucial to a proper experience of “The Ship of Fools” that one perceive the
scene depicted as having its place in a world created by Bosch’s outstanding
fantasy.
In the case of moving pictures such as films, the standpoint-standard is what
allows one to distinguish documentaries, which involve standpoints in the
actual world, from fiction movies, which involve standpoints in fictional worlds.
In principle, the pictorial experience does not tell one whether what is depicted
occurs in the actual world or in a fictional world. One needs the standpoint-
standard in order to draw this distinction. This is especially evident in the case
of mockumentaries such as Peter Greenaway’s The Falls (1980) or Peter Jack-
son’s Forgotten Silver (1995), i.e. fiction movies that disguise themselves as
documentaries in order to deceive a spectator who ignores their true stand-
point-standard.
Figure 12.1 Van Gogh’s “Shoes” (1886)
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12.3 Van Gogh’s shoes
As an illustration of disagreement concerning the standard of correctness, let us
focus on Van Gogh’s painting “Shoes” (1886). In his understanding of this
painting, philosopher Martin Heidegger applies a kind-standard to it, treating the
thing depicted as belonging to the kind “pair of peasant shoes”. He writes:
In van Gogh’s painting we cannot even tell where these shoes stand. There is
nothing surrounding this pair of peasant shoes in or to which they might
belong, only an undefined space. […] A pair of peasant shoes and nothing
more. And yet. From the dark opening of the worn insides of the shoes the
toilsome tread of the worker stands forth. In the stiffly solid heaviness of the
shoes there is the accumulated tenacity of her slow trudge through the far-
spreading and ever-uniform furrows of the field, swept by a raw wind.
(Heidegger 1964, 662–63)
Art historian Meyer Schapiro criticizes Heidegger’s understanding of the paint-
ing and proposes an alternative kind-standard, namely, “pair of city-dweller
shoes”. Schapiro relies on documents that show that Van Gogh was living in town
when he painted those shoes, thereby concluding that those should be city-dweller
shoes, not peasant shoes. He writes:
In reply to my question, Professor Heidegger has kindly written me that the
picture to which he referred is one that he saw in a show at Amsterdam in
March 1930. This is clearly de la Faille’s no. 255; there was also exhibited at
the same time a painting with three pairs of shoes […] But from neither of
these pictures, nor from any of the others, could one properly say that a
painting of shoes by van Gogh expresses the being or essence of a peasant
woman’s shoes and her relation to nature and work. They are the shoes of the
artist, by that time a man of the town and city.
(Schapiro 1968, 204)
Interestingly, Schapiro does not limit himself to propose an alternative kind-
standard, namely “city-dweller shoes” instead of “peasant shoes”. He also intro-
duces a sort of individual-standard, arguing that the shoes depicted belong to a
particular individual, namely Van Gogh himself. According to Shapiro, in order to
enjoy an appropriate appreciation of the painting we should treat the shoes
depicted as the shoes of the painter as a city-dweller.
In his book The Truth in Painting, philosopher Jacques Derrida criticizes Scha-
piro’s criticism of Heidegger, arguing that the fact that Van Gogh was living in town
when he made that painting does not entail that he depicted the shoes of a city-
dweller, let alone his own shoes. Even if Van Gogh was living in town, he might have
remembered or imagined some peasant shoes and painted them consequently.
Furthermore, Derrida puts into question the basic kind-standard that both
Shapiro and Heidegger presuppose, that is, the fact that the two shoes painted by
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Van Gogh constitute a pair. He writes: “For where do they both – I mean Scha-
piro on one side, Heidegger on the other – get their certainty that it’s a question
here of a pair of shoes?” (Derrida 1987, 261). In fact, if one carefully scrutinizes
the shapes of the shoes painted by Van Gogh, one can notice that they are quite
similar; in particular, they seem to be both left shoes. If this was right, the kind-
standard would state that what is depicted are two things both belonging to the
kind “left shoes”, not one thing belonging to the kind “pair of shoes”.
Derrida’s conclusion is that, lacking definitive pieces of evidence, we should
limit ourselves to apply the very general kind-standard “shoes” to this painting,
giving up any attempt to apply more specific kind-standards such as “pair of pea-
sant shoes” or “pair of city-dweller shoes”, let alone an individual-standard such as
“the shoes belonging to Van Gogh”. Therefore, he states: “Quite simply these
shoes do not belong, they are neither present nor absent, there are shoes, period”
(Derrida 1987, 274).
I argue that Derrida’s conclusion is too hasty. Even if we assume that he is right
in his criticism of Schapiro, we are not forced to reduce the standard of correctness
of this painting to the generic kind-standard “shoes”. On closer inspection, the
standpoint-standard keeps playing a role. An appropriate experience of the painting
requires that we see these shoes not simply as shoes, but as shoes located some-
where in Western Europe in the 1880s. These are not just “shoes, period”. Rather,
these are shoes that exist in a certain historical context on which the painting sup-
plies a peculiar standpoint. The fact that we cannot establish whether these shoes
constitute a pair, or whether they are peasant shoes or city-dweller shoes, or whe-
ther they belong to Van Gogh, does not prevent us from seeing them as shoes
belonging to the historical context in which they were painted. Indeed, even in
ordinary perception one might perceive two shoes from a certain standpoint with-
out being able to establish whether they constitute a pair or not, whether they are
peasant shoes or city-dweller shoes, and to whom they really belong.
12.4 Pictures as public artifacts
Even if one tries to minimize the role of the standard of correctness, as Derrida
does, one cannot give it up completely. In fact, Derrida’s conclusion on Van
Gogh’s painting: “there are shoes, period” still presupposes a kind-standard
according to which what one sees in this painting belongs to the kind “shoes”
and not, say, to the kind “toy shoes”. This suggests that the standard of cor-
rectness is not just a possible enrichment of a picture, but rather a constitutive
element of it. From this perspective, a picture is more than its visual appear-
ance. A picture is a pair constituted by both a visual appearance and a standard
of correctness.
Such an ontology of depiction allows us to explain why two pictures can share the
same visual appearance and yet be different pictures. They can do so in virtue of
having different standards of correctness. Consider for instance two pictures, PA and
PB, which portray two twins, A and B, in the same posture on the same background.
PA and PB are numerically distinct in spite of their having an identical appearance
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because the standard of correctness of PA states that the individual depicted is A
whereas the standard of correctness of PB states that the individual depicted is B.
Ultimately, we can conceive a picture as an artifact whose function consists in eli-
citing a specific experience from a suitable viewer. This specific experience is deter-
mined not only by the picture’s visual appearance, which elicits a certain seeing-in
state, but also by the standard of correctness, which selects the correct understanding
out of the possible understandings that are compatible with that seeing-in state. In
the example, PA and PB can elicit the same seeing-in state but their different standards
of correctness allow the viewer to select different correct understandings (viz. a
recognition of A and a recognition of B). Therefore, PA and PB are distinct particular
artifacts in virtue of having different standards of correctness.
Pictures, so understood, belong to the category that Amie Thomasson (2014, 47)
calls “public artifacts”: “While all artifacts are indeed mind dependent, public artifacts
do not depend merely on the individual intentions of their makers; they also depend
on public norms”. My point is that the public norm that governs the functioning of a
certain picture as a public artifact is its standard of correctness. The latter can derive,
and often actually derives, from the intentions of the maker of a certain picture, but
does not boil down to them. The standard of correctness is a norm, not an intention.
Depending on its standard of correctness, a picture can function in at least
three different ways. First, a picture that only has a kind-standard just provides
us with information about the features of a certain kind. The illustrations that
one can find in ornithology books are of this sort. Second, a picture that has
both a kind-standard and an individual-standard – but lacks a standpoint-stan-
dard – provides us with information about the features of a certain individual
regardless of the particular situations in which that individual might find her-
self. The photographs included in documents such as passports or identity
cards are of this sort. Third, a picture having not only a kind-standard and an
individual-standard but also a standpoint-standard provides us with information
about what is going on in a particular place at a particular time. The pictures
provided by surveillance cameras and CCTV systems are of this sort.
Even though some pictures may lack an individual-standard, the kind-standard
seems to remain an indispensable constituent of the vast majority of pictures.
Indeed, one finds it hard to conceive of a picture to which no kind-standard applies.
Maybe some works by painters such as Miro, Tanguy, Klee or Kandinski are of this
sort. We just see things with certain shapes and colors but we do not know what
kinds they belong to. Yet, in such cases, one might wonder if these pictures really
depict something, i.e. these really are pictures and not just mere images (i.e. mere
generators of seeing-in experiences). Thus, one is faced with two alternatives.
On the one hand, if one denies that these are pictures, these cannot count as
counterexamples to the claim that pictures essentially require a standard of cor-
rectness. On the other hand, if one treats these as pictures, one is at least com-
mitted to the claim that these provide us with a perspective on a world different
from ours, a world inhabited by individuals whose kinds we completely ignore. In
this case, such pictures have at least a standpoint-standard, which prescribes us to
treat what we see as occurring in a world that is different from our actual world.
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12.5 Where is the standard of correctness?
It is tempting to identify a picture with its visual appearance since the latter is all we see
when we look at a picture. Yet, we should resist this temptation since the fact that
something cannot be seen does not mean that it does not exist. If we conceive of
pictures as artifacts whose functions consist in eliciting an appropriate experience from
a suitable viewer, we should acknowledge that a picture is constituted not only by a
visible component, namely its visual appearance, but also by a hidden component,
namely its standard of correctness. Unlike the picture’s appearance, which has its place
in front of the viewer, the standard of correctness lacks a precise location in space (even
though it has a beginning in time). The ontological nature of the standard of cor-
rectness is not that of a visible thing. Rather, the standard of correctness is a sort of
norm that remains implicit in practice even though it can be made explicit by means of
texts such as titles, labels, catalogs, encyclopedia entries, works of art history, etc.
The standard of correctness is a norm that a cultural community implicitly
accepts – often through deference to some experts – and applies to a certain picture.
In principle, this norm is determined by the intentions of the maker of the picture or
by the causal mechanism that produced it, depending on whether the picture is
handmade or not. Yet, the standard of correctness that is actually in force for a pic-
ture – in a certain historical period, within a certain cultural community – depends on
the pieces of information possessed and by the attitudes adopted by the members of
that community. If detailed information about the intentions of the maker or the
circumstances of the relevant causal process is no longer available, the standard of
correctness is redefined by the members of the relevant community on the basis of
the pieces of evidence that are at their disposal.
What happens in such cases is the realistic version of a thought experiment
suggested by Michael Newall:
While intention does provide the standard of correctness for manugraphic pictures,
this is not a matter of logical necessity. We can, for instance, imagine a situation in
which manugraphic pictures operate according to a different standard of correct-
ness. Imagine a community in which painters put their images to a popular vote in
order to determine their meaning. Voters would be required to consider the var-
ious items that they find that each picture surface can occasion a visual experience
or recognition of, and then choose one of these and write its name on a ballot. The
picture’s subject matter is then the item with the most votes.
(Newall 2011, 4)
Newall treats this hypothesis as a merely theoretical conjecture, arguing that “To
do away with a standard of correctness based on intention would be to make pic-
tures much less useful to us. Understandably, this function is something that no
culture that makes use of images appears to have sacrificed” (Newall 2011, 4). Yet,
he seems to overlook that there are pictures for which reliable information on the
makers’ intentions (or on the circumstances of the relevant causal processes) is no
longer available, and yet we still want to provide these pictures with standards of
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correctness on the basis of the few pieces of evidence that we possess. In such cases,
we resort to some procedures of the sort imagined by Newall. Certainly, we do not
write our preferences on a ballot thereby establishing the standard of correctness by
selecting the kind or the individual or the standpoint with the most votes. However,
we rely on an implicit negotiation that proceeds along similar lines and pursuits the
same purpose. Alberto Voltolini makes a similar point when he writes:
Upon closer examination, we find that it is not the case that the aboutness of
an opaque picture in question is always settled by authorial intentions. Let us
consider the famous moai figures, found on Easter Island. We take them to be
statues representing the gods of the Polynesian community living on the
island before its discovery by the Europeans. Yet who knows? Maybe the
artists who sculpted the moai had altogether different intentions. […] Hence,
already in the case of opaque pictures, their intentional aboutness is a matter
of negotiation between their producers and their consumers.
(Voltolini 2015, 72)
As the outcome of a negotiation, the standard of correctness rests upon the atti-
tudes of the member of the relevant cultural community, as well as on the docu-
ments (catalogs, encyclopedia entries, works of art history, etc.) that have recorded
them. If such attitudes and documents change, the standard of correctness chan-
ges in turn. This is not surprising, if we acknowledge that the standard of cor-
rectness is a public norm, and public norms can change over time, just as juridical
laws do.
Ultimately, pictures, as public artifacts can change in both their components.
On the one hand, the appearance of a picture can change as a consequence of
changes of its material supports. On the other hand, the standard of correct-
ness can change as a consequence of changes in the information possessed and
in the attitudes adopted by the members of the relevant community. In prin-
ciple, the standard of correctness of a picture is easier to preserve than its visual
appearance, since the former can be easily recorded in written documents
whereas the latter may be embodied in delicate material objects such as painted
canvas. However, the fact that the standard of correctness is an invisible com-
ponent of a picture that usually remains implicit in practice can lead people to
take it for granted thereby overlooking the possibility of losing it as time goes
by. If this is right, a proper preservation of a picture should involve taking care
not only of its visual appearance but also of its standard of correctness. In this
sense, the art restorer and the art historian participate to the same enterprise,
namely, preserving a picture. While the restorer takes care of the visual
appearance of a picture, the historian takes care of its standard of correctness.
12.6 What good is the standard of correctness?
What holds true for preservation also applies to appreciation. As Nelson Goodman
(1968, 111–112) puts it:
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The aesthetic properties of a picture include not only those found by looking at
it but also those that determine how it is to be looked at. This rather obvious
fact would hardly have needed underlining but for the prevalence of the time-
honored Tingle-Immersion theory, which tells us that the proper behaviour on
encountering a work of art is to strip ourselves of all vestments of knowledge
and experience (since they might blunt the immediacy of our enjoyment), then
submerge ourselves completely and gauge the aesthetic potency of the work by
the intensity and duration of the resulting tingle. The theory is absurd on the
face of it and useless for dealing with any important problems of aesthetics; but
it has become part of the fabric of our common nonsense.
If one considers the behavior and listens to the comments of the visitors of a gal-
lery, one can notice that – half a century after the time when Goodman wrote these
lines – the “Tingle-Immersion theory” still has a significant quantity of followers. In
particular, it is quite common, when one visits an art gallery, to encounter visitors
who are limiting themselves to looking at paintings, without caring at all about the
standard of correctness. If what I have argued in this chapter is right, such visitors fail
in having an appropriate appreciation of the paintings they see. They use such artifacts
in the wrong way, that is, as mere generators of seeing-in states. The ignorance of the
standard of correctness prevents them from selecting the correct understanding of a
picture out of possible understandings of it. They misuse a picture by ignoring the
norm that governs its use, just like an incompetent driver would misuse a car. The
latter, of course, is much more dangerous than the former, but what is going on in
both cases is a misuse of a public artifact. The truth in painting, which was warranted
by the standard of correctness, gives way to the post-truth in painting.
The visitors of a gallery who misuse a picture are not necessarily responsible for their
ignorance. Sometime pictures are exhibited without some accompanying labels so that
a visitor who ignores the standard of correctness lacks an easy way to get it. Sometimes
the labels are there but the information they convey is too vague or too anecdotal to
lead one to grasp the standard of correctness. Something similar holds true for gallery
guides, who may succeed or fail in highlighting the standard of correctness of a picture
depending on the pieces of information with which they provide their followers.
More generally, the appropriate appreciation of a picture is a matter of educa-
tion. It is up to art courses in schools to promote the awareness that a picture is
constitute not only by its visual appearance but also by its standard of correctness,
and that a proper appreciation of a picture requires them both. In this sense, there
are two basic ways in which education can contribute to promote appropriate
practices of picture appreciation. First, an art teacher can directly teach her stu-
dents the standards of correctness of several masterpieces of art history. Second, an
art teacher can teach her students a method allowing them to acquire the relevant
pieces of information in order to figure out the standard of correctness of a certain
picture that they encounter for the first time. In carrying out these educative tasks,
art teachers rely on the outcomes of disciplines such as art history and art theory.
This leads us to stress the key role that art scholars play in the enforcement of
the standard of correctness. In fact, art historians and art theorists are among the
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epistemic authorities to whom we defer the researches and negotiations aimed at
establishing the standards of correctness of the pictures we live with. In particular,
we rely on art scholars in order to enjoy appropriate appreciations of paintings,
that is, in order to use them as “public artifacts”, in conformity with the functions
they should fulfill and with the norms that govern their use. If one considers, for
instance, a milestone of art history and art theory such as the work of Erwin
Panofsky – e.g. his essays Early Netherlandish Painting, Its Origins and Character
(Panofsky 1953), Meaning in the Visual Arts (Panofsky 1955), Renaissance and
Renascences in Western Art (Panofsky 1972) – one can acknowledge how these
disciplines can improve our understanding and appreciation of pictures by high-
lighting their standards of correctness. What Panofsky calls “iconography” is,
indeed, a systematic method for individuating the standard of correctness of spe-
cific classes of paintings.
10.7 Pictorial post-truth
The standard of correctness is crucial not only for a proper aesthetics appreciation
of paintings but also for a proper understanding of pictures in general. When the
connection between the visual appearance of a picture and its standard of cor-
rectness is broken, the former becomes a potential bearer of what I call “pictorial
post-truth”. This is a situation in which the picture’s appearance, split from the
corresponding standard of correctness, is no longer understood but rather
misunderstood.
Remember that what the standard does is, first of all, to compensate the epis-
temic limitations of pictorial perception with respect to ordinary perception. In the
latter we experience things in their context, whereas in the former we experience a
scene detached from its context. Thus, the standard allows us to somehow
reconstruct the missing context. When the standard is lacking, a misleading pur-
ported context can replace the true one. Here is where post-truth enters into the
picture.
In fact, digital technology significantly increases the repeatability of pictures. As
flagrantly shown by the web, in the global era pictures allow us to see almost any
place from any other place. Yet, with respect to pictures, repeatability is a double-
edged sword. It spreads a picture by exponentially increasing the number of its
instances but also risks to weaken the intelligibility of a picture because the more
the instances the more the difficulty to keep all of them in contact with the pic-
ture’s standard of correctness. At a certain point, the picture becomes a mere
visual appearance to which wrong interpretations can be attached. Let us consider
two paradigmatic cases.
The first one is a photograph of film director Steven Spielberg on the set of his film
Jurassic Park (https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2014/07/12/
steven-spielberg-triceratops-facebook-jurassic-park/12574887/). The standard of
correctness of this picture reveals what we see as a relax moment in the staging of a
fiction film. Yet, disentangled from its standard of correctness, this picture might
become the portrait of a hunter with his prey, thereby eliciting indignation from
166 Enrico Terrone
supporters of animal rights, or at least troublemakers purporting to do so, namely
trolls. The second example is a photograph of the Pink Floyd concert in Venice in
1989 (www.ilmessaggero.it/primopiano/cronaca/libia_concerto_pink_floyd_bufala
-3836132.html). This picture, severed from its standard of correctness, has recently
been diffused on social networks, in a spirit of racist propaganda, as a purported pic-
ture of migrants leaving Libya for Italy.
This is the way in which pictorial post-truth works. Firstly, the picture’s
appearance is detached from the picture’s standard of correctness. Then, the
standard of correctness is replaced by some misinformation. Finally, the picture is
interpreted according to such misinformation thereby becoming a carrier of post-
truth. In some cases pictorial post-truth can be fun, but in others it can contribute
to deteriorate civility. Therefore, taking care of the standard of correctness of pic-
tures is not only a matter of aesthetic appreciation; it has a significant impact also
on the social and political dimensions of our lives.
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